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Chapter 1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This thesis consists of three essays on the determinants of corporate bond yield spreads. 
Specifically, it focuses on (1) the impact of investor sentiment on the correlation between 
corporate bond yield spreads through the correlation between credit risk and liquidity, (2) the 
impact of consumer sentiment on issuers’ credit risk, and (3) the comovement of individual 
corporate bonds’ liquidity with market liquidity.1 
 
Several studies document the rise in corporate bond yield spreads during times of 
financial stress (e.g., Driessen, 2005; Friewald et al., 2012; Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012; Chun et 
al., 2014). For instance, the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, the 
downgrades of the General Motors Corporation and the Ford Motor Company to junk status 
in 2005, or the US subprime crisis in 2008 are examples of severe financial stress events that 
have highlighted the importance of credit risk, liquidity, and the influence of sentiment for the 
US corporate bond market. Corporate bonds’ simultaneously falling credit quality and 
liquidity lead to rising yield spreads, decreasing investors‘ portfolio values, and increasing 
issuers‘ financing costs. The overall impact likely has been reinforced through investors’ fear 
of even larger future losses leading to flight-to-quality behavior (e.g., Longstaff et al., 2005; 
Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012). This raises several questions: What are the risk factors affecting 
corporate bond yield spreads? What are the determinants of credit risk and liquidity, and how 
                                                                                                                                               
1 A corporate bond’s yield spread is defined as the difference between a bond’s yield and a benchmark risk-free 
rate. The yield spread compensates investors for bearing risks (e.g., Fisher, 1959; Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001); 
Longstaff et al., 2005; Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012). As such, credit risk describes the risk that the issuer of a bond 
may default or its default probability changes (e.g., Fisher, 1959; Merton, 1974). Liquidity has several 
meanings. This thesis focuses on bonds’ trading liquidity. Bonds are liquid, if they can be traded quickly and 
in large quantities without significant deviations from their fundamental value (e.g., Fisher, 1959; Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986). 
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do both affect corporate bond yield spreads? Does investor or consumer sentiment have an 
impact on corporate bond yield spreads? What determines diversification opportunities among 
corporate bonds? These questions are of vital interest for researchers, investors, issuers, and 
policy makers, especially when considering the growth in the outstanding amount of US 
corporate bonds. It steadily increased over the last two decades from 2 trillion USD in 1995 
to 8 trillion USD in 2015 accounting, on average, to more than 30% of the US stock market 
capitalization.2 In providing answers to these questions, this thesis contributes to the literature 
analyzing the determinants of corporate bond yield spreads. 
The academic literature on the determinants of corporate bond yield spreads can be 
broadly separated into three strands. The first strand of the literature analyzes the risk factors 
affecting corporate bond yield spreads. By corporate bonds’ nature of being debt capital, the 
issuers’ credit risk should be the main risk factor driving yield spreads (Merton, 1974). 
However, the literature documents that credit risk models are not able to fully explain 
empirically observed yield spreads.3 More precisely, the literature shows that corporate bond 
yield spreads have both a credit risk as well as a non-credit risk component with a large fraction 
of the latter being often attributed to liquidity.4 More recent research documents that also the 
correlation between credit risk and liquidity influences corporate bond yield spreads.5 This 
underlines the importance of understanding the determinants of corporate bond credit risk and 
liquidity. 
Hence, the second strand of the literature focuses on the analysis of issuers’ credit risk. 
For this purpose, the literature analyzes the determinants of credit ratings and credit default 
swap6 (CDS) premiums.7 By definition, credit ratings measure issuers’ credit risk and CDS 
                                                                                                                                               
2 See Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) (2016) and World Bank (2016). 
3 Examples of studies that document the existence of the so called “credit spread puzzle” are Collin-Dufresne et 
al. (2001), Elton et al. (2001), and Huang and Huang (2012). 
4 Examples of studies that document liquidity to be an important risk factor influencing corporate bond yield 
spreads are Longstaff et al. (2005), Nashikkar et al. (2011), Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), and Friewald et al. 
(2012). 
5 In this context, Longstaff et al. (2005) find a negative correlation between credit risk and liquidity premiums 
for corporate bonds while Ericsson and Renault (2006) motivate and document a positive correlation. Bühler 
and Trapp (2009), Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), and Friewald et al. (2012) find risk factor correlation to be 
positive. For stocks, Rösch and Kaserer (2013) document a positive relation between credit risk and liquidity. 
6 A credit default swap is a credit derivative designed as an insurance contract whose payoff is linked to the credit 
risk of an underlying reference bond or issuer. 
7 The determinants of credit ratings are analyzed by, e.g., Pottier and Sommer (1999), Jorion et al. (2005); Güttler 
and Wahrenburg (2007), Cheng and Neamtiu (2009), Becker and Milbourn (2011), and Jiang et al. (2012) who, 
for instance, document differences between the credit ratings of different agencies and an impact of credit rating 
market competition on rating quality. Among others, Ericsson et al. (2009), Zhang et al. (2009), Cao et al. 
(2010), Tang and Yan (2013), and Wang et al. (2013) analyze the determinants of CDS premiums and document 
that firm value information, either accounting-based or from the equity market, determines CDS premiums. 
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premiums reflect the market price of issuers’ credit risk (e.g., Hull et al., 2004; Norden and 
Weber, 2004). The literature documents that both are linked while CDS premiums are the 
more efficient credit risk measure summarizing firm value and credit rating information.8 
However, neither credit risk measured by CDS premiums, credit ratings, nor additional firm 
value information, can fully explain corporate bond yield spreads. This finally underlines the 
importance of the non-credit risk component in corporate bond yield spreads. 
Thus, the third strand of the literature focuses on the analysis of corporate bonds’ non-
credit risk component which has been mainly linked to liquidity. Given the over-the-counter 
(OTC) market structure of the corporate bond market, it is not possible to observe a limit order 
book as for centralized markets such as the New York Stock Exchange. Thus, measuring 
liquidity for corporate bonds is even more challenging. Therefore, on the one hand, this strand 
of the literature focuses on the measurement of corporate bond liquidity.9 On the other hand, 
it investigates the determinants of liquidity and its influence on corporate bond yield spreads.10 
 
The essays in this thesis contribute to the previous three strands of the literature on the 
determinants of corporate bond yield spreads. The first essay (Bethke et al., 2015) adds to the 
strand of the literature on the risk factors affecting corporate bond yield spreads by identifying 
an economic mechanism of investor sentiment driving the correlation between yield spreads 
through the correlation between credit risk and liquidity. While the risk factors affecting 
corporate bond yield spreads are already extensively studied, the literature on the correlation 
between yield spreads is scarce.11 This is surprising as correlations are crucial when managing 
                                                                                                                                               
8 In this context, e.g., Hull et al. (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004) provide evidence of the predictive power 
of CDS premiums for credit rating downgrades. Examples of studies showing that CDS lead corporate bonds 
are, e.g., Blanco et al. (2005), Forte and Peña (2009) , Norden and Weber (2009), and Coudert and Gex (2010). 
9 An overview of existing studies with respect to the used liquidity proxies is given by Friewald et al. (2012). 
Several studies exist that use bond characteristics as liquidity proxies, e.g., issuance volume, issuers’ industries, 
or trading activity variables such as trade volume or number of trades. Examples are, e.g., Collin-Dufresne et 
al. (2001), Houweling et al. (2005), Longstaff et al. (2005), and Friewald et al. (2012). In addition, several 
studies exist that develop liquidity proxies or apply liquidity proxies already used in studies for other asset 
classes. For instance, the Roll measure and the inter-quartile range are proxies for bid-ask spreads (e.g., Han 
and Zhou, 2007; Pu, 2009; Bao et al., 2011) while the Amihud measure proxies for the price impact of a trade 
(e.g., Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012; Friewald et al., 2012). 
10 Studies that analyze corporate bond liquidity are, among others, Alexander et al. (2000), Schultz (2001), 
Longstaff et al. (2005), Chacko et al. (2005), Houweling et al. (2005), Bessembinder et al. (2006), Edwards et 
al. (2007), Chen et al. (2007), Bao et al. (2011), Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), Friewald et al. (2012), Acharya et 
al. (2013), and Schestag et al. (2016). Overall, the studies show that liquidity influences corporate bond yield 
spreads and its magnitude varies over time and across bonds. 
11 Examples of studies that analyze correlations for other asset classes are, e.g., Ang and Chen (2002), Connolly 
et al. (2007), and Christiansen and Ranaldo (2009) for stocks, Abad et al. (2010), Piljak (2013), and Abad et 
al. (2014) for sovereign bonds, and Connolly et al. (2005), Baele et al. (2010), Bansal et al. (2014), and Nieto 
and Rodriguez (2015) between asset classes. 
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portfolios. Moreover, economic mechanisms known from the stock market are not easily 
transferable. This is because studies related to the stock market often document retail 
investors’ herding behavior to determine higher correlations in market downturns. However, 
this explanation is unlikely to apply for the corporate bond market due to a higher fraction of 
institutional investors who are less prone to herding behavior in market downturns (e.g., 
Kumar and Lee, 2006; Borensztein and Gelos, 2003). As a consequence, we develop a 
theoretical model that proposes an economic mechanism for bond correlations that takes two 
main effects of investor sentiment induced behavior into account. First, investors with low 
sentiment avoid risky assets (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Ben-Rephael et al., 2012; Da et 
al., 2015). Second, investors react more to negative information than to positive information 
(e.g., Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2012; Kaplanski and Levy, forthcoming). Thus, low 
sentiment makes investors less willing to invest in bonds with high credit risk and these bonds 
are less liquid than when sentiment is good due to investors’ stronger reactions. As a result of 
these two effects, liquidity premiums increase more with credit risk premiums when sentiment 
is low. This higher correlation between the two main corporate bond risk factors is consistent 
with investors’ flight-to-quality into safer assets, e.g., Treasury bonds or cash. Finally, high 
risk factor correlation translates into high correlation between corporate bond yield spreads. 
In particular, our model predicts that investors’ sentiment influences bond correlation through 
risk factor correlation. 
In our empirical analyses we focus on a sample of US corporate bond transaction data 
from October 2004 to September 2010. We first document that bond correlation varies heavily 
over time. Second, consistent with our model’s predictions, our main results confirm that the 
correlation between risk factors is high when investor sentiment is low and high risk factor 
correlation translates into high bond correlation. Investor sentiment has a significant indirect 
impact on bond correlation via risk factor correlation even after controlling for a possible 
direct impact of sentiment, herding behavior, and the state of the economy. 
Taken together, this essay documents the importance of risk factor correlation for 
corporate bond yield spreads. Our results are consistent with investor sentiment driving 
investors’ flight-to-quality behavior and thereby influencing corporate bond investors’ 
diversification opportunities. Thus, the findings of this essay are highly important for portfolio 
and risk managers. 
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Having shown that investor sentiment plays an important role in the corporate bond 
market, it is of further interest whether the sentiment of consumers, i.e. investors and all other 
individuals acting in an economy, also has an impact on corporate bond yield spreads. 
Consumer sentiment might influence corporate bond yield spreads through their credit risk 
component. This is because consumer sentiment drives economic output (e.g., Ludvigson, 
2004; Golinelli and Parigi, 2004; Gelper et al., 2007; Fornell et al., 2010). Thus, consumer 
sentiment should impact firms’ credit risk as firms’ economic success depends on the 
willingness to consume (e.g., Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Anderson et al., 2004). 
Adhering to this idea, in the second essay (Bethke and Gehde-Trapp, 2016) we add to 
the strand of the literature analyzing the determinants of credit risk by investigating whether 
aggregated volume of Google search queries possesses fundamental value for the CDS market. 
Today, Google is one of the major internet search engines.12 It is likely that individuals’ also 
use Google to gather information for their consumer decisions. Thereby they reveal their 
sentiment through their search queries (Demartini and Siersdorfer, 2010) which, in the end, 
influences their consumption. Consistent with this view, the aggregated volume of Google 
search queries contains consumption information before other financial variables or economic 
indicators (e.g., McLaren and Shanbhogue, 2011; Vosen and Schmidt, 2011; Choi and Varian, 
2012). However, it is still an open issue whether aggregated Google search volume contains 
fundamental information for capital markets (e.g., Da et al., 2011b; Da et al., 2015; Dimpfl 
and Jank, 2016). In this context, the CDS market is an ideal laboratory to further analyze this 
open issue. This is because only institutional investors are active in the CDS market which 
reduces the influence of uninformed noise trading (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; 
Boehmer and Kelley, 2009). In line with this view, the literature documents that information 
is priced efficiently (e.g., Norden and Weber, 2004; Acharya and Johnson, 2007). Finally, 
Tang and Yan (2010) show that monthly measured consumer sentiment is a determinant of 
CDS premiums while Google allows us to capture daily consumer sentiment before any other 
financial variable. If aggregated volume of Google search queries possesses fundamental value 
for the CDS market, we expect it to improve CDS premium change forecasts. If it even 
contains fundamental information not yet reflected in CDS premiums, we expect the Google 
indices to predict trends in CDS premium changes. 
                                                                                                                                               
12 Nearly 80% of US households had access to the internet and 64% of US citizens used Google for their internet 
searches in 2015 (e.g., eMarketer, 2016; Comscore, 2016). 
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Our analyses focus on the Markit CDX Investment Grade Index.13 Additionally, we 
use time series of aggregated volume of Google search queries from January 2004 to 
December 2013 for a large set of positive and negative connoted terms. These terms are used 
to compute two Google indices, one based on all positive and negative connoted terms and 
one based on positive and negative connoted economic terms. In line with the existing 
literature, we find the contemporaneous Google indices to positively determine CDS premium 
changes (e.g., Tang and Yan, 2010; Tang and Yan, 2013). We then document in-sample 
predictive power for both Google indices. However, the Google indices predict CDS premium 
change reversals. Thus, our results show that the Google indices contain no new fundamental 
information for the CDS market. Instead, the results are consistent with shocks in overall risk 
aversion temporarily influencing CDS premiums (e.g., Tetlock, 2007, Tang and Yan, 2010, 
and Tang and Yan, 2013). However, as indicated by the predictive power of both indices, 
analyzing Google search volume is valuable. In support of this result, we find that both Google 
indices improve out-of-sample forecasts especially in times when forecasts are more 
demanding. Overall, although both indices contain no new fundamental information, their in- 
and out-of-sample predictive power documents their fundamental value for the CDS market 
and its market participants. 
The first two essays look at different aspects of sentiment and its influence on credit 
markets. Thereby the first essay identifies investor sentiment to be a driver of flight-to-quality 
behavior which is related to decreasing corporate bond liquidity. In this context, the question 
arises which corporate bonds are most affected by sharp decreases of corporate bond market 
liquidity. 
For this reason, the third essay (Bethke, 2016) contributes to the strand of the literature 
that analyzes the determinants of corporate bond liquidity. While liquidity as a risk factor 
affecting individual corporate bond yield spreads has already been extensively analyzed, the 
literature on the comovement of individual bonds’ liquidity with market liquidity, 
commonality in liquidity, is scarce.14 This is surprising as commonality in liquidity influences 
investors’ opportunities to benefit from diversification (Domowitz et al., 2005). This is even 
more surprising given the size of the US corporate bond market and the fact that liquidity 
                                                                                                                                               
13 A CDS index is designed as a credit insurance contract whose payoff is linked to the credit risk of a basket of 
firms. 
14 Among others, Chordia et al. (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Huberman and Halka (2001), Kempf and 
Mayston (2008), and Karolyi et al. (2012) study commonality in liquidity among stocks, Chordia et al. (2005) 
between sovereign bonds and stocks, and Cao and Wei (2010), Marshall et al. (2013), and Frino et al. (2014) 
for derivative markets. 
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significantly dropped for all US corporate bonds during the financial crisis in 2008 (e.g., Dick-
Nielsen et al., 2012; Friewald et al., 2012). This suggests that the liquidity of individual 
corporate bonds depends on the overall market liquidity leading to commonality in liquidity. 
My empirical analyses base on a sample of US corporate bond transaction data from 
July 2002 to December 2012. First, I document that commonality in liquidity exists among 
US corporate bonds. Given this result, it is then essential to get a better understanding of the 
determinants of commonality in liquidity. The theoretical literature suggests comovement in 
liquidity supply and demand to determine the degree of commonality in liquidity.15 
For the cross-section of corporate bonds, my analyses reveal that the degree of 
commonality in liquidity is higher for bonds with an investment grade credit rating, with 
longer time to maturity, with higher amount outstanding, and for bonds issued by financial 
firms. In multivariate analyses that consider a broader set of possible bond, firm, and industry 
characteristics, I find support for supply- and demand-side effects both influencing individual 
bonds’ comovement with market liquidity. 
For the time series of market-wide commonality in liquidity, I document that it varies 
heavily over time and peaks in months with more financial stress events. As for the cross-
sectional results, I find supply- and demand-side effects to determine market-wide 
commonality in liquidity while the results provide evidence on supply-side effects, such as 
funding liquidity, being more important. In summary, my results contribute to the literature 
by providing a detailed picture of commonality in liquidity among corporate bonds. 
Overall, the three essays provide new insights into the determinants of corporate bond 
risk factors and their impact on corporate bond yield spreads. First, the correlation between 
corporate bonds is higher when sentiment is low. This effect arises through higher risk factor 
correlation which is consistent with investors’ flight-to-quality behavior. Thus, risk factor 
correlation is important to consider when pricing corporate bonds. Second, not only investor 
sentiment but also consumer sentiment measured by aggregated volume of Google search 
queries is important as it determines and forecasts CDS premium changes. The results are 
consistent with a temporary impact of overall risk aversion on CDS premiums and show that 
                                                                                                                                               
15 Regarding liquidity supply, higher inventory risk (e.g., Kyle and Xiong, 2001; Gromb and Vayanos, 2002), 
tighter risk management (Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2007), or lower funding liquidity (Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009) of liquidity suppliers may induce higher commonality in liquidity. Correlated demand for 
liquidity may arise through investors’ correlated selling activities arising through initial losses that raise the 
fear of even larger future losses (e.g., Bernardo and Welch, 2004; Morris and Shin, 2004), increased demand 
for more liquid assets (Vayanos, 2004), or preference for cheap information resulting in a common subset of 
information that is used to price different assets (Veldkamp, 2006). 
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Google search volume is valuable for forecasting CDS premium changes especially in times 
when forecasts are more demanding. Finally, this thesis documents that investors’ demand and 
supply for corporate bonds influences the relation of individual corporate bonds’ liquidity to 
market liquidity. In summary, the results are highly relevant for investors’ diversification 
benefits across corporate bonds, firms’ financing costs, and policy makers’ basis for decision-
making. 
 
   
 
Chapter 2* 
 
2. Investor Sentiment, Flight-to-Quality, 
and Corporate Bond Comovement 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Correlations are crucial when setting up efficient portfolios, taking appropriate hedging 
decisions, and managing risks. Thus, it is not surprising that correlations are widely studied in 
the financial literature (e.g., Ang and Chen, 2002; Connolly et al., 2007; Baele et al., 2010; 
Abad et al., 2014; Nieto and Rodriguez, 2015). This evidence is based on correlations between 
equity markets, government bond markets, individual stocks and bonds, and common factors 
in asset prices and returns. Our paper contributes to this literature by identifying an economic 
mechanism of correlated risk factors driving corporate bond correlations. 
Using a sample of US corporate bonds, we document that bond correlation varies heavily 
over time. Correlation between high-yield and investment-grade bonds is, for example, about 
three times higher in the financial crisis beginning in July 2007 than it was before. 
Why does bond correlation display this time-series behavior? One possible explanation, 
typically adopted to explain correlations in equity markets, is investors’ herding. Kumar and 
Lee (2006) show that trading is correlated across retail investors and influences stock 
comovements. However, it is unlikely that retail investor herding is as important in bond 
markets as in equity markets since bond markets are dominated by institutional investors less 
prone to herding in market downturns (Borensztein and Gelos, 2003). 
                                                                                                                                               
* This chapter is based on Bethke et al. (2015). 
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We propose an alternative explanation. In a nutshell, our theoretical model is based on the 
idea that investor sentiment has two main effects on investor behavior: Investors with low 
sentiment avoid risky assets (Baker and Wurgler, 2006) and react more to negative information 
(e.g., Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2012; Kaplanski and Levy, forthcoming). Thus, when 
sentiment is low, investors are less prone to invest in bonds with high credit risk and these 
bonds are less liquid than when sentiment is high. Consequently, liquidity premiums increase 
more with credit risk premiums when sentiment is low, i.e., correlation between these two 
main risk factors in corporate bonds is higher. High risk factor correlation translates into high 
correlation between corporate bonds. Thus, low investor sentiment ultimately goes along with 
high bond correlation.  
In the empirical part of our paper, we use TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance 
Engine) data from October 2004 to September 2010. We document how bond correlation 
evolves over time and test our model that links bond correlation to risk factor correlation and 
risk factor correlation to investor sentiment. We find strong support for the predictions of our 
model. Correlation between risk factors in the corporate bond market is high when investor 
sentiment is low and high risk factor correlation translates into high bond correlation. Investor 
sentiment has a significant indirect impact on bond correlation via risk factor correlation even 
after controlling for a possible direct impact of sentiment, herding behavior, and state of the 
economy. Our results are stable over time and remain stable when we dig deeper into the cross-
section by analyzing correlations between more detailed credit rating buckets. 
After establishing our main results, we run several tests to determine robustness of our 
findings. We show that our main findings depend neither on how we measure credit risk and 
liquidity premiums nor on how we proxy investor sentiment. They remain robust when we 
adjust correlations for interest rate risk and unexpected inflation, use the swap rate as proxy 
for the risk-free rate, or split the sample into a pre-crisis and crisis interval. 
Our study is related to several strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the large 
body of literature measuring asset correlations across countries and asset classes. Inter-market 
studies for sovereign bonds (for Europe, e.g., Kim et al., 2006; Abad et al., 2010; Abad et al., 
2014; for Europe and the US, e.g., Skintzi and Refenes, 2006; Christiansen, 2007; for 
developed countries, Driessen et al., 2003; for emerging and frontier countries, Nowak et al., 
2011; and Piljak, 2013) and equities (Connolly et al., 2007; Christiansen and Ranaldo, 2009) 
focus on increasing financial integration at the international level. Studies that span asset 
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classes such as sovereign bond and equity markets (e.g., Connolly et al., 2005; Yang et al., 
2009; Baele et al., 2010; Baker and Wurgler, 2012; and Bansal et al., 2014) or sovereign bond, 
corporate bond and equity markets at the aggregate level (e.g., Baur and Lucey, 2009; Brière 
et al., 2012) document the evolution of financial integration and flight to low-risk sovereign 
bonds in market downturns. At the individual security level, Acharya et al. (2013) find higher 
inter-market correlation between distressed stocks and corporate bonds in times of market 
downturns; Nieto and Rodriguez (2015) document common factors driving correlation 
between US stocks and corporate bonds of the same issuer. Correlations within asset classes 
are assessed either directly (e.g., Steeley, 2006 for different maturity segments of the UK 
sovereign bond market) or via common risk factors (e.g., Steeley, 1990; Litterman and 
Scheinkman, 1991 for UK and US sovereign bonds; Fama and French, 1993; Collin-Dufresne 
et al., 2001; Elton et al., 2001; Gebhardt et al., 2005; and Lin et al., 2011 for US corporate 
bonds; Klein and Stellner, 2014 and Aussenegg et al., 2015 for European corporate bonds). 
We add to this literature by analyzing correlations within the US corporate bond market, 
determining and analyzing the correlation of systematic credit risk and liquidity, and 
interpreting this correlation as a flight-to-quality phenomenon. 
Second, our paper is related to the literature that analyzes the economic mechanisms 
leading to higher correlation between asset returns. King and Wadhwani (1990) suggest that 
investors infer asset values in one market from values in another market to a larger degree 
when the information environment becomes more complex, which leads to higher correlations. 
Connolly et al. (2007) trace high correlation back to high market uncertainty. In Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2009), a sudden drying up of investors’ funding ability leads to low market 
liquidity and high correlation. Barberis et al. (2005) argue that groups of investors are prone 
to "investment habitats". Investors within one habitat trade more similarly. Kumar and Lee 
(2006) show that such herding is caused by investor sentiment. Chordia et al. (2011) find that 
market downturns lead to retail investors’ herding and to higher stock correlations. We add to 
this literature by showing that low investor sentiment increases risk factor correlation, and 
high risk factor correlation leads to high bond correlation. 
Third, we contribute to the literature analyzing the relation between liquidity and credit 
risk. Vayanos (2004) argues that investors attach a higher value to liquidity when markets are 
volatile. Ericsson and Renault (2006) motivate and document a positive correlation between 
credit risk and liquidity premiums for corporate bonds. Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) and Friewald 
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et al. (2012) show that – consistent with flight-to-quality behavior – liquidity premiums 
increase more for low-rated than for high-rated corporate bonds during the recent financial 
crisis. In contrast, Longstaff et al. (2005) find a negative correlation between credit risk and 
liquidity premiums for corporate bonds. Our paper reconciles this contradictory evidence by 
showing that risk factor correlation varies over time and depends on investor sentiment. In 
addition, we show that stronger flight-to-quality increases the comovement within corporate 
bond markets. 
Finally, our results extend the growing literature on the influence of investor sentiment in 
the US corporate bond market. Nayak (2010) finds that corporate bond spreads are affected 
by investor sentiment. Tang and Yan (2010) show that market-wide credit spreads negatively 
depend on investor sentiment. We add to this literature by showing that low investor sentiment 
leads to high risk factor correlation and, ultimately, high bond correlation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we document how 
bond correlation evolves over time. In Section 2.3, we develop our model to explain varying 
bond correlation and state our main hypotheses linking bond correlation to risk factor 
correlation and risk factor correlation to investor sentiment. Our hypotheses are tested in 
Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, we provide various robustness tests and Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2. Bond correlation over time 
2.2.1. Bond sample 
We calculate bond correlations based on bond transaction data (actual trade price, yield 
resulting from this price, trade size, trade time, and trade date) from TRACE (Trade Reporting 
and Compliance Engine). We filter out erroneous trades with the algorithm described in Dick-
Nielsen (2009) and use only plain vanilla bonds with fixed coupons. We exclude bonds 
without S&P rating (obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream) and initial time to maturity 
of more than 30 years. Additionally, we exclude bonds for which Thomson Reuters 
Datastream does not provide 5-year credit default swap (CDS) mid quotes, since we use these 
to calculate credit risk premiums. 
As TRACE does not cover BBB-rated and high yield bonds before October 2004 
(Goldstein and Hotchkiss, 2012), our sample starts on October 1, 2004. It ends on September 
30, 2010, since Thomson Reuters Datastream provides CDS data only until that date. We 
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exclude federal holidays as only sparse trading occurs on these days. The final sample consists 
of 4,266 corporate bonds of 426 companies. Table 2.1 displays summary statistics. 
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of the TRACE sample 
  All IG HY AAA&AA A BBB IG – HY  
#Firms 302.44 245.01 65.04 35.69 97.21 140.47 179.97 *** 
#Bonds 1,531.61 1,364.13 169.79 333.00 626.93 412.25 1,194.34 *** 
Volume  453.16 463.64 368.19 598.38 450.81 382.26 95.45 *** 
Time to maturity 5.32 5.24 5.87 5.24 4.92 5.81 -0.63 *** 
Coupon 6.10 5.92 7.54 5.05 5.87 6.66 -1.62 *** 
S&P rating 6.88 6.03 13.59 2.40 5.61 8.56 -7.56 *** 
#Trades 78.87 81.86 53.81 97.57 93.33 50.23 28.05 *** 
Trade Size  360.20 365.54 319.68 243.79 281.07 591.27 45.86 *** 
Turnover 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.00   
Notes: The table reports characteristics of the TRACE corporate bond sample. We report the mean of these 
characteristics for the full sample, the investment grade (IG) sample and high yield (HY) sample. The IG sample 
is further split into three subsamples consisting of all bonds belonging to specific credit rating buckets. The 
buckets are AAA and AA, A, and BBB. #Firms is the average number of companies with actively traded bonds, 
#Bonds is the average number of actively traded bonds per month. Volume is the average outstanding volume 
per actively traded bond in million USD. Time to maturity is the average time to maturity in years. Coupon is the 
average per annum coupon rate in percentage points. S&P rating is the average S&P rating expressed as a number 
(AAA=1, …, C=21). #Trades is the average number of trades per bond per month. Trade size is the average trade 
size per bond in thousand USD. Turnover is the average monthly trading volume per bond as a percentage of 
issue volume. In the last column, we report the difference between the IG and HY sample ***, **, and * denote 
significance of a t-test for differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Table 2.1 shows that the mean number of companies with actively traded bonds per month 
is 302, the majority with an investment grade (IG) rating (245 companies). The mean number 
of actively traded bonds per month (1,531) indicates that five bonds per issuing company are 
traded. Again, most bonds are in the IG segment, but even the high yield (HY) segment 
contains a broad bond portfolio (170 bonds). Mean outstanding volume is 453.64 m USD. It 
is significantly higher in the IG segment than in the HY segment (IG: 463.64 m USD; 
HY: 368.79 m USD). Mean time to maturity roughly equals 5 years and is significantly higher 
in the HY segment (IG: 5.24 years; HY: 5.87 years). The mean S&P rating for IG bonds is 
6 (=A), the mean HY rating is almost 14 (=B+). Regarding trading activity, IG bonds trade 
significantly more frequently: 82 trades per bond per month, on average, compared to 54 trades 
of HY bonds. Mean trade size is 14% larger for IG bonds than for HY bonds. Despite the  
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higher trading frequency and trading size, mean turnover is not larger for IG bonds than for 
HY bonds due to higher issuance volume in the IG segment. 
An analysis of the specific credit rating buckets shows most bonds are rated A or BBB, 
but average bond volumes and number of trades (but not trade size) are larger in the AAA&AA 
bucket.16 Time to maturity equals roughly five years in all buckets, and turnover is also similar 
in all buckets. As expected, coupon rates are larger for lower credit rating buckets.  
2.2.2. Bond correlation 
To calculate bond correlation, we first aggregate corporate bonds into two portfolios: an 
investment grade and a high yield corporate bond portfolio. Like Longstaff et al. (2005), we 
focus on bond spreads as the difference between the yield and the maturity-matched risk-free 
rate (obtained by interpolating US Treasury yields).17 For each trading day, we compute one 
IG and one HY portfolio yield spread as the average yield spread across all traded bonds in 
the respective segment. We then calculate bond correlation as the 22-day rolling Pearson’s 
correlation between the two portfolios’ daily yield spread changes.18 We focus on changes 
instead of levels to ensure stationarity. Figure 2.1 shows how bond correlation evolves over 
time. 
Figure 2.1 clearly shows that bond correlation varies strongly over time. It exhibits spikes 
around the acquisition of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan (March 16, 2008) and the September 
2008 turmoil (federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on September 7, the 
acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America on September 14, and the Lehman default 
on September 15). It is easy to see that bond correlation is much higher at the start of the 
financial crisis (July 2007). A numerical analysis shows that it is about three times as large,  
 
                                                                                                                                               
16  Like Wang and Wu (2015), we split the IG segment into three credit rating buckets and do not split the HY 
segment due to its much lower number of bonds and trading frequency. The first IG bucket (AAA&AA) 
consists of all bonds rated AAA or AA. The second and third IG buckets consist of bonds rated A and BBB, 
respectively. 
17  More specifically, on each trading day we collect constant maturity US Treasury yields from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream of maturities between one month and 30 years. We then fit a cubic function with maturity as the 
independent variable to the observed yields, and use the interpolated yield as a proxy for the maturity-matched 
risk-free rate at this date. 
18  As an alternative, we could measure time-varying correlation via a dynamic conditional correlation (DCC)-
GARCH model, as Nieto and Rodriguez (2015) and Bartram and Wang (2015), or a smooth transition Markov-
switching model, as Yang et al. (2009). We choose the conventional rolling window estimation as in Connolly 
et al. (2007); Panchenko and Wu (2009); Chordia et al. (2011); and Bansal et al. (2014) because it is more 
parsimonious with respect to the number of parameters that need to be estimated, does not depend on a specific 
distribution assumption or a specific functional form for the transition function, and is less likely to be 
dominated by past dynamics, and thus overstate persistence, if the data contains structural breaks. 
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Figure 2.1: Bond correlation time series 
 
Notes: The figure displays bond correlation time series. The depicted time period lasts from November 2, 2004 
to September 30, 2010. Bond correlation is computed as the 22-day rolling Pearson’s correlation between the 
average investment grade and the average high yield bond yield spread changes. 
with 21.3% after July 2007 but only 6.3% before, and the difference is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. This increase in correlation mirrors the higher correlation between equities in 
crises widely documented in the empirical literature (King and Wadhwani, 1990; Longin and 
Solnik, 1995; De Santis and Gerard, 1997; Longin and Solnik, 2001; Connolly et al., 2007; 
Chordia et al., 2011). 
Next we analyze bond correlations in the ratings cross-section. We use the same buckets 
as before, and compute correlation between two credit rating buckets using the same portfolio 
approach as for Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1. Table 2.2 reports summary statistics. 
Table 2.2 shows that correlations between the different buckets are positive on average. 
However, average correlation is much lower (around 0.15) and only significant at the 5% level 
when the HY segment is involved, compared to correlations between the IG buckets (0.70 at 
least, always significant at the 1% level). This difference is consistent with empirical evidence 
in Brière et al. (2012) that cross-country correlations across the IG and HY segment are lower 
than correlations within the IG and the HY segment. The standard deviation and the 5th and 
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95th percentile indicate high variation over time in all correlations, in line with the visual 
impression obtained from Figure 2.1. 
Table 2.2: Summary statistics of bond correlations 
Bond correlation  Mean  Std. Dev. 5th Percentile 95th Percentile 
IG with HY 0.15 ** 0.29 -0.33 0.66 
AAA&AA with A 0.91 *** 0.12 0.62 0.99 
AAA&AA with BBB 0.70 *** 0.18 0.35 0.92 
AAA&AA with HY 0.14 ** 0.28 -0.34 0.62 
A with BBB 0.70 *** 0.18 0.35 0.94 
A with HY 0.15 ** 0.30 -0.35 0.66 
BBB with HY 0.15 ** 0.31 -0.38 0.67 
Notes: This table reports the mean, standard deviation, 5th, and 95th percentile of bond correlations. Bond 
correlations are determined as described in Section 2.2.2. We report correlations between investment grade (IG) 
and high yield (HY) bonds. The IG sample is further split into three subsamples consisting of all bonds belonging 
to specific credit rating buckets. The buckets are AAA and AA, A, and BBB. ***, **, and * denote significance 
of a t-test for differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Significance is 
determined using Newey-West standard errors.  
2.3. Explaining bond and risk factor correlation 
In this section, we propose a model to explain the evolution of bond correlation. The model 
uses the fact that the main risk factors priced in bond yield spreads are credit risk and liquidity. 
Therefore, higher correlation between these risk factors translates into higher bond correlation. 
This raises the question: What drives risk factor correlation? We show that low sentiment 
translates into high risk factor correlation and, thus, high bond correlation.  
Our model consists of two basic ingredients: First, correlation between risk factors (credit 
risk premiums, liquidity premiums) depends crucially on investor sentiment. Second, bond 
correlation is determined by this correlation between credit risk premiums and liquidity 
premiums. We focus on the economic intuition in this section. In the appendix, we formally 
derive our hypotheses in a reduced-form model based on a discrete two-factor Hull and White 
(1994) term structure model.  
2.3.1. Risk factor correlation and investor sentiment 
We first derive the impact of investor sentiment on risk factor correlation. Consider a corporate 
bond whose credit risk and liquidity vary over time. For simplicity, consider a zero bond 
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maturing at date t=2 with notional value 1 and assume that the risk-free interest rate is r=0 and 
the recovery rate is R=0 as well. We can express the bond’s risk-neutral price at time t=1 as  
   1 1B 1, 2 exp    , (2.1) 
where 1  is the bond’s risk-neutral default intensity and 1  is the bond’s risk-neutral illiquidity 
intensity, both known at t=1. From the perspective of time t=0, the default and illiquidity 
intensities at t=1 are unknown, and the price at time t=0 is  
     00 0 1 1B 0,2 exp exp         E , (2.2) 
where expectations are computed under the risk-neutral measure. The corresponding per-
period log yields at time t=0 and time t=1 are      0 00 0 1 11 log exp2         ys E  
and 1 1 1  ys , and the corresponding credit risk and liquidity premiums19 are 
   10 0 0
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
 
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 (2.4) 
Equations (2.3) and (2.4) show that in this model, the covariance between credit risk and 
liquidity premium changes   0 , cCov rar liq  equals the covariance between the intensities 
 0 1 1,  Covar . 
In the empirical literature (e.g., Ericsson and Renault, 2006 or Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012), 
credit risk and liquidity premiums are usually assumed to be positively correlated, which 
corresponds to positively correlated intensities in our model (as in Schönbucher, 2002). 
Economically, this positive correlation reflects the pricing effect of the well-known flight-to-
quality behavior of investors: bonds become less liquid when their credit quality deteriorates 
                                                                                                                                               
19  Since we consider a risk-neutral investor, we use the term “risk premium“ for the compensation this investor 
requires for expected losses. As Equations (2.2) to (2.4) show, the investor does not demand additional 
compensation for possible variations in the credit quality or liquidity of the bond. 
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(e.g., Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012; Friewald et al., 2012; and Acharya et al., 2013) as investors 
shift their portfolios towards risk-free bonds or cash.  
The novel mechanism we suggest is that the extent of flight-to-quality depends on investor 
sentiment. The economic rationale is twofold. First, low investor sentiment reduces an 
investor’s propensity to invest in risky assets (Baker and Wurgler, 2006). Hence, the overall 
bond liquidity premium level is high when investor sentiment is low. We therefore link 
sentiment to liquidity premium levels. Second, the extent to which liquidity premiums change 
as a reaction to shocks in credit quality depends on sentiment. Investors perceive risks more 
severely when their sentiment is low (e.g., Kaplanski and Levy, forthcoming), and low 
sentiment affects an investor’s reaction to negative information about firm fundamentals more 
than her reaction to positive information (e.g., Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2012). 
Therefore, we make the impact of credit risk shocks on liquidity premiums dependent on the 
sentiment level. 
We model both effects in our setting by introducing a general investor sentiment 
parameter x and an impact variable ta  which depends on the default intensityt . Both x and 
ta  jointly determine the magnitude of the flight-to-quality effect that investors exhibit as a 
reaction to a credit risk shock.20 Larger values of x (-1 < x < 1, where x = 0 corresponds to neutral 
sentiment) indicate lower investor sentiment; ta  depends on whether the fundamental 
information is negative (then,  ut ta a ), neutral (  mt ta a ), or positive (  dt ta a  with 
1 1 1 d m ua a a ). To illustrate the sentiment impact, consider a negative fundamental information 
(  ut ta a ) about the firm implying a credit risk shock at t=1 ( 1 0  ). If investor sentiment is 
low, i.e., x is positive, investors react more strongly to this information, which leads to a higher 
flight-to-quality effect compared to the case of neutral sentiment (x=0). Conversely, positive 
sentiment (x<0) reduces the flight-to-quality effect compared to the case of neutral sentiment. 
We model this sentiment-dependent flight-to-quality effect by multiplying the liquidity 
intensity 1  with  11 ua x .21 Therefore, the liquidity risk premium depends on sentiment:  
                                                                                                                                               
20  Conceivably, causality could also run in the opposite direction: a liquidity shock could be the fundamental 
information, and this could affect credit risk. In our model, we choose credit risk as the fundamental 
information for two reasons: First, only this direction of the effect is consistent with the economic intuition of 
Baker and Wurgler (2006), Kaplanski and Levy (forthcoming), and Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012). 
Second, this is consistent with empirical evidence of Kalimipalli and Nayak (2012) and Kalimipalli et al. (2013) 
that liquidity shocks have a second-order effect on corporate bond spreads compared to credit risk shocks.  
21  Positive sentiment (x<0) can generate negative risk factor correlation in our model, leading to a flight-from-
quality effect. Longstaff et al. (2005) and Ericsson and Renault (2006) have empirically documented that 
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 (2.5) 
and the covariance between credit risk and liquidity premium changes   0 , cCov rar liq  
equals the covariance between the credit risk intensity and the sentiment-adjusted liquidity 
intensities   0 1 1 1, 1     Covar a x .22 This covariance as well as the corresponding 
correlation both increase in the sentiment parameter x as shown in the appendix. This leads to 
our first hypothesis: risk factor correlation increases when investor sentiment decreases.  
2.3.2. Bond correlation and risk factor correlation 
Second, we link risk factor correlation and bond correlation. Consider two corporate bonds, 
for example, one investment grade bond i and one high yield bond h with positive default and 
liquidity intensities / ,i h t  and  / , 1    i h t ta x . Without loss of generality, the default (liquidity) 
intensity of a bond can be split into a systematic part , / , m t i h  (  , / ,1      m t t i ha x ) and an 
idiosyncratic part, /i h  ( /i h ). Under the standard assumption that idiosyncratic factors are 
uncorrelated with systematic risk factors and across bonds, the covariance between yield 
spread changes of the two bonds results solely from covariance between systematic credit risk 
and systematic liquidity:23  
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  (2.6) 
                                                                                                                                               
negative and positive correlations alternate in corporate bond markets. However, models that can explain both 
positive and negative risk factor correlations are scarce: for example, Ericsson and Renault (2006) can only 
generate consistently positive risk factor correlations. Beber et al. (2009), on the other hand, document average 
negative correlations between credit risk and liquidity premiums, and Chan et al. (2011) find flight-from-
quality episodes in equity and commodity markets. 
22 Alternatively, one could interpret ta x  as the time-varying market price of liquidity risk, which could be caused 
by variations in the risk-free interest rate or in unexpected inflation. Since our model is derived from the 
perspective of a risk-neutral investor, we only account for these effects in our empirical analysis. In Section 
2.5.2, we show that sentiment remains significant as a determinant of risk factor correlation even after adjusting 
credit risk and liquidity premiums for interest rate risk and unexpected inflation. 
23  There is a large body of literature on correlated defaults and systematic credit risk: see, e.g., Das et al. (2007) 
or Duffie et al. (2009). Among others, Chacko (2006) and Lin et al. (2011) show that systematic liquidity is 
priced for corporate bonds. Bao et al. (2011) document a positive relation between systematic credit risk and 
systematic illiquidity in corporate bond markets.  
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In the appendix, we formally show that this relation also holds for correlations.24 Thus, 
higher risk factor correlation (resulting from correlation between the systematic credit risk and 
liquidity) translates into higher bond correlation. This leads to our second hypothesis: bond 
correlation increases when risk factor correlation increases.  
2.4. Hypotheses tests  
2.4.1. Measuring investor sentiment and risk factor correlation 
We use the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) daily market volatility index (VIX) to 
capture investor sentiment.25 It measures the implied volatility of options on the S&P 500 and, 
thus, reflects investors’ expectation about future market volatility. VIX is said to measure 
investor fear (e.g., Whaley, 2000, Baker and Wurgler, 2007) and is widely used as investor 
sentiment proxy (e.g., Kurov, 2010; Kaplanski and Levy, 2010; Da et al., 2015; and Smales, 
2015). A high value of VIX corresponds to low investor sentiment. In our sample, VIX has an 
average value of 21.42 and a standard deviation of 11.61. A possible concern is that VIX will 
not reflect pure investor sentiment, but mainly the state of the economy. To ensure that we do 
not capture this effect, we orthogonalize VIX to macroeconomic factors as in Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) and use the residual of this orthogonalization as our measure of sentiment in 
the remainder of the paper.26 The residual has mean zero and its standard deviation is 6.40. 
To determine risk factor correlation, we first calculate credit risk premiums and liquidity 
premiums at the bond level. We use daily 5-year CDS mid quotes from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream as a proxy for the bond’s credit risk premium. As a proxy for the liquidity 
premium, we use the non-credit risk portion of the bond yield spread (see, e.g., Longstaff et 
al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007). To compute this, we subtract the CDS mid quote from the yield 
spread to obtain the bond’s liquidity premium.27 On average, the credit risk premium equals 
                                                                                                                                               
24  Note that our model can generate negative bond correlation. The intuition is that if the systematic credit risk 
and liquidity intensity are sufficiently negatively correlated, bond covariance and thus bond correlation is also 
negative.  
25  In the robustness section, we use alternative measures of investor sentiment and show that the qualitative 
results of this paper do not depend on the investor sentiment proxy. 
26  The factors used in the orthogonalization are the growth rate of the 12-month moving averages of growth in 
durable, nondurable, and services consumption, growth in employment, growth in industrial production, and a 
dummy for NBER recessions We obtain the time series from the Federal Reserve Economic Database: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ 
27  Arguably, the CDS mid premium and the non-credit risk portion on the bond yield spread may also reflect 
factors other than credit risk and liquidity. In Section 2.5.1, we show that our empirical results are robust 
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0.85% for IG bonds and 3.59% for HY bonds. The difference in the liquidity premiums is less 
pronounced: The mean liquidity premium is 1.44% in the IG and 2.21% in the HY segment. 
Both differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
To calculate risk factor correlation, we aggregate corporate bonds into an IG and a HY 
portfolio as in Section 2.2.2. For each portfolio, we determine daily credit risk premiums and 
liquidity premiums as the average across all traded bonds in the respective segment. We then 
compute 22-day rolling Pearson’s correlation between credit risk and liquidity premium 
changes. The average of the IG and the HY correlation is our measure of risk factor correlation. 
To obtain an unbounded variable, we transform Pearson’s correlation using the Fisher z-
transformation from Section 2.4.2 onwards. We proceed in the same way when we calculate 
risk factor correlation for bonds belonging to specific credit rating buckets (e.g., A and BBB): 
We first form two portfolios (consisting of A and BBB bonds, respectively), then calculate the 
correlation between credit risk and liquidity premium changes in each portfolio, and finally 
average the two correlation estimates to come up with risk factor correlation. Table 2.3 reports 
summary statistics on risk factor correlations. 
Table 2.3: Summary statistics of risk factor correlations 
Risk factor correlation  Mean Std. Dev. 5th Percentile 95th Percentile 
IG and HY 0.03 0.20 -0.27 0.37 
AAA&AA and A 0.07 0.23 -0.30 0.46 
AAA&AA and BBB 0.05 0.22 -0.33 0.40 
AAA&AA and HY 0.04 0.21 -0.30 0.39 
A and BBB 0.04 0.20 -0.26 0.41 
A and HY 0.03 0.24 -0.35 0.45 
BBB and HY 0.01 0.24 -0.36 0.42 
Notes: This table reports the mean, standard deviation, 5th, and 95th percentile of risk factor correlations. Risk 
factor correlations are determined as described in Section 2.4.1. We report risk factor correlations calculated for 
the investment grade (IG) and high yield (HY) segment. The IG sample is further split into three subsamples 
consisting of all bonds belonging to specific credit rating buckets. The buckets are AAA and AA, A, and BBB. 
***, **, and * denote significance of a t-test for differences from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, 
respectively. Significance is determined using Newey-West standard errors.  
Table 2.3 documents that the average risk factor correlation is small in economic terms. 
The positive values, though not significant, indicate a moderate flight-to-quality effect in all 
                                                                                                                                               
against the use of alternative credit risk and liquidity premium specifications. Section 2.5.2 adjusts correlations 
for additional risk factors. 
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credit ratings buckets. This finding is in line with evidence by Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) that 
flight-to-quality affects both investment grade and speculative corporate bonds. Interestingly, 
the maximum value of 0.07 is attained for the highest credit rating buckets (AAA&AA with 
A), suggesting that even highly rated corporate bonds suffered from the flight-to-quality effect 
during our observation interval. However, differences between the average risk factor 
correlations are not statistically significant as indicated by the high standard deviations 
(   0.20) and the values of the 5th and 95th percentile.  
We conclude the descriptive analysis of risk factor correlation by comparing the cross-
sectional results of Table 2.2 and Table 2.3. Consistent with the lower risk factor correlation 
when the HY segment is involved, Table 2.2 indicates lower bond correlation in these cases. 
Economically, this implies that diversification across the IG and HY segments decreases 
portfolio risk because risk factor correlation is low. However, if risk factor correlation 
increases, this diversification benefit is reduced. In the next section, we therefore turn to our 
analysis of sentiment as a driver of risk factor correlation. 
2.4.2. The link between sentiment and risk factor correlation 
In this section, we test our first main hypothesis: Risk factor correlation increases when 
sentiment decreases. To do so, we run the following time-series regression: 
Corr Sentiment Controls .        Riskt t t t  (2.7) 
Risk factor correlation CorrRiskt  and sentiment are measured as described in Section 2.4.1. We 
use the Fisher z-transformations of risk factor correlations to obtain an unbounded variable. 
Controlst  is the vector of variables controlling for market-wide risk and for market downturns. 
We include these variables since equity market correlation is higher when market risk is high 
(e.g., King and Wadhwani, 1990; Longin and Solnik, 1995) and during market downturns 
(e.g., Longin and Solnik, 2001). To measure market-wide risk, we determine the market-wide 
yield spread as the sum of the credit risk premium and liquidity premium. We then compute 
its 22-day rolling standard deviation as a proxy for market-wide risk. The average value of 
this standard deviation is 0.33 with a standard deviation of 0.30. To indicate market downturns, 
we define a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the yield spread at time t is above 
a one-sigma band compared to the previous month.  
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Table 2.4: Risk factor correlation and investor sentiment 
Notes: The table reports the results of the regression of risk factor correlation on sentiment and control variables. Risk factor correlation is the Fisher z-transformation of 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients, determined as described in the main text in Section 2.4.1. Sentiment is measured as CBOE VIX index orthogonalized to macroeconomic 
factors. The control variables are market-wide risk and a market downturn dummy. Market-wide risk is measured as the 22-day rolling standard deviation of the sum of 
the credit risk premium and liquidity premium. The market downturn dummy takes on a value of one if the yield spread at time t is above a one-sigma band compared to 
the previous month. Columns 1 to 7 provide the results for the investment grade (IG) and high yield (HY) segment The IG sample is further split into three subsamples 
consisting of all bonds belonging to specific credit rating buckets. The buckets are AAA and AA, A, and BBB. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Significance is determined using Newey-West standard errors. Adjusted R² are in percentage points. The number 
of observations is 1,456 in all regressions. 
 
Dependent variable: Risk factor correlation 
Explanatory variables IG and HY AAA&AA and A AAA&AA and BBB AAA&AA and HY A and BBB A and HY BBB and HY 
Sentiment  0.0037 *** 0.0058 *** 0.0033 ** 0.0024 ** 0.0066 *** 0.0059 *** 0.0034 ** 
(0.0001)   (0.0000)  (0.0321)  (0.0444)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0171)   
Market-wide risk 0.2967 *** -0.0410 * -0.0484 0.3044 *** -0.0532 ** 0.3007 *** 0.2915 *** 
(0.0000)  (0.0891)  (0.1021) (0.0000) (0.0171)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  
Market downturn 0.0070  0.1288 *** -0.0741 ** -0.1214 *** 0.0734 ** 0.0325  -0.1813 *** 
(0.8161)  (0.0019) (0.0452)  (0.0004) (0.0265) (0.3879) (0.0003)  
Constant -0.0713 *** 0.0866 *** 0.0705 *** -0.0503 *** 0.0585 *** -0.0634 *** -0.0766 *** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  
Adj. R2 21.86 4.36 1.20 14.27 4.62 18.58 10.39 
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Table 2.4 shows the regression results. In the first column, we present results for the 
overall risk factor correlation calculated using all IG and HY bonds. Columns 2 to 7 present 
results for the more detailed credit rating buckets used above. 
Table 2.4 provides strong support for our first hypothesis: Irrespective of whether we 
consider the overall (IG&HY) or the bucket-specific risk factor correlations, risk factor 
correlation is significantly (at least at the 5% level) related to sentiment with the hypothesized 
positive coefficient sign. Thus, risk factor correlation, and hence flight-to-quality, increases 
when investor sentiment decreases. With respect to the different credit rating buckets, the 
lower intercept when the HY segment is involved is consistent with the lower average values 
in Table 2.3. In contrast, the control variables have no consistent impact on risk factor 
correlation across the buckets.  
2.4.3. The link between risk factor correlation and bond correlation 
We now test our second hypothesis: Bond correlation increases with risk factor correlation. 
We run the following time-series regression: 
Corr Corr Sentiment Herding Controls .              Bond Riskt t t t t t  (2.8) 
The main variables are bond correlation CorrBondt  and risk factor correlation Corr
Risk
t . We use 
Fisher z-transformations of both correlations to obtain unbounded variables. We add the same 
vector of controls, Controlst , as in Table 2.4 to capture possible effects of the state of the 
economy on bond correlation. Furthermore, we add sentiment (captured by VIX) to control 
for the direct impact of investor sentiment on bond correlation. Since empirical studies (e.g., 
Kumar and Lee, 2006) have documented a link between investors’ herding behavior and equity 
market correlations and a similar link might exist in the bond market, we also control for 
herding in the bond market.28 We calculate the herding measure of Lakonishok et al. (1992) 
for each traded bond i on each day t as: 
 , , ,LSV br -br - br - br t ti t i t t i tE . (2.9) 
The buyer ratio ,bri t  denotes the fraction of buys relative to the total number of trades of bond 
i on day t. br t  is the buyer ratio on day t averaged across bonds, and  ,br - brtt i tE  is the bias 
                                                                                                                                               
28 Cai et al. (2012) document herding behavior among bond mutual fund managers. 
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correction suggested by Bellando (2012). The resulting LSV measure has a mean of 0.09 and 
a standard deviation of 0.02. Table 2.5 reports the regression results. 
Table 2.5 provides strong support for our second hypothesis. We find a positive and 
significant impact of risk factor correlation on bond correlation, no matter whether we consider 
the overall market or specific credit rating buckets. The A and HY credit rating bucket exhibits 
the highest sensitivity, but all coefficient estimates are of a similar order of magnitude. We 
also find a significant direct impact of sentiment on bond correlation, except for the highest 
credit rating buckets (AAA&AA and A). The herding variable and the remaining control 
variables have no consistent impact on bond correlation. 
A possible concern with our empirical analysis in Equation (2.8) is that we cannot 
formally test whether sentiment affects bond correlation only directly, or also indirectly via 
the risk factor correlation channel we propose. To address this concern, we test for significance 
of this indirect impact using a causal mediation analysis as in Imai et al. (2010b). The 
mediation model is based on Equations (2.7) and (2.8), and allows us to quantify the indirect 
impact of sentiment on bond correlation via risk factor correlation.29 We report the indirect 
impact of sentiment on bond correlation, measured via the average causal mediation effect, in 
the last row of Table 2.5. Significance is computed using bootstrapped standard errors from 
10,000 simulation runs. The last row of Table 2.5 shows that investor sentiment has a 
statistically significant indirect impact on bond correlation via risk factor correlation, which 
amounts to up to 18% of the total impact of investor sentiment (for the A and HY credit rating 
buckets). Hence, sentiment affects bond correlation not only directly, but also indirectly via 
risk factor correlation. 
Overall, the results of Section 2.4 clearly support the economic rationale developed in 
Section 2.3: When investor sentiment decreases, risk factor correlation increases, translating 
into increasing bond correlation. 
                                                                                                                                               
29  Specifically, Equation (2.7) represents the mediator model and specifies the conditional distribution of the 
mediator risk factor correlation given the treatment sentiment, and the control variables. Equation (2.8) 
represents the outcome model and specifies the conditional distribution of the outcome bond correlation given 
the mediator risk factor correlation, the treatment sentiment, and the control variables. We fit both models 
sequentially, using standard errors with a Newey-West correction. We then estimate the average causal 
mediation effect (the indirect impact) using the algorithm in Imai et al. (2010a) for parametric inference, and 
determine its significance using bootstrapped standard errors. 
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Table 2.5: Bond correlation and risk factor correlation 
Dependent variable: Bond correlation 
Explanatory variables IG and HY AAA&AA and A AAA&AA and BBB
AAA&AA and 
HY A and BBB A and HY BBB and HY 
Risk factor correlation 0.2461 *** 0.2753 *** 0.2738 *** 0.2500 *** 0.1277 * 0.3490 *** 0.2394 *** 
 (0.0001)   (0.0000)   (0.0000)   (0.0006)   (0.0758)   (0.0000)   (0.0011)   
Sentiment  0.0094 *** -0.0050  0.0131 *** 0.0095 *** 0.0143 *** 0.0099 *** 0.0072 *** 
(0.0000)   (0.1096) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0012)  
Herding 0.8971  -1.7728 ** 1.8381 ** -0.2783 3.3710 *** 1.2131 * 0.2824  
 (0.1276)  (0.0467)  (0.0182) (0.6804) (0.0001)  (0.0626) (0.6928)  
Market-wide risk 0.0279  -0.5279 *** -0.3777 *** 0.0254 -0.4206 *** -0.0291 -0.1364 ** 
(0.4744)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.6693) (0.0000)  (0.5675) (0.0186)  
Market downturn 0.1124 ** 0.1542  -0.0170  0.2081 *** -0.1259  0.1443 ** 0.2310 *** 
(0.0406)  (0.1585) (0.8058) (0.0077) (0.1073) (0.0271) (0.0023)  
Constant 0.0610  2.0890 *** 0.9095 *** 0.1456 ** 0.8114 *** 0.0501  0.1723 *** 
(0.2519)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0268) (0.0000) (0.4028) (0.0070)  
Adj. R2 11.22 11.31 14.38 13.16 14.61 16.67 6.78 
Indirect impact 0.0009 *** 0.0016 *** 0.0009 *** 0.0006 ** 0.0008 ***  0.0021 *** 0.0008 *** 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0100)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)   
Notes: The table reports results of the regression of bond correlation on risk factor correlation, sentiment, herding, market-wide risk, and market downturn. Both bond 
correlation and risk factor correlation are the Fisher z-transformation of Pearson’s correlation coefficients, determined as described in the main text in Section 2.2.2 and 
2.4.1. Herding is measured using the approach of Lakonishok et al. (1992) as described in Section 2.4.3. Sentiment, market-wide risk, and market downturn are as in 
Table 2.4. We report correlations between investment grade (IG) and high yield (HY) bonds. The IG sample is further split into three subsamples consisting of all bonds 
belonging to specific credit rating buckets. The buckets are AAA and AA, A, and BBB. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level. Significance is determined using Newey-West standard errors. Adjusted R² are in percentage points. In the last row, we report the indirect impact 
of sentiment on bond correlation, measured by the average causal mediation effect using the approach of Imai et al. (2010b) as described in Section 2.4.3. The 
corresponding standard errors are bootstrapped. The number of observations is 1,456 in all regressions. 
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2.5. Robustness  
In this section, we perform various robustness tests. In Section 2.5.1, we check for the 
robustness of our results when we use alternative proxies for credit risk and liquidity premium. 
The motivation for this robustness analysis is that CDS mid quotes may not be pure measures 
of credit risk, but may also reflect CDS illiquidity (e.g., Tang and Yan, 2008; Bongaerts et al., 
2011), and bond yield spreads may reflect other time-varying factors than credit risk and 
liquidity (e.g., Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001). In Section 2.5.2, we adjust correlations for 
interest rate risk and unexpected inflation. The reason is that both may affect both credit risk 
premiums and liquidity premiums, and we might erroneously identify this impact as risk factor 
correlation. In Section 2.5.3 we, use alternative proxies for investor sentiment and in Section 
2.5.4 we use the swap-rate as an alternative proxy for the risk-free rate. Finally, we test the 
temporal stability of our results in Section 2.5.5. For the sake of brevity, we report only results 
for the overall market (HY and IG) in the robustness tests.  
2.5.1. Alternative credit risk and liquidity premium 
We first control for the impact of CDS illiquidity on CDS mid premiums: correlation between 
CDS mid quotes and bond yield spreads minus CDS mid quotes (which we use as a proxy for 
liquidity premiums) may also reflect CDS illiquidity. Like Tang and Yan (2008), we use the 
CDS bid-ask spread as the independent variable to identify the liquidity component in the CDS 
mid quote. We run a time-series regression of CDS mid quotes on CDS bid-ask spreads for 
each CDS contract, and then compute risk factor correlation and bond correlation as in Section 
2.2.2 and 2.4.1, this time using the unexplained part instead of the original CDS mid quotes. 
The first two columns of Table 2.6 present the results we obtain when repeating our analyses 
from Section 2.4 for these adjusted correlation measures.  
All our main results remain valid when we use the alternative credit risk premium: 
sentiment explains risk factor correlation, and risk factor correlation explains bond correlation. 
We can therefore exclude CDS illiquidity as an alternative explanation for our effect. 
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.6 we use an alternative measure for the liquidity premium. 
Arguably, part of the non-credit yield spread may be due to factors other than illiquidity. 
Empirically, taxes (Elton et al., 2001), equity volatility and accounting variables (Campbell 
and Taksler, 2003), and an unexplained systematic factor (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001) have 
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Table 2.6: Alternative credit risk and liquidity premium 
 Alternative credit risk premium Alternative liquidity premium 
Explanatory variables RFC BC RFC BC 
Risk factor correlation   0.1920 ***    0.1728 ** 
  (0.0076)    (0.0357)  
Sentiment 0.0028 ** 0.0096 *** 0.0068 *** 0.0082 *** 
 (0.0354)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)   (0.0011)  
Herding   1.9002 **   1.8942 ** 
   (0.0139)    (0.0136)  
Market-wide risk 0.1716 *** -0.1693 *** 0.0624 ** -0.0939 * 
 (0.0000) (0.0007)  (0.0228)  (0.0680)   
Market downturn -0.0806 * 0.2564 *** 0.1247 *** 0.2369 *** 
 (0.0636)  (0.0001) (0.0092)  (0.0006) 
Constant -0.0418 *** 0.1402 ** 0.0363 *** 0.0899 
 (0.0029) (0.0418) (0.0020)  (0.1735) 
Adj. R2 4.80 9.27 11.90 8.49 
Indirect impact   0.0005 ***    0.0012 *** 
      (0.0000)     (0.0000)   
Notes: The table replicates Table 2.4 and 2.5 using only the investment grade and high yield segment. In 
Columns 1 and 2, risk factor correlation (RFC) and bond correlation (BC) are computed using CDS mid quotes 
adjusted for CDS illiquidity as the credit risk measure as described in Section 2.5.1. In Columns 3 and 4, RFC 
and BC are computed using price dispersion as the liquidity measure as described in Section 2.5.1. ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Significance is determined using Newey-West standard 
errors for the regression analyses, and bootstrapped standard errors for the indirect impact. Adjusted R² are in 
percentage points. The number of observations is 1,456 in all regressions. 
been shown to affect bond yield spreads. Directly adjusting for these effects, however, is 
difficult since they differ across bonds but are basically constant over time (taxes, accounting 
variables), unavailable for some bonds (equity volatility), or impossible to proxy for 
(unexplained systematic factors).  
We therefore compute an alternative liquidity measure not derived from yield spreads. 
Jankowitsch et al. (2011) introduce a price dispersion measure that reflects transaction costs 
as well as dealers’ inventory risk and investors’ search costs. Friewald et al. (2012) show that 
this measure is a major liquidity proxy in the corporate bond market. Hence, we focus on price 
dispersion as an alternative measure of bond illiquidity using the modified version of Schestag 
et al. (2016) and compute for each bond i on each trading day t the average price dispersion as 
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where N denotes the number of trades on day t, Qn is the trading volume of trade n on day t, 
Pn is the transaction price of trade n on day t, and P  is the average across all transaction prices 
on day t. This relative dispersion measure gives us an estimate of the effective relative spread. 
We then compute risk factor correlation and bond correlation, using price dispersion as 
the liquidity premium measure. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.6 present the results when we 
repeat the analyses from Section 2.4, using the new risk factor correlation and bond 
correlation. The results clearly show that the main results still hold. Investor sentiment drives 
risk factor correlation and risk factor correlation determines bond correlation. Thus, we can 
reject the hypothesis that our results are driven by our use of the non-credit risk component of 
the yield spread as the liquidity premium. 
2.5.2. Correlations adjusted for interest rate risk and unexpected inflation 
In this section, we control for the impact of interest rate risk and unexpected inflation by 
adjusting our correlation measures. The reason is that interest rate risk might affect both credit 
risk premiums (due to the link between a firm’s default risk and the risk-free rate (see, e.g., 
Duffee, 1999)) and liquidity premiums (because of the flight-to-quality effect). Hence, we 
might erroneously identify interest rate risk as risk factor correlation, leading to spurious 
results in the estimation of Equations (2.7) and (2.8). Similarly, unexpected inflation has been 
proposed as an explanation for time-varying risk aversion (Brandt and Wang, 2003), leading 
to higher market prices of risk for all risk sources, and thus also an increased comovement of 
credit risk and liquidity premiums.  
To control for interest rate risk, we first regress yield spread, credit risk premium, and 
liquidity premium changes on changes in the 5-year constant-maturity Treasury yield. Then, 
we compute risk factor correlation and bond correlation as before, but now use the residuals 
of the first-step regression instead of the original observations. We then repeat the analyses 
from Section 2.4. The results are presented in the first two columns of Table 2.7. 
The first two columns of Table 2.7 show that our main results remain valid when we use 
interest rate risk-adjusted correlations: sentiment explains risk factor correlation, and risk 
factor correlation explains bond correlation. Thus, interest rate risk does not drive our results. 
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Table 2.7: Correlations adjusted for interest rate risk and unexpected inflation 
 Adjustment for interest rate risk  Adjustment for unexpected inflation 
 Explanatory variables RCF BC  RFC BC 
Risk factor correlation   0.3172 ***     0.2787 *** 
  (0.0000)    (0.0015)   
Sentiment 0.0034 *** 0.0089 *** 0.0031 *** 0.0100 *** 
 (0.0003)  (0.0000)  (0.0013)   (0.0000)   
Herding   0.7771   0.8897 
   (0.2241)   (0.2170) 
Market-wide risk 0.2687 *** 0.0045 0.3049 *** 0.0512 
 (0.0000) (0.9213) (0.0000)  (0.3712) 
Market downturn 0.0034 0.0971 0.0372  0.0748 
 (0.9006) (0.1461) (0.1947)  (0.3475) 
Constant -0.0628 *** 0.0722 -0.0810 *** 0.0562 
 (0.0000) (0.2109) (0.0000)  (0.3942) 
Adj. R2 18.42 12.00  24.20 12.58 
Indirect impact   0.0011 ***     0.0009 *** 
     (0.0000)     (0.0000)  
Notes: The table replicates Table 2.4 and 2.5 using only the investment grade and high yield segment. In 
Columns 1 and 2, risk factor correlation (RFC) and bond correlation (BC) are adjusted for interest rate risk as 
described in Section 2.5.2. In Columns 3 and 4, both RFC and BC are adjusted for unexpected inflation as 
described in Section 2.5.2. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Significance is 
determined using Newey-West standard errors for the regression analyses, and bootstrapped standard errors for 
the indirect impact. Adjusted R² are in percentage points. The number of observations is 1,456 in all regressions. 
We next control for the impact of unexpected inflation. We compute unexpected inflation 
as the difference between the realized inflation rate and its forecast using the following 
regression: 
1 1 2 2Inflation nflation nflationI I        t t t t . (2.11) 
Inflation t  denotes the monthly inflation rate based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
provided by the Federal Reserve Economic Database. We use the residuals from the above 
regression as the monthly unexpected inflation, and interpolate between monthly estimates to 
obtain a daily estimate.  
To adjust our correlation measures for unexpected inflation, we use the same approach as 
before. We first regress yield spread, credit risk premium, and liquidity premium changes on 
changes in unexpected inflation. Then, we use the residuals from this regression to compute 
correlations and test our two hypotheses. The results, presented in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 
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2.7, document that our results still hold when we use inflation-adjusted correlations: When 
investor sentiment decreases, risk factor correlation increases, translating into increasing bond 
correlation. Thus, our proposed mechanism remains valid when using inflation-adjusted 
correlations, ruling out the possibility that unexpected inflation drives our results. 
2.5.3. Alternative proxies for investor sentiment 
In this section, we use five alternative proxies for investor sentiment: Individual Investor 
Sentiment Index (AAII) from Thomson Reuters Datastream (weekly) as in Brown and Cliff 
(2004); Economic Cycle Research Institute United States Leading Index (ECRI) (weekly); 
Daily Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU) (daily) suggested by Baker et al. 
(forthcoming)30; St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index (FSI) from the St. Louis Fed (weekly) 
which is similar to the Kansas City Financial Stress Index described in Hakkio and Keeton 
(2009); and the SENTIX World Economic Sentiment Index (SENTIX) (monthly). If 
necessary, we interpolate the indices to a daily frequency. 
The indices offer different ways of capturing sentiment: They are based on surveys of 
investors’ expectations in the US (AAII) and worldwide (SENTIX), screen US newspaper 
articles for positive and negative terms (EPU), are constructed from market variables capturing 
financial stress (FSI), or anticipate turns in the economic cycle (ECRI). Given the index 
construction, high sentiment is associated with high values for AAII, ECRI, and SENTIX and 
low values for EPU and FSI. To assure that all proxies have the same expected sign as our 
main sentiment proxy (VIX), we redefine AAII, ECRI, and SENTIX by multiplying them with 
-1. We again orthogonalize each sentiment index to the macroeconomic factors as in Baker 
and Wurgler (2006) to ensure that they do not capture the state of the economy.  
Table 2.8 shows that our main results also hold when we use alternative proxies for 
investor sentiment. Sentiment drives risk factor correlation, and risk factor correlation drives 
bond correlation, no matter which proxy we use for investor sentiment. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
30 http://www.policyuncertainty.com/us_daily.html 
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Table 2.8: Alternative proxies for investor sentiment 
Panel A: Risk factor correlation as dependent variable 
Explanatory variables AAII ECRI EPU FSI SENTIX 
Sentiment 0.0023 *** 0.0103 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0386 *** 0.0016 * 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0002)   (0.0989)   
Market-wide risk 0.3046 *** 0.2639 *** 0.2961 *** 0.2911 *** 0.2990 *** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)
Market downturn 0.0535 ** 0.0285 0.0239 0.0068  0.0369
 (0.0464) (0.3674) (0.3778) (0.8313)  (0.1971)
Constant -0.0770 *** -0.0613 *** -0.0718 *** -0.0695 *** -0.0736 *** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)
Adj. R2 23.59 26.87 22.18 21.85 21.01 
Panel B: Bond correlation as dependent variable 
Explanatory variables AAII ECRI EPU FSI SENTIX 
Risk factor correlation  0.2933 *** 0.2249 *** 0.2758 *** 0.2361 *** 0.2720 *** 
 (0.0008)  (0.0052)  (0.0003)  (0.0018)   (0.0016)   
Sentiment -0.0010 0.0075 *** 0.0001  0.1296 *** 0.0045 * 
 (0.2952) (0.0038)  (0.7378) (0.0000)   (0.0758)   
Herding 1.4351 ** 0.7133 1.3624 ** 0.8424  1.0865
 (0.0402) (0.2485) (0.0338) (0.1814)  (0.1176)
Market-wide risk 0.0342 0.0274 0.0382 0.0056  0.0234
 (0.5664) (0.5841) (0.4535) (0.9016)  (0.6743)
Market downturn 0.1922 ** 0.1933 *** 0.1960 *** 0.0840  0.1852 ** 
 (0.0175) (0.0032) (0.0064) (0.1237)  (0.0155)
Constant 0.0064 0.0742 0.0115 0.0749  0.0413
 (0.9206) (0.1889) (0.8450) (0.1905)  (0.5205)
Adj. R2 8.64 9.56 8.43 13.24 9.09 
Indirect impact 0.0007 *** 0.0023 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0091 *** 0.0004 ** 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)   (0.0200)   
Notes: The table replicates Table 2.4 (Panel A) and 2.5 (Panel B) for alternative proxies for investor sentiment 
using only the investment grade and high yield segment. AAII is the Individual Investor Sentiment Index, ECRI 
the Economic Cycle Research Institute United States Leading Index, EPU the Daily Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Index, FSI the St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index, and SENTIX the SENTIX World Economic Sentiment Index. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Significance is determined using Newey-West 
standard errors for the regression analyses, and bootstrapped standard errors for the indirect impact. Adjusted R² 
are in percentage points. The number of observations is 1,456 in all regressions. 
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2.5.4. Alternative proxy for the risk-free rate 
In Section 2.4 we use maturity-matched constant maturity US-Treasury bonds to approximate 
risk-free rates. We now show that our results are robust when we use swap rates as a proxy for 
the risk-free rates, as in, e.g., Friewald et al. (2012).31,32 The results are presented in Table 2.9. 
Table 2.9: Swap rate as proxy for the risk-free rate 
Explanatory variables RCF BC 
Risk factor correlation 0.1460 * 
 (0.0667)  
Sentiment 0.0029 *** 0.0078 *** 
 (0.0022)  (0.0002) 
Herding  0.4830  
  (0.4578)  
Market-wide risk 0.3429 *** 0.0203  
 (0.0000) (0.7134) 
Market downturn -0.0433  0.1087 * 
 (0.1589) (0.0770) 
Constant -0.0935 *** 0.1141 * 
 (0.0000) (0.0590) 
Adj. R2 8.63 6.01 
Indirect impact   0.0004 *** 
      (0.0000)   
Notes: The table replicates Table 2.4 and 2.5 using only the investment grade and high yield segment. Instead of 
calculating the risk-free rate from US Treasuries, we now use swap rates. Risk factor correlation (RFC) and bond 
correlation (BC) are computed based on yield spreads computed from swap rates. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Significance is determined using Newey-West standard errors for the 
regression analyses, and bootstrapped standard errors for the indirect impact. Adjusted R² are in percentage 
points. The number of observations is 1,456 in all regressions. 
Table 2.9 shows that our results do not change when we use the swap rate to proxy the 
risk-free rate. The impact of sentiment on risk factor correlation remains significant as does 
the impact of risk factor correlation on bond correlation.  
                                                                                                                                               
31  More specifically, on each trading day we collect US swap rates from Thomson Reuters Datastream of 
maturities between one week and 30 years. We then fit a cubic function with maturity as the independent 
variable to the observed yields, and use the interpolated yield as a proxy for the maturity-matched risk-free 
rate at this date. 
32  Alternatively, one could use Overnight Index Swap rates (Michaud and Upper, 2008), the general collateral 
rate (Longstaff, 2000) or risk-free rates implied by derivatives prices (Brenner and Galai, 1986; Brenner et al., 
1990). However, these rates are either not available for longer maturities, or empirically lie between Treasury 
rates and swap rates (Naranjo, 2009). We therefore focus on plain-vanilla interest rate swap rates. 
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2.5.5. Stability over time 
In this section, we test the stability of our main results over time. We use two time splits. First, 
we split our sample period into two subperiods of equal size. Second, we spilt our sample at 
the beginning of the financial crisis (July 1, 2007 as in Friewald et al., 2012). For each 
subperiod we repeat the analyses from Section 2.4. The results are presented in Table 2.10. 
Table 2.10: Temporal stability 
Panel A: Risk factor correlation as dependent variable 
Explanatory variables First half of  sample period 
Second half of 
sample period 
 Before  
July 2007 From July 2007 
Sentiment 0.0059 ** 0.0020 * 0.0094 *** 0.0023 ** 
 (0.0124) (0.0625) (0.0001)   (0.0251)   
Market-wide risk 0.3372 *** 0.3203 *** 0.3009 *** 0.3351 *** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Market downturn 0.0145  0.0675 ** 0.0422  0.0611 ** 
 (0.5872) (0.0154) (0.1161)  (0.0265)  
Constant -0.0352 ** -0.1359 *** -0.0068  -0.1461 *** 
 (0.0126) (0.0000) (0.6188)  (0.0000)  
Adj. R2 17.57 34.90  20.23 34.33 
Panel B: Bond correlation as dependent variable 
Explanatory variables First half of sample period 
Second half of 
sample period 
 Before  
July 2007 From July 2007 
Risk factor correlation  0.3148 *** 0.4125 *** 0.4003 *** 0.5227 *** 
 (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0003)   (0.0000)   
Sentiment 0.0227 *** 0.0101 *** 0.0116 ** 0.0110 *** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0400)   (0.0000)   
Herding -0.7876  -0.5408  0.0053  -1.7016 ** 
 (0.3967)  (0.5720)  (0.9956)  (0.0255)  
Market-wide risk 0.1489 ** -0.0100  0.1437 ** -0.0769  
 (0.0198) (0.8784) (0.0201)  (0.1532)  
Market downturn -0.3764 *** 0.0236  -0.3952 *** 0.0065  
 (0.0000) (0.7332) (0.0000)  (0.9116)  
Constant 0.1823 ** 0.2728 *** 0.0707  0.4254 *** 
 (0.0232) (0.0036) (0.3818)  (0.0000)  
Adj. R2 18.28 20.68  20.82 21.69 
Indirect impact 0.0019 *** 0.0008 ** 0.0037 *** 0.0012 *** 
 (0.0000) (0.0100) (0.0000)   (0.0000)  
Notes: The table replicates Table 2.4 (Panel A) and 2.5 (Panel B) using only the investment grade and high yield 
segment. In Columns 1 and 2, we report results for the first and second half of the sample period. The number of 
observations is 728 in each subsample. In Columns 3 and 4, we cut the sample at July 1st, 2007 as in Friewald et 
al. (2012) to capture the beginning of the financial crisis. The number of observations is 644 in the first and 812 
in the second subsample. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Significance is 
determined using Newey-West standard errors for the regression analyses, and bootstrapped standard errors for 
the indirect impact. Adjusted R² are in percentage points. 
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Table 2.10 shows that our results are stable when splitting our sample in the middle or at 
the beginning at the financial crisis. In both subperiods, we find a significant impact of 
sentiment on risk factor correlation and of risk factor correlation on bond correlation. Since 
the effects seem to be so stable over time, we expect our findings to remain valid in the years 
following our sample period. 
2.6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we theoretically and empirically explore the link between investor sentiment, 
risk factor correlation, and bond correlation. We set up a simple theoretical model that shows 
that investors exhibit a stronger flight-to-quality when sentiment is low. This in turn leads to 
higher risk factor correlation between the two main risk factors in corporate bond markets: 
credit risk and liquidity. As a consequence of this higher risk factor correlation when sentiment 
is low, bonds exhibit a higher comovement. Thus, sentiment-induced flight-to-quality 
effectively reduces diversification benefits across corporate bonds. 
We test our model predictions using data on US corporate bonds and find strong and 
robust empirical support for our hypotheses: (i) When investor sentiment decreases, risk factor 
correlation increases. (ii) This increasing risk factor correlation translates into increasing bond 
correlation. We rule out several alternative explanations for our findings and show that they 
are stable over time and in the cross-section. 
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2.A. Model relating investor sentiment to bond correlation 
In Section 2.3, we outline the economic intuition of how risk factor correlation is linked to 
investor sentiment and how bond correlation is linked to risk factor correlation. We formalize 
this intuition in a discrete two-factor model in this appendix. We first provide a detailed model 
description and then derive our hypotheses.  
2.A.1. Model setup 
Our model is based on a discrete two-factor Hull and White (1994) term structure model. We 
consider a single default-risky zero bond with two periods to maturity. The bond can default 
after one period (t=1) or after two periods (t=2). Default occurs at the end of a period, and in 
default the bond holder is paid a fraction R (recovery rate) of the bond’s notional value. For 
simplicity, we set the default-free interest rate r and the bond’s recovery rate to zero (r=0, 
R=0). The credit risk of this bond is described by the risk-neutral survival probability P : 
  2
1
1 2, exp 

      
t
t
t t
P t t , (2.12) 
where t  is the discrete stochastic default intensity at time t. We model the default intensity 
evolution from 0  (which is known at t=0) to 1  (conditional on no default in t=1, which 
occurs with probability 01 exp( )  PD ). The default intensity can increase or decrease by 
a constant factor   or remain the same     1 1 1 1 0 0 0, , ,,             m du  and the 
unconditional probability of the states are (1 )   uPD p , (1 )   mPD p , and (1 )   dPD p , 
respectively. The conditional probabilities for each state are derived via the following moment 
conditions of Schönbucher (2002): 
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The first condition implies that there are no other states for the default intensity in t=1. 
The second condition ensures that there is no drift in the default intensity. The third condition 
links the conditional probabilities to the conditional variance.  
Now consider a bond affected by illiquidity. The price impact of illiquidity is described 
by a liquidity discount factor L : 
  2
1
1 2, exp 

      
t
t
t t
L t t , (2.14) 
where t  is a non-negative, discrete stochastic liquidity intensity process. We model the 
evolution of t  in a similar trinomial tree model as the evolution of t . In Figure 2.2, we 
describe the common dynamics of the credit risk and liquidity intensity.  
Panel A of Figure 2.2 shows the base case where the credit risk and liquidity intensity are 
independent. In Panel B of Figure 2.2, we introduce the well-known flight-to-quality by 
allowing for a positive correlation between both intensities without taking investor sentiment 
into account. We model this as Schönbucher (2002) and introduce a parameter   that ranges 
from zero to one. This parameter affects the joint probabilities of the credit risk and liquidity 
intensity. For 0  , it increases the joint probabilities for states where both intensities move 
in the same direction: higher   indicates higher correlation between the two intensities. Hence, 
positive values of   model the price effect of investors’ flight-to-quality behavior not due to 
investor sentiment. 
Panel C of Figure 2.2 displays our full model, which also takes investor sentiment and its 
impact on flight-to-quality into account. We capture investor sentiment in the parameter x . 
Larger values of x  ( 1 1)  x  indicate lower investor sentiment. The non-negative random 
variable ta  captures fundamental news about the firm. Thus, our full model extends the model 
in Panel B of Figure 2.2 by allowing an additional sentiment-driven flight-to-quality. We 
assume (consistent with the empirical evidence of Mian and Sankaraguruswamy, 2012) that 
investors react more to negative information than to neutral or positive information when 
investor sentiment is low. Thus, ta  takes on a value of 1ua  for 1u , 1ma  for 1m , and 1da  for 1 d  
with 1 1 10   d m ua a a . Consistent with the assumption that 0 1  m , we choose 0 1 . ma a  
  
 
 
2. Investor Sentiment, Flight-to-Quality, and Corporate Bond Comovement 38 
 
Figure 2.2: Reduced-form credit risk and liquidity model 
 
Panel A: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: 
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Figure 1.2 (Continued): Reduced-form credit risk and liquidity model 
 
Panel C: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure displays the joint dynamics of default and liquidity intensities, conditional on no default at time 1. At time 0,   and   equal 0  and 0 . At time 1, the 
default intensity may increase ( 1 0    u ) with probability up , decrease ( 1 0    d ) with probability dp , or remain the same ( 1 0 m ) with probability mp . 
  is defined as 3 .     t  Also, the liquidity intensity may increase ( 1 0    u ) with probability up , decrease ( 1 0   d ) with probability dp , or 
remain the same ( 1 0 m ) with probability mp .   is defined as 3 .     t  Panel A displays the tree for uncorrelated intensities. Panel B shows the tree for 
correlated intensities. Panel C presents our final model. There, the liquidity intensity level depends on the default intensity level. This is modeled by the random variable 
 1 1 1 1, , u m da a a a . Furthermore the influence of investor sentiment on liquidity intensities is modeled by the parameter x  where high values of x  indicate low investor 
sentiment. 
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2.A.2. Impact of investor sentiment on risk factor correlation 
Based on the model described above, we now derive the correlation between changes in a 
corporate bond’s credit risk premium and liquidity premium, and show that this correlation 
increases when investor sentiment decreases.  
We start by considering a zero bond with maturity in t=2 which is only subject to credit 
risk. From the perspective of time t=1 and conditional on no default at t=1, the risk-neutral 
price of such a zero bond is 1exp( )  and the log yield a risk-neutral investor requires for 
investing in this bond equals: 
  111
1log
e
.
xp

     
cr  (2.15) 
At time t=0, the bond price is 00 1exp( exp() )     E , and the per-period log yield required 
by a risk-neutral investor is: 
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with        0 1 1 11exp p exp p exp p exp                 u m du m dE . Since the bond price is 
determined solely by credit risk, the change in its log yield equals the change in the credit risk 
premium: 
     01 0 11 0 1 log exp .2           cr cr cr E  (2.17) 
Now consider a bond that is subject to both credit risk and illiquidity. From the perspective 
of time t=1 and conditional on no default in t=1, this bond has a risk-neutral price of 
  1 1 1exp 1     a x  and a log yield of  1 1 1 11   y as x . At time t=0, the price is 
     0 0 1 110 0exp 1 exp 1              a x E a x , and the corresponding per-period 
log yield is  
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       0 0 00 0 1 1 11 1 log exp 12                ys a x E a x  (2.18) 
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 (2.19) 
Since the yield of this zero bond consists of the credit risk premium (which is known from 
Equations (2.15) and (2.16)) and the liquidity premium, the latter equals: 
 1 1 1 1 11 ,     liq ys cr a x  (2.20) 
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The liquidity premium change is: 
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 (2.22) 
The correlation between credit risk and liquidity premium changes can now be easily derived. 
Since the terms in brackets are constants in Equations (2.17) and (2.22), the covariance 
between credit risk and liquidity premium changes is given by: 
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The expected values are  
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 (2.26) 
The correlation between credit risk and liquidity premium changes directly follows from 
these expressions. Note that the correlation depends on investor sentiment x . Figure 2.3 
illustrates the impact of investor sentiment on risk factor correlation. More specifically, it 
shows that risk factor correlation increases when investor sentiment decreases, the first 
hypothesis stated in Section 2.3. 
Figure 2.3: Risk factor correlation and sentiment 
 
Notes: The figure displays correlation between credit risk and liquidity premium changes as a function of investor 
sentiment x. High values of x indicate low investor sentiment. The plot is based on the following parameter 
values: 0 01,  3.00%,  2.00%,  1.73%,  1.30%,  a 1.00,  a 0.50,  a 0.00.             u m dt  
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To prove this relation formally, we show that the first derivative of the correlation with 
respect to x  is larger than zero. We assume that the usual regularity conditions apply for all 
random variables, i.e., the first and second moment exist and are finite, and the variance is 
positive. For ease of exposition, we consider the case 0  , i.e., the flight-to-quality effect is 
purely driven by sentiment. However, the relation also holds in the more general case 0.   
We start by showing how the numerator of the correlation, the covariance between credit 
risk and liquidity premium changes, depends on investor sentiment. For 0  , 1  and 1  are 
independent. Therefore, the covariance summands given in Equation (2.23) can be written as  
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Consequently, the covariance between the premium changes becomes 
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Equation (2.29) shows two properties of our model. First, the covariance between the 
premium changes increases when investor sentiment decreases, since  
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is always positive. This follows from the fact that by construction (i) 1  has no drift
 11 0    m E , and (ii) the following inequalities hold: 
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Second, since the second and third factor in (2.29) are positive, the covariance between the 
premium changes is positive if x > 0 (bad sentiment) and negative if x < 0 (good sentiment). 
Thus, our model can generate both positive and negative risk factor correlations. 
The denominator of the bond correlation equals the square root of the product of the 
variances of premium changes. The credit risk premium, and hence its change, is independent 
of investor sentiment .x  Hence, its variance is also independent of .x  The variance of the 
liquidity premium, however, depends on :x  
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 (2.32) 
Using Equations (2.29) and (2.32) and taking the first derivative of the correlation with 
respect to x  yields: 
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The usual regularity conditions for random variables and the fact that  0 1 1, 0 ar aCov  
ensure that the first two terms after the second equal sign in Equation (2.33) are positive. 
To show that the product of the last two terms in Equation (2.33) is also positive, we re-
write the third term in Equation (2.33) using the independence of 1  and 1a : 
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We further use (2.32) and re-write the last term in brackets in Equation (2.33) as 
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Multiplying Equation (2.35) with Equation (2.34) results in: 
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 (2.36) 
Consequently, the product of the last two terms in Equation (2.33) is always positive. This 
proves that risk factor correlation increases when investor sentiment decreases – the first 
hypothesis tested in the empirical part of our paper. 
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2.A.3. Bond correlation and risk factor correlation 
In this section, we provide a formal proof that higher risk factor correlation translates into 
higher bond correlation. We consider two bonds, e.g., one investment grade bond i and one 
high yield bond h with positive default and liquidity intensities / ,i h t  and / , .i h t  Both intensities 
contain a systematic credit risk and a systematic liquidity intensity, ,m t  and ,m t , as well as 
idiosyncratic credit risk and liquidity intensities, /i h  and /i h . For ease of exposition, we use 
the notation  / / , / / ,: 1      xi h m t i h m t ta x  in the following. We define the default and liquidity 
intensities for bonds i  and h  as follows: 
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 (2.37) 
We assume that the systematic factors are positively correlated, the idiosyncratic risk factors 
are uncorrelated with the systematic risk factors and across bonds, and that both bonds have 
positive loadings on the systematic factors ( , 0 i , , 0 i , , 0 h , , 0 h ).  
The covariance between the yield spread changes of bond i and h is given by 
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 (2.38) 
since the constants in brackets in (2.17) and (2.22) drop out of the covariance. Equation (2.38) 
shows three properties of our model: first, the covariance between the two bonds increases 
when the correlation between the systematic intensities ,1m  and ,1 xm  increases. Second, bond 
correlation is strictly positive if risk factor correlation is positive. Third, for sufficiently 
negative correlation between ,1m  and ,1 xm , the covariance between the two bonds (and thus 
bond correlation) can become negative. Whether bond correlation is negative depends on the 
standard deviation ratios of ,1m  and ,1 xm  and on the systematic risk factor loadings ,i , ,i , 
,h , and ,h : 
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Equation (2.39) shows that bond correlation can become negative for sufficiently negative risk 
factor correlation. This is the case whenever either ,
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. We illustrate this relation in Figure 2.4. 
Figure 2.4: Bond correlation and risk factor correlation 
 
Notes: The figure displays correlation between bond yield spread changes as a function of investor sentiment risk 
factor correlation. The plot is based on the following parameter values: 
   , , , ,  1.13 0.60,  0.01,  2.72,  0.15, 0.14.              m mi h i h Var Var  
Figure 2.4 shows that bond correlation monotonously increases in risk factor correlation 
and becomes positive for risk factor correlations higher than -0.24.  
We now turn to the formal analysis of the relation between bond correlation and risk factor 
correlation. The denominator of the correlation between the yield spread changes equals the 
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square root of the product of the variances of the yield spread change of bonds i and h. The 
variance of  / i hys  can be expressed as follows: 
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 (2.40) 
We now use Equations (2.38) and (2.40) to calculate the first derivative of the correlation 
between  iys  and  hys : 
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 (2.41) 
with respect to risk factor correlation  0 ,1 ,1,   xm mCorr :  
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 (2.42) 
The first factor is a function of the variances of the yield spread changes, systematic credit 
risk, and liquidity intensities. Due to the regularity conditions, all variances are larger than 
zero. Hence, we consider the second factor and show that it is larger than zero. We first show 
this for  0 ,1 ,1,0 1    xm mCorr  and address negative risk factor correlation below.  
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Expanding the second factor results in: 
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Due to our assumptions ( , 0 i , , 0 i , , 0 h , , 0 h ,  0 ,1 ,1,0 1    xm mCorr ) and 
the fact that all variances are larger than zero, 1summand  is larger than zero. Hence, it only 
remains to show that 2summand  and 3summand  are larger than or equal to zero. Rearranging 
2summand  gives: 
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Both terms in braces in Equation (2.44) always have the same sign. If , , , , ,      h i h i  it 
follows that 2 2 2 2, , , ,      h i h i . Similarly this holds for , , , ,      h i h i . If , , , ,      h i h i  , 
then the product is zero. Consequently Equation (2.44) is always larger than or equal to zero. 
Rearranging 3summand  gives: 
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Due to our assumptions ( , 0 i , , 0 i , , 0 h , , 0 h ,  0 ,1 ,1,0 1    xm mCorr ) and 
the fact that all variances are larger than zero, all factors in Equation (2.45) are larger than or 
equal to zero. Hence, we have shown that Equations (2.44) and (2.45) are larger than or equal 
to zero.  
We now turn to negative risk factor correlation. As discussed above, negative risk factor 
correlation can result in negative bond correlation. Equation (2.42) directly shows that 
negative bond correlation always increases in risk factor correlation, since all terms in brackets 
are positive. It therefore remains to be shown whether bond correlation also increases in risk 
factor correlation when bond correlation is positive (and risk factor correlation is negative). 
This positive relation will not hold in general, and we therefore derive conditions under which 
it holds. From Equation (2.42), we know that bond correlation increases in risk factor 
correlation if and only if 
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 (2.46) 
Without loss of generality, we set    1Var =z Var  i hys ys , , 2 ,   i hz , and 
, 3 ,   i hz . It is economically plausible that 1 1z , 2 1z , and 3 1z  since we consider 
two bonds with different credit and liquidity risk, e.g., one investment grade bond i and one 
high yield bond h. The condition therefore becomes  
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 (2.47) 
For the special case that 1 3z z , it is immediately clear that Equation (2.47) holds, since the 
correlation is positive but bounded from above by 1. Otherwise, Equation (2.47) holds when 
either 1 2z z  or 1 3z z  . 
This completes our analysis of the relation between bond correlation and risk factor 
correlation. This substantiates the economic rationale of our second hypothesis to be tested in 
the empirical part of our paper. 
 
   
 
Chapter 3† 
 
3. Forecasting Credit Default Swap 
Premiums with Google Search Volume 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Individuals’ decisions are all based on a decision making process that weighs up several 
different alternatives resulting from a given subset of information (Simon, 1955). Today, 
Google is one of the major internet search engines for individuals to gather information for 
their decisions. Nearly 80% of US households had access to the internet and 64% of US 
citizens used Google for their internet searches in 2015 (e.g., eMarketer, 2016; Comscore, 
2016). Thus, it is likely that individuals’ also use Google to gather information for their 
consumer decisions. Thereby they reveal their sentiment through their search queries 
(Demartini and Siersdorfer, 2010). Finally, their sentiment influences their consumption and 
consequently economic output. Consistent with this view, the aggregated volume of Google 
search queries (Google search volume) contains valuable consumption information before 
other financial variables or economic indicators (e.g., McLaren and Shanbhogue, 2011; Vosen 
and Schmidt, 2011; Choi and Varian, 2012). However, it is still an open issue whether 
aggregated Google search volume contains fundamental information for capital markets (e.g., 
Da et al., 2011b; Da et al., 2015; Dimpfl and Jank, 2016). This paper adds to the literature by 
analyzing whether aggregated volume of Google search queries has fundamental value for 
capital markets by following a new approach based on the credit default swap (CDS) market. 
                                                                                                                                               
† This chapter is based on Bethke and Gehde-Trapp (2016). 
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CDS simplified the tradability of credit risk since their introduction at the end of the 
twentieth century. A CDS is a credit derivative designed as a credit insurance contract. Its 
payoff is linked to the default or change in default probability of a certain issuer or bond. The 
contracts are solely traded by institutional investors who are well-informed (e.g., Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2004; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009). This reduces the influence of uninformed noise 
trading often found for stocks (Baker and Wurgler, 2006) and leads to an efficient pricing of 
information for CDS (e.g., Norden and Weber, 2004; Acharya and Johnson, 2007). Finally, 
Tang and Yan (2010) show that monthly measured consumer sentiment is a determinant of 
CDS premiums while Google allows us to capture daily consumer sentiment before any other 
financial variable. Thus, the CDS market provides an ideal setting to analyze the fundamental 
value of Google search volume. If aggregated Google search volume possesses fundamental 
value for the CDS market, it should improve CDS premium forecasts. If it even contains 
fundamental information not yet reflected in CDS premiums, we expect it to predict trends in 
CDS premium changes. Given the characteristics of the CDS market, these findings would be 
strong evidence for the fundamental value of Google search volume also for other capital 
markets. 
In this paper, we focus on the Markit CDX Investment Grade Index.33 More precisely, our 
analyses focus on CDS premium changes due to stationarity reasons (e.g., Byström, 2006; 
Avino and Nneji, 2014). In addition, we use aggregated volume of Google search queries for 
the period from January 1, 2004 to December 27, 2013 for a large set of terms. These are 
positive and negative connoted terms within the General Inquirer’s merged word list of the 
Harvard IV-4 dictionary and Lasswell value dictionary as well as the Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) word list. We are able to download the daily aggregated US search volume of 
3,404 terms. In the following we use the method of Da et al. (2015) to construct a Google 
index capturing consumer sentiment. Every six months we identify the index constituents by 
regressing CDS premium changes on the contemporaneous search volume of each term. The 
literature documents terms with a negative market impact to be best in identifying sentiment 
(e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Da et al., 2015). Thus, those 30 terms with the highest positive t-statistic 
constitute our index for the next 6 months. 
In advance, it is not obvious which terms should be considered in the index constituent 
computation, because we do not know whether all or only economic terms of our word list 
                                                                                                                                               
33 A CDS index is designed as a credit insurance contract whose payoff is linked to the credit risk of a basket of 
firms. 
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capture sentiment better. Furthermore, it is unknown beforehand which subset of terms 
contains additional information not already captured by other financial variables. Our large set 
of terms with Google search volume allows us to analyze subsets of terms. Thus, we first 
compute one daily Google index based on all 3,404 terms. Second, we limit the choice of 
terms to economic terms and again compute one daily Google index. Consistent with the 
findings of Tang and Yan (2010), our results show that both Google indices are significantly 
positively related to CDS premium changes. However, only the Google index based on our 
full set of terms remains significant after the inclusion of control variables. Thus, this index 
seems to contain contemporaneous information not already captured by well-established 
determinants of CDS premium changes. 
Given the previous result, we know that our Google indices comove with CDS premium 
changes. In line with the above economic rationale of these indices containing information not 
yet reflected in CDS premium changes, we expect our Google indices to have predictive power 
for CDS premium changes. This expectation is supported by our in-sample forecast results. 
Both Google indices predict CDS premium change reversals. If Google search volume even 
contains fundamental information, we expect it to predict trends in CDS premium changes. 
However, the Google indices predict CDS premium change reversals. This result is in line 
with even the CDS market being temporarily influenced by shocks to overall risk aversion 
(e.g., Tetlock, 2007 ;Tang and Yan, 2010). Hence, our results show that the Google indices 
contain no new fundamental information for the CDS market. But, they possess fundamental 
value as indicated by their predictive power. 
However, a model’s better in-sample explanatory power does not necessarily translate 
into better out-of-sample forecast accuracy. Our results show that the overall out-of-sample 
predictive power of our Google indices is weak. Specifically, adding our Google indices in 
out-of-sample forecasts does not significantly enhance the forecasts’ accuracy relative to 
models without them. In line with Avino and Nneji (2014), we document that a simple 
autoregressive model only considering lagged CDS premium changes has the highest forecast 
accuracy. Thus, these findings support that information is priced efficiently for CDS. 
Nevertheless, analyzing Google search volume is valuable. We find that the Google index 
based on economic terms improves forecasts in times of high CDS volatility while its forecasts 
in low volatility regimes are not statistically different to those not considering this Google 
index. Thus, when precise forecasts are most needed information in Google search volume is 
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valuable. Additionally, both Google indices statistically significantly improve forecasts for 
longer forecast horizons with low economic significance. Overall, these results reveal that 
Google search volume provides fundamental value especially in times when forecasts are more 
demanding. For CDS investors, it may be one source of information to maintain or even 
increase the informational efficiency of the CDS market. 
Having established our main results, we run several robustness tests. First, we provide 
evidence for the assumption underlying all our analyses of the Google indices containing 
information before CDS premium changes and not vice versa. The results of Granger causality 
tests document the validity of this assumption. Second, we compare our indices to the FEARS 
index suggested by Da et al. (2015) by adding it as a further control variable to our regression 
models. We find that the impact of our indices does not evaporate. Third, our results hold 
when varying the number of index constituents. Finally, we limit the index construction to 
only negative connoted (economic) terms and show that it is important to consider positive 
and negative terms for the index not limited to economic terms. 
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the literature 
analyzing the determinants of firms’ credit risk based on yield spreads or CDS premiums. A 
vast literature focuses on firm-specific determinants of CDS premiums (e.g., Benkert, 2004; 
Ericsson et al., 2009; Callen et al., 2009; Tang and Yan, 2013; Bai and Wu, 2014). However, 
we add to the literature analyzing the impact of market-wide variables. Theoretically, Tang 
and Yan (2006) propose a model in which macroeconomic variables determine firms’ credit 
risk while Chen (2010) argues that firms adjust their financing policy to macroeconomic 
conditions leading to countercyclical behavior of their credit risk. Empirically, Carling et al. 
(2007) show the relevance of macroeconomic variables in explaining firms‘ credit risk. Huang 
and Kong (2008) find that the announcement of macroeconomic news has an impact on firms‘ 
yield spreads, especially for high yield firms. In addition, Baum and Chi (2010) and 
Wisniewski and Lambe (2015) find macroeconomic uncertainty to determine CDS premiums 
and CDS premium changes. Byström (2006) shows that the stock market return and volatility 
determine European CDS premium changes. Breitenfellner and Wagner (2012) extend this 
study by showing that stock returns and implied stock market volatility are determinants after 
the financial crisis in 2008 while global financial variables such as the gold price and the global 
stock market return are main drivers before and in the financial crisis. Additionally, there 
exists a scarce literature analyzing the impact of consumer sentiment on CDS premiums. 
 
 
3. Forecasting Credit Default Swap Premiums with Google Search Volume 56 
 
Carling et al. (2007), Tang and Yan (2010) and Tang and Yan (2013) show that consumer 
sentiment influences CDS premiums negatively. Thereby consumer sentiment is used as a 
proxy for overall risk aversion. We contribute to this literature by documenting that daily 
aggregated Google search volume determines CDS premiums. Overall, our results are in line 
with Google search volume being a proxy for overall risk aversion. 
Second, our paper extends the literature on the predictability of credit risk. Krishnan et al. 
(2010) document that the shape of the risk-free yield curve improves yield spread forecasts. 
Gündüz and Uhrig-Homburg (2011) find predictive power of CDS premiums for CDS 
premiums of firms within the same credit rating bucket. Norden (2014) analyzes the CDS 
market efficiency and shows that CDS premiums contain public and private information. 
Finally, Avino and Nneji (2014) find simple autoregressive models with one lag to have the 
highest forecast accuracy for CDS premium changes. We add to this literature by providing 
additional evidence on the informational efficiency of the CDS market and by showing that 
Google search volume is a source of further valuable information as indicated by its predictive 
power for CDS premium changes. 
Finally, we contribute to the literature analyzing the fundamental value of Google search 
volume. So far, the existing literature focuses on stock markets. Thereby the literature may be 
split into two strands: On the one hand, papers use Google search volume to capture sentiment 
(Da et al., 2015). On the other hand, studies use Google search volume to extract investor 
attention for specific stocks (Da et al., 2011a). A short-lived influence of Google search 
volume is documented by (e.g., Da et al., 2015; Dimpfl and Jank, 2016). Their findings are 
consistent with noise trader models (e.g., De Long et al., 1990; Subrahmanyam, 2005) or 
models where trades do not arise due to information, i.e. liquidity needs or changes in overall 
risk aversion (e.g., Campbell et al., 1993; Hendershott and Menkveld, 2014). Persistent 
influence of Google search volume on prices is documented by (Da et al., 2011b). We 
contribute to this literature by documenting a temporary impact of Google search volume on 
CDS premium changes being in line with shocks to overall risk aversion. Furthermore, we 
analyze different sets of terms and the difference in their fundamental value for the CDS 
market. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe our sample 
and the construction of Google indices. The in-sample predictive power of our Google indices 
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is tested in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we investigate the out-of-sample predictive power. 
Various robustness tests provides Section 3.5 and Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2. Data and Google index construction 
The paper uses data from several sources. Section 3.2.1 describes the data of the basic sample 
of CDS premiums and control variables. Section 3.2.2 describes how we use aggregated 
volume of Google search queries to compute two Google indices. 
3.2.1. CDS sample 
The paper uses CDS mid quotes of the Markit CDX Investment Grade Index (CDS premiums) 
with five years to maturity downloaded from Bloomberg. Our sample period lasts from 
November 19, 2004 to December 30, 2013. The CDS index is a credit insurance contract 
whose payoff is linked to the credit risk of a basket of firms. Every six months a new series of 
the index is issued with an updated basket of firms. Our index values describe the mid quotes 
of the most recent series at a point in time. Figure 3.1 shows the time-series evolution of the 
CDS premiums. 
Figure 3.1: Markit CDX Investment Grade Index time series 
 
Notes: The figure displays the time series of CDS mid quotes in basis points of the Markit CDX Investment 
Grade Index. The depicted time period lasts from November 19, 2004 to December 30, 2013. 
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Figure 3.1 shows that the CDS premiums rose enormously with the onset of the financial 
crisis in 2008. Peaks are around the acquisition of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan (March 16, 2008) 
and the September 2008 turmoil (federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on 
September 7, the acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America on September 14, and the 
Lehman default on September 15). After these events CDS premiums remained at higher 
levels as before. The figure indicates that the time series is not stationary. Thus, we analyze 
first differences of CDS premiums in the following (e.g., Byström, 2006; Breitenfellner and 
Wagner, 2012; Avino and Nneji, 2014). 
Additionally, we obtain further market variables from Thomson Reuters Datastream and 
the Federal Reserve Economic Database34. The variables are the S&P 500 Index return, 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) daily market volatility index (VIX), the 5-year 
USD Libor swap rate, and the term spread defined as the difference between the 10-year and 
2-year US Treasury note rate. Finally, we download the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business 
Conditions Index (ADS Index)35 suggested by Aruoba et al. (2009) and the daily Economic 
Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU Index)36 suggested by Baker et al. (forthcoming). Summing 
up, we use the same sets of control variables in our regressions in Section 3.3 to 3.5 as Avino 
and Nneji (2014) and Da et al. (2015). Consistent with the literature, we use the S&P 500 
Index return and the CBOE VIX as proxies for stock market returns and volatility found to be 
determinants of CDS premium changes (Breitenfellner and Wagner, 2012). The 5-year USD 
Libor swap rate proxies for the risk-free rate (Houweling and Vorst, 2005). The term spread 
describes the steepness of the yield curve (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001). The ADS Index 
measures the overall state of macroeconomic conditions (Aruoba et al., 2009) with higher 
values indicating better conditions. Baker et al. (forthcoming) show that their EPU Index 
measures policy-related economic uncertainty and has an impact on economic output. 
Wisniewski and Lambe (2015) find this index to be related to CDS premium changes. 
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of changes in CDS premiums and the control 
variables. The statistics are comparable to those reported by Avino and Nneji (2014). Overall, 
the variables are stationary as indicated by the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Thus, the 
analyses in the following sections base on changes in CDS premiums and control variables. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
34 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 
35 https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/business-conditions-index 
36 http://www.policyuncertainty.com/us_daily.html 
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of sample variables 
  Mean Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera   ADF  
CDS 0.0062 3.8210 0.1046 19.9724 38072.4609 *** -32.1325 ***
CBOEVIX -0.0005 1.9049 0.6056 18.1176 31465.5094 *** -39.0817 ***
S&P 500 0.0003 0.0132 -0.4271 10.5122 10613.4828 *** -37.101 ***
Swap rate -0.0010 0.0610 -0.0034 4.3479 1802.4493 *** -34.1983 ***
Term spread 0.0006 0.0449 -0.0178 5.4717 2855.3591 *** -33.8151 ***
ADS Index 0.0001 0.0278 1.3394 35.3271 119802.4130 *** -13.8814 ***
EPU Index -0.0142 58.3453 0.0152 3.8664 1425.1469 *** -54.5923 ***
Notes: The table reports the summary statistics of the main variables in our sample. We report the mean, standard 
deviation (Std. dev.), skewness (Skewness), kurtosis (Kurtosis), Jarque-Bera test statistic (Jarque-Bera), and 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic (ADF) of these variables for the full sample period from November 19, 
2004 to December 30, 2013. CDS is the change in the Markit CDX Investment Grade Index. S&P 500 is the 
return of the S&P 500 Index. CBOEVIX is the change in the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility 
Index computed out of S&P 500 Index option prices. Swap rate is the change in the 5-year USD-Libor Swap rate. 
Term spread is the change in the difference between the 10-year and 2-year Treasury rate. ADS Index is the 
change in the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions index. EPU Index is change in the daily Economic 
Policy Uncertainty index. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
3.2.2. ALL-SVI and FIN-SVI Google index construction 
We obtain aggregated volume of Google search queries (Google search volume) from Google 
Trends.37 For terms with enough searches, this Google product provides the aggregated search 
volume for these terms scaled by the maximum search volume within a pre-defined region and 
time period. We download the US search volume for all positive and negative connoted terms 
within the General Inquirer’s merged word list of the Harvard IV-4 dictionary and Lasswell 
value dictionary as well as the Loughran and McDonald (2011) word list for the period from 
January 1, 2004 to December 27, 2013. In our analyses we only consider time series longer 
than one year. Based on this criterion, we get daily time series for 3,404 terms. Thus, our 
analyses base on an extremely large set of daily time series of Google search volume. In the 
appendix we provide a more detailed description on how we compute daily time series. 
To construct Google indices, we mainly follow Da et al. (2015). First, we compute log 
differences of each search volume time series 
, , , 1log( ) log( )  i t i t i tSV SV SV   (3.1) 
                                                                                                                                               
37 http://www.google.com/trends 
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where ,i tSV  is the search volume for the i-th term at day t. Da et al. (2015) document 
seasonality effects and heteroscedasticity of search volume time series. Therefore, they adjust 
the time series of their sample once for the full sample period. Contrary, we adjust the time 
series in our sample on each day since we expect Google indices to have predictive power for 
CDS premium changes. Thus, we should only use the information up to a specific day to adjust 
our data. Specifically, for each log difference time series of search volume on each day we 
winsorize the 2.5% smallest and 2.5% largest observations in the period from January 1, 2004 
to the specific day. Afterwards, we remove seasonality by regressing the log differences on 
weekday and month dummies and use the residuals in the following (Da et al., 2015). Finally, 
we standardize the residual time series by dividing by the time series’ standard deviation 
resulting in adjusted log differences of search volume time series ( , i tASV ). 
Having cleaned the search volume data, we are able to compute a Google index. 
Consistent with Tetlock (2007) and Da et al. (2015), we assume terms with a negative market 
impact to be best in identifying sentiment. Every 6 months, we separately regress the time 
series of adjusted search volume of all terms up to the index constituents’ computation date 
on contemporaneous CDS premium changes.38 Then, the constituents of our Google index are 
the 30 terms with the highest positive t-statistics. We finally compute the Google index on day 
t by using the most recent index constituents and summing up the most recent adjusted log 
differences of search volume ( , i tASV ) for day t of these terms as in Da et al. (2015) resulting 
in one Google index times series ( tSVI ) 
30
,
1
.

 t i t
i
SVI ASV   (3.2) 
Our large set of terms with Google search volume allows us to analyze subsets of terms. Using 
the described procedure, we compute a Google index based on all positive and negative 
connoted terms (  tALL SVI ) and a Google index based on all positive and negative connoted 
economic terms (  tFIN SVI ).39 We choose these two sets of possible terms because Da et al. 
(2015) base their index construction on economic terms only. Thereby they assume that only 
                                                                                                                                               
38 Terms have to have at least half a year of available Google search volume to be considered as potential index 
constituents. 
39 Economic terms are those terms in the categories Econ@ or ECON of the General Inquirer’s merged list of the 
Harvard IV-4 dictionary and Lasswell value dictionary. The analysis of economic terms is based on 120 Google 
search volume time series. 
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economic terms contain consumer sentiment information. However, ultimately this is not 
obvious. Consumers, i.e. individuals, reveal their sentiment in their daily searches irrespective 
of whether these are economic terms or not (Demartini and Siersdorfer, 2010). In advance, 
there is no reason to limit the choice of potential index constituents to economic terms. 
Table 3.2: Google index constituents 
 ALL-SVI Google index  FIN-SVI Google index 
Rank Term Coverage FIN-SVI Rank  Term Coverage ALL-SVI Rank 
1 agile 68.42%   charitable 100.00%  
2 crude 68.42%   gamble 94.74%  
3 cuddle 63.16%   crisis 89.47% 25 
4 failing 63.16%   skill 89.47%  
5 crusade 57.89%   success 89.47%  
6 depression 57.89% 16 bankrupt 84.21% 16 
7 enhancements 57.89%   benefit 84.21%  
8 gold 57.89% 13 colony 84.21%  
9 nervous 57.89%   compensation 84.21%  
10 recession 57.89% 18 poor 84.21% 169 
11 risk 57.89%   expensive 78.95%  
12 robbery 57.89%   equity 73.68%  
13 associate 52.63% 14 gold 73.68% 8 
14 deviation 52.63%   associate 68.42% 13 
15 awkward 47.37%   profit 68.42%  
16 bankrupt 47.37% 6 depression 63.16% 6 
17 expert 47.37%   expense 63.16%  
18 faint 47.37%   recession 63.16% 10 
19 smooth 47.37%   bankruptcy 57.89%  
20 warp 47.37%   capitalize 57.89% 40 
21 accused 42.11%   contribute 57.89%  
22 appears 42.11%   corrupt 57.89%  
23 visionary 42.11%   default 57.89%  
24 defaults 36.84%   successful 57.89%  
25 crisis 31.58% 3 unemployed 57.89%  
26 accept 26.32%   lay 52.63%  
27 allegiance 26.32%   backer 47.37%  
28 bait 26.32%   donate 47.37%  
29 brute 26.32%   jobless 47.37% 44 
30 consider 26.32%   warfare 42.11% 188 
Notes: The table reports the 30 most often Google index constituents resulting from the construction of Google 
indices based on all positive and negative connoted terms (ALL-SVI, Column 2 to Column 4) as well as all positive 
and negative connoted economic terms (FIN-SVI, Column 5 to Column 7) as explained in Section 3.2.2. The 
terms are reported in Column 2 and Column 5 (Term). They are sorted by their occurrence frequency (Coverage), 
reported in Column 3 and Column 6. The maximum number a term may be an index constituent is 19. Column 4 
and Column 7 show, if possible, the rank of a term in the respective other Google index. 
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Table 3.2 lists the 30 most frequently used index constituents of both indices, the 
frequency of these terms being an index constituent (coverage ratio), and compares the 
frequency ranks of terms in both indices. The maximum frequency of terms to be an index 
constituent is 19. In case of the ALL SVI  Google index no term is an index constituent for 
the full sample period. The highest coverage ratio equals 68.42%. Contrary, for the FIN SVI  
Google index “charitable” is an index constituent for the full sample period.40 The comparison 
of coverage ratios reveals that those of the ALL SVI  Google index are lower and thus 
fluctuation among index constituents is higher relative to the FIN SVI  Google index. This 
effect is driven by the fact that the fraction of economic terms to all terms is only 3.5%. 
However, the list of terms and the rank comparison reveal that both indices are not fully 
distinct but consider similar terms (e.g., depression, gold, recession). Given that the correlation 
between both indices is 47%, this also documents that both indices differ to a certain degree. 
This is in line with our above rationale to compute two Google indices as, in advance, it is not 
obvious which index contains additional information for the CDS market. 
Given that both indices contain different information, we first test whether both indices 
are determinants of CDS premium changes. For this purpose we use three regression models 
for each Google index. The first model is a basic model only considering lagged CDS premium 
changes and the contemporaneous Google indices 
1/          t t t tCDS ALL FIN SVI CDS   (3.3) 
where  tCDS  are the changes in CDS premiums and  tALL SVI  as well as  tFIN SVI  are 
the contemporaneous Google indices. In line with Byström (2006) we consider lagged changes 
in CDS premiums to control for autocorrelation. We extend the first model in Equation (3.3) 
with two sets of control variables 
1 1/2 ,1/2/ FIN             t t t t tCDS ALL SVI CDS Controls   (3.4) 
where the second model’s set of control variables is ,1tControls  and the third model’s set of 
control variables is ,2tControls . ,1tControls  consists of the set of control variables used in 
Avino and Nneji (2014): the S&P 500 Index return, the change in the CBOE VIX, the change 
in the 5-year swap rate, and the change in the term spread. ,2tControls  is the set of control  
 
                                                                                                                                               
40 Note, this does not mean that “charitable“ is the term with the highest explanatory power for CDS premium 
changes throughout our sample period. 
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Table 3.3: Contemporaneous impact of Google indices on CDS premium changes 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Panel A: ALL-SVI Google index 
Intercept 0.0072 0.0631 0.0709 
 (0.9254) (0.2314) (0.1762) 
ALL-SVI(t) 1.7574 *** 0.5484 ** 0.5830 ** 
 (0.0002) (0.0464) (0.0350) 
CDS(t-1) 0.0946 * 0.1613 *** 0.1645 *** 
 (0.0965) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
S&P 500(t)   -172.8831 *** -176.6000 *** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CBOE VIX(t)   0.2469 *** 0.2502 *** 
 (0.0029) (0.0034) 
5yr swap rate(t)   -4.2027 **   
 (0.0298)  
Term spread(t)   3.2590   
 (0.1650)  
ADS Index(t)     -4.2310 
 (0.1003) 
EPU Index(t)     -0.0005 
 (0.7113) 
Adj. R² 1.69 52.56 52.21 
Obs. 2300 2299 2299 
Panel B: FIN-SVI Google index 
Intercept 0.0058 0.0624 0.0701 
 (0.9393) (0.2374) (0.1809) 
FIN-SVI(t) 1.0097 ** 0.1034 0.1198 
 (0.0142) (0.6540) (0.6058) 
CDS(t-1) 0.0931 0.1612 *** 0.1644 *** 
 (0.1029) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
S&P 500(t)   -172.4829 *** -176.2000 *** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
CBOE VIX(t)   0.2545 *** 0.2581 *** 
  (0.0020) (0.0024) 
5yr swap rate(t)   -4.2432 **   
  (0.0281)   
Term spread(t)   3.3037   
  (0.1590)   
ADS Index(t)     -4.2550 * 
  (0.0972) 
EPU Index(t)     -0.0004 
  (0.7589) 
Adj. R² 1.20 52.47 52.12 
Obs. 2300 2299 2299 
(Continued) 
  
 
 
3. Forecasting Credit Default Swap Premiums with Google Search Volume 64 
 
Table 3.3 (Continued): Contemporaneous impact of Google indices on CDS premium 
changes 
Notes: The table reports the results of the regression of CDS premium changes on lagged CDS premium changes 
(CDS), the Google indices (ALL-SVI and FIN-SVI), and control variables. The Google indices are described in 
the main text in Section 3.2.2. Panel A reports the results for the Google index based on all positive and negative 
connoted terms (ALL-SVI). Panel B reports the results for the Google index based on all positive and negative 
connoted economic terms (FIN-SVI). Model 1 is the basic model, regressing CDS premium changes on the 
Google indices and lagged CDS premium changes. For Model 2, the additional control variables are the S&P 
500 Index return (S&P 500), the change in the CBOE VIX (CBOE VIX), the change in the 5-year swap rate (5yr 
swap rate), and the change in the term spread (Term spread). For Model 3, the additional control variables are 
the S&P 500 Index return (S&P 500), the change in the CBOE VIX (CBOE VIX), the change in the Aruoba-
Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index (ADS Index), and the change in the Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Index (EPU Index). P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. Significance is determined using Newey-West standard errors. Adjusted R² are in 
percentage points. 
variables used in Da et al. (2015). It consists of the S&P 500 Index return, the change in the 
CBOE VIX, the change in the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index (ADS 
Index), and the change in the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU Index). 
Table 3.3 shows the regression results of the regression models from Equation (3.3) and 
Equation (3.4). Panel A of Table 3.3 shows that the ALL SVI  Google index is significantly 
positively related to CDS premium changes at least at the 5% level. Panel B of Table 3.3 
reports that the FIN SVI  Google index is only significantly positively related to CDS 
premium changes at the 5% level in case of the basic model in Column 1. Adding control 
variables leads to an insignificant coefficient. The positive coefficients are in line with the 
findings of Tang and Yan (2010) and Da et al. (2015). The results reveal that the index 
constituents’ positive contemporaneous relation to CDS premium changes at the index 
constituents’ computation dates remains robust on the other sample days. Higher Google 
indices, i.e. days with increases in searches for the respective index constituents, coincide with 
higher CDS premium changes. 
Overall, we find that the contemporaneous Google indices ALL SVI  and FIN SVI  are 
positively related to CDS premium changes while the ALL SVI  Google index determines 
CDS premium changes irrespective of the set of control variables. The difference in the 
significance of both Google indices reveals that the FIN SVI  Google index 
contemporaneously seems to only contain information that is already captured by other 
financial variables. 
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3.3. In-sample predictive power of Google indices 
Given our initial rationale of Google search volume containing information before any other 
financial variable, this section tests the in-sample predictive power of our Google indices 
described in Section 3.2. For this purpose we use the three regression models from Equation 
(3.3) and Equation (3.4) with lagged variables. The dependent variable is always the time 
series of CDS premium changes. The first model is the basic model considering lagged CDS 
premium changes and our lagged Google indices 
1 1/           t t t tCDS ALL FIN SVI CDS   (3.5) 
where  tCDS  are the changes in CDS premiums and 1 tALL SVI  as well as 1 tFIN SVI  
are the lagged Google indices. In line with Avino and Nneji (2014) we consider lagged 
changes in CDS premiums as the most important variable for CDS premium change forecasts. 
We extend the first model in Equation (3.5) with two sets of lagged control variables 
1 1 1/2 1,1/2/               t t t t tCDS ALL FIN SVI CDS Controls   (3.6) 
where 1,1tControls  and 1,2tControls  are the same sets of control variables as defined in 
Section 3.2 based on Avino and Nneji (2014) and Da et al. (2015). If aggregated Google search 
volume possesses fundamental value for the CDS market, we expect it to improve CDS 
premium change forecasts. If it even contains fundamental information not yet reflected in 
CDS premiums, we expect the Google indices to predict trends in CDS premium changes. 
Table 3.4 shows the regression results for the above three models based on the lagged 
Google indices and lagged control variables (Equation (3.5) and Equation (3.6)). The results 
document that both Google indices have in-sample predictive power at the 5% to 10% level. 
Relative to the other variables the Google indices have the highest p-values. Regarding the 
economic effect of both Google indices, a one standard deviation shock today seems to be 
temporary. Due to the negative loading, the positive shock to CDS premium changes reported 
in Table 3.3 is reversed the day after. This finding is similar to those of Tetlock (2007) and Da 
et al. (2015). Thus, our results provide evidence for our Google indices having fundamental 
value for the CDS market although they contain no fundamental information not yet priced in 
CDS premiums. This would be the case if the loadings of the Google indices in Table 3.3 and 
Table 3.4 would have the same signs.  
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Table 3.4: In-sample predictive power of Google indices for CDS premium changes 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Panel A: ALL-SVI Google index 
Intercept 0.0047 0.0136 0.0123 
 (0.9513) (0.8593) (0.8726) 
ALL-SVI (t-1) -0.8535 ** -0.7370 * -0.7698 * 
 (0.0286) (0.0711) (0.0573) 
CDS(t-1) 0.0985 * 0.1284 0.1263 
 (0.0882) (0.1311) (0.1328) 
S&P 500(t-1)   -19.7428 -19.5534 
  (0.4151) (0.4137) 
CBOE VIX(t-1)   -0.2432 * -0.2414 * 
  (0.0789) (0.0821) 
5yr swap rate(t-1)   0.8261   
  (0.7197)   
Term spread(t-1)   -0.6565   
  (0.7745)   
ADS Index(t-1)     -0.3874 
  (0.9113) 
EPU Index(t-1)     0.0026 
  (0.1262) 
Adj. R² 1.01 1.32 1.47 
Obs. 2300 2298 2298 
Panel B: FIN-SVI Google index 
Intercept 0.0054 0.0144 0.0131 
 (0.9442) (0.8512) (0.8647) 
FIN-SVI (t-1) -0.6778 ** -0.5749 * -0.5740 * 
 (0.0352) (0.0762) (0.0743) 
CDS(t-1) 0.0969 * 0.1268 0.1246 
 (0.0903) (0.1343) (0.1364) 
S&P 500(t-1)   -19.9593 -19.7985 
  (0.4050) (0.4031) 
CBOE VIX(t-1)   -0.2439 * -0.2427 * 
  (0.0746) (0.0771) 
5yr swap rate(t-1)   0.8558   
  (0.7085)   
Term spread(t-1)   -0.6949   
  (0.7604)   
ADS Index(t-1)     -0.3203 
  (0.9262) 
EPU Index(t-1)     0.0025 
  (0.1428) 
Adj. R² 0.98 1.30 1.43 
Obs. 2300 2298 2298 
(Continued) 
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Table 3.4 (Continued): In-sample predictive power of Google indices for CDS premium 
changes 
Notes: The table reports the results of the regression of CDS premium changes on lagged CDS premium changes 
(CDS), the lagged Google indices (ALL-SVI and FIN-SVI), and lagged control variables. The Google indices are 
described in the main text in Section 3.2.2. Panel A reports the results for the Google index based on all positive 
and negative connoted terms (ALL-SVI). Panel B reports the results for the Google index based on all positive 
and negative connoted economic terms (FIN-SVI). Model 1 is the basic model, regressing CDS premium changes 
on the lagged Google indices and lagged CDS premium changes. For Model 2, the additional lagged control 
variables are the S&P 500 Index return (S&P 500), the change in the CBOE VIX (CBOE VIX), the change in 
the 5-year swap rate (5yr swap rate), and the change in the term spread (Term spread). For Model 3, the additional 
lagged control variables are the S&P 500 Index return (S&P 500), the change in the CBOE VIX (CBOE VIX), 
the change in the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index (ADS Index), and the change in the 
Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU Index). P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Significance is determined using Newey-West standard 
errors. Adjusted R² are in percentage points. 
Overall, our results are in line with two strands of theoretical models. These are noise 
trader models (e.g., De Long et al., 1990; Subrahmanyam, 2005) and models where trades are 
not based on information, but arise due to, e.g., liquidity needs or changes in overall risk 
aversion (e.g., Campbell et al., 1993; Chordia and Subrahmanyam, 2004; Hendershott and 
Menkveld, 2014). As summarized by Tetlock (2007), both types of theoretical models predict 
reversals. Since our analyses base on the institutional CDS market the influence of noise 
trading is unlikely. Thus, it is more likely that our results arise through sudden changes in 
overall risk aversion. 
Summing up the findings reported in Table 3.4, we provide evidence for the predictive 
power and the fundamental value of Google search volume for the CDS market. 
3.4. Out-of-sample predictive power of Google indices 
The previous section documents in-sample predictive power of our Google indices indicating 
fundamental value of Google search volume for the CDS market. To find further support for 
this finding, this section analyzes the out-of-sample predictive power of our Google indices 
described in Section 3.2. In Section 3.4.1 we test whether our Google indices improve the one-
day ahead forecast accuracy. Section 3.4.2 analyses one-day ahead forecast results for different 
times of CDS volatility. Finally, Section 3.4.3 compares results for different forecast horizons. 
3.4.1. One-day ahead out-of-sample forecasts 
In this section we perform one-day ahead out-of-sample forecasts to test the predictive power 
of our ALL SVI  and FIN SVI  Google index. For this purpose we use the three regression 
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models from Section 3.3 with and without our Google indices. Based on these models and the 
Google indices we perform one-day ahead forecasts 
  1 1/2 ,1/2         without SVIt t t tCDS CDS Controls   (3.7) 
and 
  1 1/2 ,1/2/             with SVIt t t t tCDS ALL FIN SVI CDS Controls   (3.8) 
where  tCDS  are the changes in CDS premiums,  tALL SVI  as well as  tFIN SVI  are our 
Google indices, ,1tControls  as well as ,2tControls  are the sets of control variables defined as 
in Section 3.2, and /  1 without with SVItCDS  are the CDS premium change forecasts without and with 
considering our Google indices. The models in Equation (3.7) and Equation (3.8) are first 
estimated based on an extending window of all known observations from the start of our 
sample to the current day t. The coefficient estimates are then used to compute forecasts for 
day t+1. We get daily forecasts for the period from May 26, 2005 to December 30, 2013. 
Based on the forecasts and the actual realized CDS premium changes for the next day 
( 1 tCDS ), we are able to evaluate the predictive power of our Google indices. We test the 
forecast accuracy of the models in Equation (3.7) against the forecast accuracy of the same 
models additionally considering the ALL SVI  or FIN SVI  Google index in 
Equation (3.8) .41 For this purpose, we compare the mean absolute error (MAE), mean squared 
error (MSE), and the mean correct prediction (MCP) of these models. We test the null 
hypothesis of a model without and with the respective Google index ( ALL SVI  or 
FIN SVI ) generating equal forecasts. For the MAE and MSE, we test the null hypothesis 
using the modified Diebold and Mariano (1995) test and the weighted modified Diebold and 
Mariano (1995) test. For the MAE we additionally use the Giacomini and White (2006) test 
and for the MSE we additionally use the Clark and West (2007) test. For the MCP we use the 
2-proportion z-test. A detailed description of the applied statistical tests can be found in Avino 
and Nneji (2014). This analysis reveals whether the inclusion of our Google indices provides 
additional value in forecasting CDS premium changes.  
                                                                                                                                               
41 Avino and Nneji (2014) also compare their basic model to a random walk model. Unreported results (available 
upon request from the authors) document that all models are superior to a random walk model as in Avino and 
Nneji (2014). 
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Table 3.5: Out-of-sample predictive power of Google indices for CDS premium changes 
    ALL-SVI Google index  FIN-SVI Google index 
Model 1 MAE 2.2082            
without Google index MSE 15.2955            
 MCP 54.27%            
Model 1 MAE 2.2205** °°° ^^    2.2166     
with Google index MSE 15.3031      15.2871   ~  
 MCP 53.45%      53.22%     
Model 2 MAE 2.2298            
without Google index MSE 15.4900            
 MCP 52.21%            
Model 2 MAE 2.2425** °°° ^^    2.2386* ° ^   
with Google index MSE 15.5064      15.4897     
 MCP 51.24%      52.02%     
Model 3 MAE 2.2231            
without Google index MSE 15.4263            
 MCP 53.72%            
Model 3  MAE 2.2366*** °°° ^^^    2.2305     
with Google index MSE 15.4404      15.4259     
 MCP 52.44%      52.94%     
Notes: The table reports the results of out-of-sample forecasts based on the models described in Equation (3.7) 
and Equation (3.8). For each model and Google index (ALL-SVI and FIN-SVI) a forecast without and with the 
respective Google index is computed. The ALL-SVI and FIN-SVI Google index are described in the main text in 
Section 3.2.2. Column 3 and Column 4 report the results for the ALL-SVI Google index. Column 5 and Column 
6 report the results for the FIN-SVI Google index. Model 1 is the basic model only considering lagged CDS 
premium changes. Model 2 additionally considers the lagged S&P 500 Index return, the lagged change in the 
CBOE VIX, the lagged change in the 5-year swap rate, and the lagged change in the term spread. Model 3 
additionally considers the lagged S&P 500 Index return, the change in the CBOE VIX, the change in the Aruoba-
Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index, and the change in the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index. We report 
the mean absolute error (MAE), the mean squared error (MSE), and the mean correct prediction of the sign of 
the CDS premium changes (MCP). Additionally, we test the null hypothesis of a model without and with the 
respective Google index (ALL-SVI or FIN-SVI) generating equal forecasts. We test the null hypothesis for the 
MAE and MSE using the modified Diebold and Mariano (1995) test and the weighted modified Diebold and 
Mariano (1995) test. For the MAE we additionally use the Giacomini and White (2006) test and for the MSE we 
additionally use the Clark and West (2007) test. For the MCP we use the 2-proportion z-test. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the modified Diebold and Mariano (1995) test. °°°, °°, and 
° denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the weighted modified Diebold and Mariano (1995) test. 
^^^, ^^, and ^ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the Giacomini and White (2006) test. ~~~, 
~~, and ~ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the Clark and West (2007) test. ###, ##, and # 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the 2-proportion z-test. 
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Table 3.5 provides the out-of-sample one-day ahead forecast results. Column 3 and 
Column 4 of Table 3.5 report the results for the ALL SVI  Google index. The models 
considering this Google index are slightly worse regarding the values of the MAE and MSE, 
as well as the statistical significance for the MAE of the modified Diebold and Mariano (1995) 
test, weighted modified Diebold and Mariano (1995) test, and Giacomini and White (2006) 
test. Column 5 and Column 6 of Table 3.5 show the results for the FIN SVI  Google index. 
Although the MAE and MSE are slightly higher for the models considering this Google index, 
the difference is not statistically significant. 
To sum up, Table 3.5 shows that both indices do not improve out-of-sample forecasts. 
However, other financial variables also do not improve forecasts of CDS premium changes as 
the basic model only considering lagged CDS premium changes has the lowest MAE and 
MSE. Irrespective of the used set of variables, improving the CDS forecast accuracy is 
demanding which is evidence for the informational efficiency of the CDS market. 
3.4.2. Out-of-sample forecasts for different periods 
Given the previous section’s findings, CDS volatility may be a parameter that decisively 
influences the forecast accuracy of the basic autoregressive model with lagged CDS premium 
changes. High CDS volatility might reduce the forecast accuracy when it is most needed 
(Dimpfl and Jank, 2016). In this section we analyze whether our two Google indices 
( ALL SVI  and FIN SVI ) improve the forecast accuracy of the models explained in 
Section 3.4.1 in times of high CDS volatility. 
First, we compute CDS volatility as the 20-day rolling standard deviation of CDS 
premium changes. Second, we sort the days in our forecasting period according to the 
computed CDS volatility. Finally, we compute the same statistics and statistical tests as in 
Table 3.5 for different quantiles of our sample. Table 3.6 reports the results. 
Panel A of Table 3.6 shows the results for the 10% (low CDS volatility) and 90% (high 
CDS volatility) quantile for the ALL SVI  and FIN SVI  Google index. The results for the 
ALL SVI  Google index show that it slightly improves the forecast accuracy in high volatile 
times for all models. But, it also reduces the forecast accuracy in times of low volatility. The 
results for the FIN SVI  Google index are more convincing. It significantly improves the  
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Table 3.6: Out-of-sample predictive power of Google indices for different periods 
Panel A: 10% and 90% quantile 
    ALL-SVI (10% quantile)  ALL-SVI (90% quantile)  FIN-SVI (10% quantile)  FIN-SVI (90% quantile) 
Model 1 without MAE 0.3018 7.0108 0.3018 7.0108
Google index MSE 0.1569 95.7713 0.1569 95.7713
 MCP 62.39% 53.67% 62.39% 53.67%
Model 1 with MAE 0.3304***°° ^^^ 6.9881 ° 0.3020 6.9762** °° ^^
Google index MSE 0.1747* 95.4477 0.1574 95.2079** °° ~~
 MCP 53.21% # 51.38% 61.01% 50.92%
Model 2 without MAE 0.3108 7.1104 0.3108 7.1104
Google index MSE 0.1704 97.0702 0.1704 97.0702
 MCP 59.63% 53.67% 59.63% 53.67%
Model 2 with MAE 0.3427***°° ^^^ 7.0913 ° 0.3108 7.0816* ° ^
Google index MSE 0.1901* 96.8282 0.1707 96.6244** ° ~~
 MCP 52.29% 51.38% 58.26% 52.29%
Model 3 without MAE 0.3121 7.0792 0.3121 7.0792
Google index MSE 0.1741 96.6208 0.1741 96.6208
 MCP 58.26% 55.05% 58.26% 55.05%
Model 3 with MAE 0.3418***°° ^^^ 7.0575 °° 0.3116 7.0511* ° ^
Google index MSE 0.1919* 96.3012 0.1743 96.1649** °° ~~
 MCP 53.21% 52.29% 59.17% 52.29%
(Continued) 
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Table 3.6 (Continued): Out-of-sample predictive power of Google indices for different periods 
Panel B: 25% and 75% quantile 
    ALL-SVI (25% quantile)  ALL-SVI (75% quantile)  FIN-SVI (25% quantile) FIN-SVI (75% quantile) 
Model 1 without MAE 0.5374     4.7674     0.5374     4.7674     
Google index MSE 0.6379     48.7575     0.6379     48.7575     
 MCP 58.82%     53.49%     58.82%     53.49%     
Model 1 with MAE 0.5647*** °° ^^^   4.7472**  ^^   0.5460* °° ^   4.7397*** °°° ^^^   
Google index MSE 0.6852*** °°    48.5646   ~  0.6640** °°    48.4268*** °°°  ~~~  
 MCP 55.33%     54.04%     58.46%     53.31%     
Model 2 without MAE 0.5463     4.8193     0.5463     4.8193     
Google index MSE 0.6485     49.3787     0.6485     49.3787     
 MCP 57.17%     51.84%     57.17%     51.84%     
Model 2 with MAE 0.5715*** °° ^^^   4.8064     0.5544* °° ^^   4.7982** °° ^^   
Google index MSE 0.6963*** °°    49.2433     0.6733** °°    49.1136** °°  ~~~  
 MCP 54.04%     51.10%     55.70%     52.21%     
Model 3 without MAE 0.5464     4.7928     0.5464     4.7928     
Google index MSE 0.6501     49.1384     0.6501     49.1384     
 MCP 56.80%     53.86%     56.80%     53.86%     
Model 3 with MAE 0.5718*** °° ^^^   4.7796     0.5577*** °°° ^^^   4.7714** °° ^^   
Google index MSE 0.7032*** °°    48.9775     0.6767** °°    48.8716*** °°  ~~~  
 MCP 54.23%     53.13%     55.88%     53.68%     
(Continued) 
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Table 3.6 (Continued): Out-of-sample predictive power of Google indices for different periods 
Notes: The table reports the results of out-of-sample forecasts based on the models described in Equation (3.7) and Equation (3.8) for different CDS premium volatility 
quantiles. CDS premium volatility is defined as the 20-day rolling standard deviation of CDS premium changes. For each model and Google index (ALL-SVI and FIN-
SVI) a forecast without and with the respective Google index is computed. The ALL-SVI and FIN-SVI Google index are described in the main text in Section 3.2.2. Panel 
A reports the results for the 10% and 90% quantile of CDS premium volatility for the Google indices. Panel B reports the results for the 25% and 75% quantile of CDS 
premium volatility for the Google indices. In each panel, Column 3 to Column 6 report the results for the ALL-SVI Google index and Column 7 to Column 10 report the 
results for the FIN-SVI Google index. Model 1 is the basic model only considering lagged CDS premium changes. Model 2 additionally considers the lagged S&P 500 
Index return, the lagged change in the CBOE VIX, the lagged change in the 5-year swap rate, and the lagged change in the term spread. Model 3 additionally considers 
the lagged S&P 500 Index return, the change in the CBOE VIX, the change in the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index, and the change in the Economic 
Policy Uncertainty Index. We report the mean absolute error (MAE), the mean squared error (MSE), and the mean correct prediction of the sign of the CDS premium 
changes (MCP). Additionally, we test the null hypothesis of a model without and with the respective Google index (ALL-SVI or FIN-SVI) generating equal forecasts. We 
test the null hypothesis for the MAE and MSE using the modified Diebold and Mariano (1995) test and the weighted modified Diebold and Mariano (1995) test. For the 
MAE we additionally use the Giacomini and White (2006) test and for the MSE we additionally use the Clark and West (2007) test. For the MCP we use the 2-proportion 
z-test. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the modified Diebold and Mariano (1995) test. °°°, °°, and ° denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level for the weighted modified Diebold and Mariano (1995) test. ^^^, ^^, and ^ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the Giacomini and 
White (2006) test. ~~~, ~~, and ~ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the Clark and West (2007) test. ###, ##, and # denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level for the 2-proportion z-test. 
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forecast accuracy for all models in high volatile times while the difference in the forecast 
accuracy is not statistically significant in low volatile times. Panel B of Table 3.6 presents the 
results for the 25% and 75% quantile. For the ALL SVI  Google index the forecast accuracy 
is no longer significantly higher in times of high CDS volatility while the reduced forecast 
accuracy in times of low CDS volatility has gained statistical significance. Contrary, for the 
FIN SVI  Google index the statistical significance in volatile times has even improved while 
it only slightly worsens the forecasts accuracy in times of low CDS volatility. This is especially 
the case when considering the best performing model only based on lagged CDS premium 
changes in Row 3 to 5 of Table 3.6. 
Overall, we see that our Google indices improve out-of-sample forecasts in times of high 
CDS volatility. Thus, when forecasts are more demanding, Google search volume improves 
the forecast accuracy. Again, the basic models only considering lagged CDS premium 
changes, or lagged CDS premium changes and the lagged Google indices have the lowest 
MAE and MSE. 
3.4.3. Out-of sample forecasts for different forecasts horizons 
Having seen that the predictive power depends on CDS volatility a second parameter related 
to uncertainty and thus possibly leading to differences in the forecast accuracy is the forecast 
horizon. In this section we test the forecast accuracy improvement of our Google indices for 
two-day, one-week, and two-week forecast horizons. 
For this analysis we focus on the models only considering lagged CDS premium changes 
without our Google indices 
 
1        without SVIt i t i tCDS CDS   (3.9) 
and with our Google indices 
 
1 1/              with SVIt i t i t i tCDS CDS ALL FIN SVI   (3.10) 
where  tCDS  are the changes in CDS premiums,  tALL SVI  as well as  tFIN SVI  are our 
Google indices, and i determines the forecast horizon. We focus on these models because they 
have the highest forecast accuracy in Section 3.4.1 and Section 3.4.2. 
Due to the longer forecast horizon, we also have to forecast the Google indices 
themselves. Similar to Dimpfl and Jank (2016), we use an autoregressive model with the 
respective lagged Google index
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Table 3.7: Out-of-sample predictive power for different forecasting horizons 
    ALL-SVI Google index  FIN-SVI Google index 
Model 1: 2 day forecast MAE 2.2080      2.2080     
without Google index MSE 15.2942      15.2942     
 MCP 50.67%      50.67%     
               
Model 1: 2 day forecast MAE 2.2091      2.2082     
with Google index MSE 15.2987      15.2926     
 MCP 49.38%      49.15%     
               
Model 1: 1 week forecast MAE 2.2095      2.2095     
without Google index MSE 15.3054      15.3054     
 MCP 49.86%      49.86%     
               
Model 1: 1 week forecast MAE 2.2095      2.2096     
with Google index MSE 15.3053      15.3053     
 MCP 49.72%      49.82%     
               
Model 1: 2 weeks forecast MAE 2.2108      2.2108     
without Google index MSE 15.3313      15.3313     
 MCP 49.70%      49.70%     
               
Model 1: 2 weeks forecast MAE 2.2107** °° ^^    2.2108** °°° ^^   
with Google index MSE 15.3311 °     15.3312** °°°  ~~  
 MCP 50.16%      49.63%     
                              
Notes: The table reports the results of out-of-sample forecasts based on the basic model without additional control 
variables described in described in Equation (3.7) and Equation (3.8) for different forecast horizons. The forecasts 
horizons are 2 days, 1 week, and 2 weeks. For each forecast horizon and each Google index (ALL-SVI and FIN-
SVI) a forecast without and with the respective Google index is computed. The ALL-SVI and FIN-SVI Google 
index are described in the main text in Section 3.2.2. Column 3 and Column 4 report the results for the ALL-SVI 
Google index. Column 5 and Column 6 report the results for the FIN-SVI Google index. We report the mean 
absolute error (MAE), the mean squared error (MSE), and the mean correct prediction of the sign of the CDS 
premium changes (MCP). Additionally, we test the null hypothesis of a model without and with the respective 
Google index (ALL-SVI or FIN-SVI) generating equal forecasts. We test the null hypothesis for the MAE and 
MSE using the modified Diebold and Mariano (1995) test and the weighted modified Diebold and Mariano 
(1995) test. For the MAE we additionally use the Giacomini and White (2006) test and for the MSE we 
additionally use the Clark and West (2007) test. For the MCP we use the 2-proportion z-test. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the modified Diebold and Mariano (1995) test. °°°, °°, and 
° denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the weighted modified Diebold and Mariano (1995) test. 
^^^, ^^, and ^ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the Giacomini and White (2006) test. ~~~, 
~~, and ~ denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the Clark and West (2007) test. ###, ##, and # 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level for the 2-proportion z-test. 
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1/ /         t i t i tALL FIN SVI ALL FIN SVI   (3.11) 
where  tALL SVI  as well as  tFIN SVI  are our Google indices. As in Section 3.4.1, the 
models in Equation (3.9), Equation (3.10), and Equation (3.11) are first estimated based on an 
extending window of all known observations from the start of our sample to the current day t. 
The coefficient estimates are then used to compute forecasts for day t+i. Table 3.7 reports the 
results for two-day, one-week, and two-week ahead forecasts. 
Table 3.7 shows that the forecast accuracy of the models including the Google indices 
improves forecasts for longer horizons relative to the model not considering the Google 
indices. For the two-week horizon the results document that the forecast accuracy is 
statistically significantly higher for the models considering the Google indices. However, the 
economic significance is low. 
In summary, both Google indices statistically significantly improve the forecasts for 
longer horizons. Hence, the results reveal that Google search volume contains fundamental 
value especially when forecasts are more demanding. 
3.5. Robustness 
This section provides results of several robustness analyses. In Section 3.5.1, we analyze the 
causal assumption underlying all our analyses of Google search volume containing 
information before CDS premium changes and not vice versa. We compare our indices to the 
FEARS index suggested by Da et al. (2015) in Section 3.5.2. Finally, Section 3.5.3 analyzes 
whether our results hold when varying the number of index constituents or when limiting the 
index construction to only negative connoted (economic) terms. 
3.5.1. Granger causality 
The previous sections’ findings document that our Google indices have fundamental value for 
the CDS market. However, the previous sections’ analyses are based on the assumption that 
the Google indices cause CDS premium changes and not vice versa. In this section we test this 
causal assumption by performing Granger causality tests. We first estimate vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models 
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where  tCDS , /  tALL FIN SVI , and 1,1/2tControls  are defined as in Section 3.2 and then 
run Granger causality tests. The first VAR model separately consider our Google indices 
( ALL SVI  and FIN SVI ) and CDS premium changes of up to 5 lags. In a second and third 
VAR model we add 1,1tControls  and 1,2tControls  from Equation (3.6) as control variables. 
Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 report the results of the Granger causality tests. 
Table 3.8: ALL-SVI Google index and CDS premium changes: Granger causality test 
Null hypothesis: CDS premium changes do not Granger 
cause the ALL-SVI Google index 
The ALL-SVI Google index does not Granger 
cause CDS premium changes 
Lags Panel A: No control variables 
1 0.5876 0.0275 ** 
2 0.8094 0.0782 * 
3 0.3132 0.1336   
4 0.3319 0.1856   
5 0.4094 0.2213   
 Panel B: S&P 500 Index return, CBOE VIX, 5yr swap rate, Term spread 
1 0.9240 0.0585 * 
2 0.8361 0.1335   
3 0.3464 0.2082   
4 0.3941 0.2624   
5 0.4389 0.3024   
 Panel C: S&P 500 Index return, CBOE VIX, ADS Index, EPU Index 
1 0.9029 0.0481 ** 
2 0.8639 0.1184   
3 0.4327 0.1860   
4 0.4786 0.2425   
5 0.5172 0.2703   
Notes: The table reports the results of Granger causality tests of whether the CDS premium changes Granger 
cause the Google index based on all positive and negative connoted terms (ALL-SVI), or whether the ALL-SVI 
Google index Granger causes CDS premium changes. The ALL-SVI Google index is described in the main text 
in Section 3.2.2. The dependent variables of the underlying vector autoregressive (VAR) models are the CDS 
premium changes and the ALL-SVI Google index, the independent variables are the lagged CDS premium 
changes and the lagged ALL-SVI Google index in in Panel A. In Panel B additional lagged control variables are 
the S&P 500 Index return, the change in the CBOE VIX, the change in the 5-year swap rate, and the change in 
the term spread. In Panel C additional lagged control variables are variables are the S&P 500 Index return, the 
change in the CBOE VIX, the change in the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index, and the change 
in the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index. We report up to 5 lags. A significant Chi-squared statistic suggests 
that the null hypothesis given in the column header can be rejected at the displayed significance level. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Table 3.9: FIN-SVI Google index and CDS premium changes: Granger causality test 
Null hypothesis: CDS premium changes do not Granger 
cause the FIN-SVI Google index 
The FIN-SVI Google index does not Granger 
cause CDS premium changes 
Lags Panel A: No control variables 
1 0.2685 0.0416 ** 
2 0.6129 0.1227   
3 0.4572 0.2223   
4 0.6455 0.2935   
5 0.2631 0.3829   
 Panel B: S&P 500 Index return, CBOE VIX, 5yr swap rate, Term spread 
1 0.5248 0.0853 * 
2 0.7221 0.2298   
3 0.5788 0.3825   
4 0.7633 0.4560   
5 0.2838 0.5624   
 Panel C: S&P 500 Index return, CBOE VIX, ADS Index, EPU Index 
1 0.6105 0.0856 * 
2 0.8317 0.2312   
3 0.7226 0.3863   
4 0.8741 0.4627   
5 0.3274 0.5642   
Notes: The table reports the results of Granger causality tests of whether the CDS premium changes Granger 
cause the Google index based on all positive and negative connoted economic terms (FIN-SVI), or whether the 
FIN-SVI Google index Granger causes CDS premium changes. The FIN-SVI Google index is described in the 
main text in Section 3.2.2. The dependent variables of the underlying vector autoregressive (VAR) models are 
the CDS premium changes and the FIN-SVI Google index, the independent variables are the lagged CDS 
premium changes and the lagged FIN-SVI Google index in in Panel A. In Panel B additional lagged control 
variables are the S&P 500 Index return, the change in the CBOE VIX, the change in the 5-year swap rate, and 
the change in the term spread. In Panel C additional lagged control variables are variables are the S&P 500 Index 
return, the change in the CBOE VIX, the change in the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index, and 
the change in the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index. We report up to 5 lags. A significant Chi-squared statistic 
suggests that the null hypothesis given in the column header can be rejected at the displayed significance level. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
Table 3.8 and Table 3.9 show that the Google indices Granger cause CDS premium 
changes and the results are robust to the inclusion of control variables. Reversely, CDS 
premium changes do not Granger cause the Google indices. This supports our assumption and 
is further evidence that Google search volume has fundamental value for the CDS market. 
3.5.2. ALL-SVI and FIN-SVI Google index vs. FEARS index 
Finding only moderate predictive power may be due to the fact that our Google indices are 
inferior to existing ones. Thus, we compare our index to the FEARS index suggested by Da et 
al. (2015). Their search query selection is more advanced since they consider combinations of 
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economic terms individuals’ searched for. Thus, their index may be superior to our Google 
indices. The correlation of the FEARS index with the ALL SVI  Google index is 33% and 
52% with the FIN SVI Google. As expected, the correlation of the two indices based on 
economic terms is higher. Nevertheless, the correlation reveals that all three indices contain 
different information. We test the robustness of our results by replicating the results of 
Table 3.4 and adding the FEARS index as additional control variable. To be able to compare 
our Google indices to the FEARS index, we additionally run these regressions for the S&P 
500 Index return as dependent variable as in Da et al. (2015). Table 3.10 reports the results. 
Panel A of Table 3.10 presents the results for the ALL SVI  Google index. The relation 
of the ALL SVI  Google index to the respective dependent variable is significant in all 
models while the FEARS index is always insignificant. Panel B of Table 3.10 shows the results 
for the FIN SVI Google index. In the basic model for CDS premium changes as dependent 
variable, the FIN SVI Google index significantly determines future CDS premium changes. 
The significance disappears when adding control variables or when considering S&P 500 
Index returns as dependent variable. However, the FEARS index is always insignificant and 
the level of statistical significance is always higher for the FIN SVI Google index. In 
addition to the results from Table 3.4, unreported results (available upon request from the 
authors) document that both indices statistically significantly predict S&P 500 Index returns 
when considered separately. Again, the level of statistical significance is higher for the 
FIN SVI  Google index. Thus, our less advanced index construction is not inferior to Da et 
al. (2015). Both indices show similar results, while the findings indicate that due to the usage 
of the CDS premium changes to construct our Google indices noise may be reduced when 
capturing information in market data. 
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Table 3.10: ALL-SVI and FIN-SVI Google index vs. FEARS index 
  Panel A: ALL-SVI Google index
CDS premium changes S&P 500 Index return
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 0.0455 0.0512 0.0517  0.0002 0.0002 0.0002  
 (0.6313) (0.5878) (0.5879) (0.4646) (0.4534) (0.4643) 
ALL-SVI (t-1) -1.1385 ** -1.0364 * -1.0853 * 0.0042 ** 0.0041 ** 0.0041 ** 
 (0.0468) (0.0831) (0.0670) (0.0310) (0.0439) (0.0407) 
FEARS (t-1) -0.4660 -0.3988 -0.3970  0.0014 0.0014 0.0014  
 (0.1778) (0.2319) (0.2371) (0.2951) (0.2832) (0.2989) 
CDS (t-1) 0.1109 * 0.1402 0.1381  0.0000 -0.0000  
 (0.0734) (0.1203) (0.1193) (0.9445) (0.9090) 
S&P 500(t-1)  -20.8944 -20.5288  -0.1350 *** -0.0920 -0.0855  
  (0.4152) (0.4174) (0.0016) (0.3383) (0.3610) 
CBOE VIX(t-1)  -0.2518 * -0.2482 * 0.0005 0.0005  
  (0.0929) (0.0986) (0.4573) (0.4266) 
5yr swap rate(t-1)  0.5612  0.0130 *  
  (0.8203)  (0.0768)  
Term spread(t-1)  0.3864  0.0025  
  (0.8813)  (0.8039)  
ADS Index(t-1)  -0.9975  -0.0378 * 
  (0.8085) (0.0799) 
EPU Index(t-1)  0.0026  -0.0000  
  (0.2131) (0.2323) 
Adj. R² 1.37 1.65 1.78 2.48 2.74 3.02
Obs. 1,773 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 
(Continued) 
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Table 3.10 (Continued): ALL-SVI and FIN-SVI Google index vs. FEARS index 
  Panel B: FIN-SVI Google index
CDS premium changes S&P 500 Index return
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 0.0485 0.0536 0.0541 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002  
 (0.6110) (0.5724) (0.5735) (0.4810) (0.4706) (0.4810) 
FIN-SVI (t-1) -0.8561 * -0.7277 -0.7489 0.0028 0.0025 0.0025  
 (0.0836) (0.1583) (0.1474) (0.1207) (0.1669) (0.1698) 
FEARS (t-1) -0.4072 -0.3608 -0.3618 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014  
 (0.2361) (0.2827) (0.2816) (0.3257) (0.3006) (0.3179) 
CDS (t-1) 0.1080 * 0.1376 0.1352 0.0000 -0.0000  
 (0.0791) (0.1265) (0.1264) (0.9167) (0.9383) 
S&P 500(t-1)  -21.4213 -21.0581 -0.1370 *** -0.0897 -0.0833  
  (0.3987) (0.4011) (0.0014) (0.3500) (0.3731) 
CBOE VIX(t-1)  -0.2552 * -0.2520 * 0.0005 0.0005  
  (0.0859) (0.0911) (0.4435) (0.4133) 
5yr swap rate(t-1)  0.6217 0.0128 *  
  (0.8006)  (0.0810)  
Term spread(t-1)  0.3218 0.0027  
  (0.9005)  (0.7862)  
ADS Index(t-1)  -0.9987 -0.0378 * 
  (0.8080) (0.0798) 
EPU Index(t-1)  0.0025 -0.0000  
  (0.2393) (0.2638) 
Adj. R² 1.25 1.54 1.65 2.31 2.56 2.84 
Obs. 1,773 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 
(Continued) 
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Table 3.10 (Continued): ALL-SVI and FIN-SVI Google index vs. FEARS index 
Notes: The table reports the results of the regression of CDS premium changes and S&P 500 Index returns on lagged CDS premium changes (CDS), the lagged Google 
indices (ALL-SVI and FIN-SVI), the lagged FEARS index (FEARS) introduced by Da et al. (2015), and lagged control variables. The Google indices are described in the 
main text in Section 3.2.2. Panel A reports the results for the Google index based on all positive and negative connoted terms (ALL-SVI). Panel B reports the results for 
the Google index based on all positive and negative connoted economic terms (FIN-SVI). In each panel, Column 2 to Column 4 show results for the regressions with CDS 
premium changes as dependent variable and Column 5 to Column 7 show results for the regressions with S&P 500 Index returns as dependent variable. For Model 1 is 
the basic model, separately regressing CDS premium changes or S&P 500 Index returns on the lagged Google indices, the lagged FEARS index, and the lagged dependent 
variable. For Model 2, the additional lagged control variables are the S&P 500 Index return (S&P 500) or CDS premium changes (CDS), the change in the CBOE VIX 
(CBOE VIX), the change in the 5-year swap rate (5yr swap rate), and the change in the term spread (Term spread). For Model 3, the additional lagged control variables 
are the S&P 500 Index return (S&P 500) or CDS premium changes (CDS), the change in the CBOE VIX (CBOE VIX), the change in the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business 
Conditions Index (ADS Index), and the change in the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU Index). P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Significance is determined using Newey-West standard errors. Adjusted R² are in percentage points. 
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3.5.3. Modifications of the Google index construction 
Finally, we analyze the robustness of our index construction. We vary the number of index 
constituents to be 25 or 35. Additionally, we base the construction of both Google indices on 
the respective set of negative connoted terms. Given the variations of Google indices, we 
replicate Table 3.4 and report the results in Table 3.11. 
Table 3.11: In-sample predictive power of Google index modifications 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Panel A: ALL-SVI Google index based on 25 index constituents 
ALL-SVI (t-1) -0.7596 ** -0.6544 -0.6895 * 
 (0.0494) (0.1060) (0.0861) 
Panel B: ALL-SVI Google index based on 35 index constituents 
ALL-SVI (t-1) -0.9444 ** -0.8246 * -0.8507 * 
 (0.0268) (0.0608) (0.0513) 
Panel C: FIN-SVI Google index based on 25 index constituents 
FIN-SVI (t-1) -0.7025 ** -0.6147 * -0.6160 * 
 (0.0276) (0.0560) (0.0545) 
Panel D: FIN-SVI Google index based on 35 index constituents 
FIN-SVI (t-1) -0.7320 ** -0.6293 * -0.6255 * 
 (0.0342) (0.0705) (0.0699) 
Panel E: Google index based on all negative connoted terms 
SVI (t-1) -0.4000 -0.2829 -0.2782 
 (0.3262) (0.5060) (0.5089) 
Panel F: Google index based on all negative connoted economic terms 
SVI (t-1) -0.6040 ** -0.5268 * -0.5534 * 
  (0.0291) (0.0620) (0.0501) 
Notes: The table reports the results of the regression of CDS premium changes on lagged CDS premium changes 
(CDS), lagged Google indices, and lagged control variables. The Google indices ALL-SVI and FIN-SVI are 
described in the main text in Section 3.2.2. This table replicates the analysis reported in Table 3.4 and varies the 
construction of both Google indices. Panel A reports the results for the ALL-SVI Google index based on 25 index 
constituents. Panel B reports the results for the ALL-SVI Google index based on 35 index constituents. Panel C 
reports the results for the FIN-SVI Google index based on 25 index constituents. Panel D reports the results for 
the FIN-SVI Google index based on 35 index constituents. Panel E reports the results for a Google index based 
on all negative connoted terms. Panel F reports the results for a Google index based on all negative connoted 
economic terms. Model 1 is the basic model, regressing CDS premium changes on the lagged Google indices 
and lagged CDS premium changes. For Model 2, the additional lagged control variables are the S&P 500 Index 
return (S&P 500), the change in the CBOE VIX (CBOE VIX), the change in the 5-year swap rate (5yr swap rate), 
and the change in the term spread (Term spread). For Model 3, the additional lagged control variables are the 
S&P 500 Index return (S&P 500), the change in the CBOE VIX (CBOE VIX), the change in the Aruoba-Diebold-
Scotti Business Conditions Index (ADS Index), and the change in the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU 
Index). For brevity, we only report the coefficients and p-values of the respective Google indices. P-values are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Significance is determined using Newey-West standard errors. Adjusted R² are in percentage points. 
 
 
3. Forecasting Credit Default Swap Premiums with Google Search Volume 84 
 
Panel A to Panel D of Table 3.11 show that our results hold when varying the number of 
index constituents. Panel E and Panel F of Table 3.11 document that the Google index based 
on all negative connoted terms has no predictive power while our results hold when we base 
the index construction on negative connoted economic terms. 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this paper we use daily aggregated volume of Google search queries to measure consumers’ 
sentiment based on the correlation of aggregated Google search volume with CDS premium 
changes. We compute two Google indices that have in-sample predictive power for CDS 
premium changes. Given this finding, we incorporate our Google indices in several out-of-
sample forecasting models for CDS premium changes. The Google indices are most powerful 
when forecasts are more demanding. 
Our results are highly relevant for researchers and practitioners. We add to the literature 
analyzing the fundamental value of Google search volume. In contrast to other studies, our 
analyses base on the CDS market. The forecast results underline the informational efficiency 
of the CDS market and that our Google indices provide no new fundamental information for 
the CDS market. Nevertheless, our findings also show that Google search volume contains 
fundamental value for the CDS market. Considering the vast number of possible search 
queries, our results also reveal that focusing on a relatively small number of economic terms 
keeps the data collection process manageable and provides the highest fundamental value. 
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3.A. Google Trends data processing 
In Section 3.2 we shortly describe our Google search volume data. In this appendix we 
describe the data processing of Google Trends data in detail. 
Google does not allow to download daily time series for periods longer than 3 months. 
For longer periods, Google Trends provides weekly time series. However, the respective time 
series do not provide the search volume for specific terms in absolute values, but are scaled 
by the maximum search volume within a pre-defined period to a range of 0 to 100. Thus, if 
daily search volume for longer periods than 3 months is required, one cannot simply append 
quarterly search volume. 
In this paper, we use Google search volume from January 1, 2004 to December 27, 2013. 
To compute daily time series of each term for this period, we follow Risteski and Davcev 
(2014) and Johansson (2016). For each term, we download one time series of weekly search 
volume covering our full sample period and, if available, 40 quarterly subsets of our sample 
period with daily time series. To be able to compute log differences, we add one to each search 
volume time series. Finally, we combine all quarterly time series. To do so, we use the weekly 
time series of each term as reference values and adjust the respective daily time series based 
on these values. Therefore, we compute an adjustment factor as the ratio of search volume for 
a specific day to the search volume of the day’s week. The daily values within this week are 
then adjusted by the week’s average daily adjustment factor. Following this procedure we 
make the daily time series comparable across different quarters. 
 
   
 
Chapter 4‡ 
 
4. Commonality in Liquidity in the 
US Corporate Bond Market 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Commonality in liquidity, the comovement of individual assets’ liquidity with market 
liquidity, has been widely studied for stock, sovereign bond, and derivative markets (e.g., 
Chordia et al., 2000; Chordia et al., 2005; Cao and Wei, 2010; Karolyi et al., 2012). However, 
less attention has been paid to the US corporate bond market, although its outstanding volume 
amounted to more than 8 trillion USD in 2015 which was more than 30% of the US stock 
market capitalization.42 This is even more surprising as for all US corporate bonds liquidity 
significantly dropped during the financial crisis in 2008 (e.g., Friewald et al., 2012; Dick-
Nielsen et al., 2012). This suggests that the liquidity of individual corporate bonds depends on 
the overall market liquidity leading to commonality in liquidity. If commonality in liquidity 
exists, it influences investors’ opportunities to benefit from diversification. Thus, knowing the 
determinants of individual bonds’ comovement with market liquidity is highly relevant. This 
paper contributes to the literature by documenting the existence and analyzing the 
determinants of commonality in liquidity among US corporate bonds. 
The analyses base on a TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine) sample of US 
corporate bond transaction data from July 2002 to December 2012. Using a factor model that 
                                                                                                                                               
‡ This chapter is based on Bethke (2016). 
42 See Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) (2016) and World Bank (2016). 
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relates bonds’ individual liquidity to market liquidity (Chordia et al., 2000), I document that 
commonality in liquidity exists among US corporate bonds. 
This finding raises the question of what determines the degree of individual bonds’ 
comovement with market liquidity. The theoretical literature suggests comovement in 
liquidity supply and demand to determine the degree of commonality in liquidity. Regarding 
liquidity supply, higher inventory risk (e.g., Kyle and Xiong, 2001; Gromb and Vayanos, 
2002), tighter risk management (Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2007), or lower funding liquidity 
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) of liquidity suppliers may induce higher commonality in 
liquidity. Correlated demand for liquidity may arise through investors’ correlated selling 
activities arising through initial losses that raise the fear of even larger future losses (e.g., 
Bernardo and Welch, 2004; Morris and Shin, 2004), increased demand for more liquid assets 
(Vayanos, 2004), or preference for cheap information resulting in a common subset of 
information that is used to price different assets (Veldkamp, 2006). Empirically, it is found for 
stocks that supply- and demand-side effects both drive commonality in liquidity (e.g., 
Coughenour and Saad, 2004; Hameed et al., 2010; Karolyi et al., 2012; Koch et al., 2016). 
For corporate bonds, obvious observable characteristics for which liquidity supply and 
demand differ are a bond’s credit rating bucket (e.g., Edwards et al., 2007; Kisgen and Strahan, 
2010; Friewald et al., 2012), time to maturity (Gehde-Trapp et al., 2016), amount outstanding 
(e.g., Edwards et al., 2007; Wang and Wu, 2015), and industry (e.g., Longstaff et al., 2005; 
Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012). These are basic and important characteristics for investors’ 
investment and issuers’ financing decisions (e.g., Hale and Santos, 2008; Gopalan et al., 2014). 
If comovement in liquidity supply and demand influences commonality in liquidity, I expect 
to find differences in the degree of commonality across these broad dimensions. For instance, 
high yield bonds should be exposed to high inventory risk and asymmetric information which 
should increase their dependence on market liquidity relative to investment grade bonds. 
However, dealers’ supply of liquidity is more focused on investment grade bonds 
(Bessembinder et al., 2016) and institutional investors are often obliged to only invest into 
investment grade bonds (Kisgen and Strahan, 2010). Accordingly, liquidity suppliers and 
demanders of investment grade bonds are exposed to similar shocks which should overall 
translate into a higher dependence of investment grade bonds on market liquidity. To test the 
existence of differences in commonality in liquidity among the four characteristics, I repeat 
my initial analysis for different sample subsets. The results show that the degree of 
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commonality in liquidity is higher for bonds with an investment grade rating, with longer time 
to maturity, with higher amount outstanding, and issued by financial firms. 
However, the previous results do not reveal whether the analyzed characteristics proxy 
for the same or separate effects. For instance, investment grade bonds have, on average, a high 
amount outstanding (Wang and Wu, 2015). Thus, I dig deeper into the analysis of the cross-
sectional determinants of individual bonds’ comovement with market liquidity by running 
panel regressions. Motivated by the previous findings, I consider these bond characteristics 
(i.e., a bond’s credit rating bucket, time to maturity, amount outstanding, and industry) as 
explanatory variables. Additionally, I add proxies for inventory risk (e.g., Stoll, 1978; 
Friewald and Nagler, 2016), dealer and customer trading activity (e.g., Ho and Stoll, 1980; 
Chordia et al., 2011), firm-specific profitability, riskiness, and information uncertainty (e.g., 
Zhang, 2006; Lu et al., 2010; Danis et al., 2014), as well as industry concentration and industry 
riskiness (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004). All variables are potentially related to supply and 
demand of liquidity for corporate bonds. In summary, I find strong support for supply- and 
demand-side effects both determining individual bonds’ comovement with market liquidity. 
So far, the results base on the assumption that market liquidity is the only source of 
commonality in liquidity. However, determinants that are common to several bonds 
themselves may be sources of commonality in liquidity. For instance, the well-known flight-
to-quality effect results in correlated demand for bonds in higher-quality credit rating buckets 
(Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012) suggesting rating bucket liquidity to be a source of comovement in 
liquidity itself. Thus, market liquidity may only be one out of several sources of corporate 
bonds’ liquidity comovement. Again, I focus on the four basic bond characteristics to analyze 
the existence and importance of further sources of commonality in liquidity. I separately add 
credit rating bucket, time to maturity, amount outstanding, and industry liquidity to the 
baseline factor model that relates bonds’ individual liquidity to market liquidity (Chordia et 
al., 2000). Thereby, I find all four sources to be significantly related to individual bond 
liquidity, but market liquidity to remain the most important source of commonality in liquidity. 
The previous findings document a high cross-sectional variation in commonality in 
liquidity for corporate bonds. In addition, it is highly relevant to understand the time-series 
dynamics of commonality in liquidity. For instance, the Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) 
model implies that evaporating dealers’ funding liquidity increases the commonality in 
liquidity for all bonds. Thus, I further analyze the determinants of the time-series variation in 
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market-wide commonality in liquidity. Based on the empirical findings for stocks (e.g., 
Hameed et al., 2010, Rösch and Kaserer, 2013) and the high dependence on dealers’ market 
making activities due to the over-the-counter (OTC) market structure of the corporate bond 
market, I expect market-wide commonality in liquidity to be higher in times of financial stress 
and funding liquidity to be a major determinant. The results show that market-wide 
commonality in liquidity varies heavily over time and peaks in months with more financial 
stress events. As for the cross-sectional results, I find that supply- and demand-side effects 
both determine market-wide commonality in liquidity. In contrast to the cross-sectional 
findings, the time-series results provide evidence on supply-side effects being more important. 
Commonality In liquidity is high, when funding liquidity is scarce. This relation is especially 
pronounced since the financial crisis in 2008. 
Having established the main results, I run tests to determine the robustness of the main 
findings. First, I show that the cross-sectional findings do not depend on how I measure 
commonality in liquidity, how I construct the underlying bond sample, or on whether I 
consider a bond or firm sample. Second, time-series results remain robust when using 
alternative funding liquidity or market liquidity proxies, or when varying the method to 
measure commonality in liquidity. 
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the literature 
documenting commonality in liquidity for US stocks (e.g., Chordia et al., 2000; Hasbrouck 
and Seppi, 2001; Huberman and Halka, 2001; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003), for international 
stock markets (e.g., Galariotis and Giouvris, 2007; Kempf and Mayston, 2008; Karolyi et al., 
2012; Rösch and Kaserer, 2013; Dang et al., 2015b), for derivative markets (e.g., Marshall et 
al., 2013; Frino et al., 2014), across international markets (e.g., Brockman et al., 2009; 
Syamala et al., 2014; Dang et al., 2015a), across US stocks and Treasury bonds (Chordia et 
al., 2005), and across US corporate bonds and credit default swaps (Pu, 2009). The paper adds 
to this literature by documenting the existence of commonality in liquidity among US 
corporate bonds. 
Second, the paper is related to the literature that analyzes the economic mechanisms 
behind commonality in liquidity. Theoretical models link comovement in liquidity to liquidity 
supply effects (e.g., Kyle and Xiong, 2001; Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Gârleanu and 
Pedersen, 2007; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Cespa and Foucault, 2014) or liquidity 
demand effects (e.g., Bernardo and Welch, 2004; Morris and Shin, 2004; Vayanos, 2004; 
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Veldkamp, 2006). Empirically, Coughenour and Saad (2004), Comerton-Forde et al. (2010), 
Hameed et al. (2010), and Rösch and Kaserer (2013) present evidence for supply-side effects; 
Kamara et al. (2008), Koch et al. (2016), and Karolyi et al. (2012) find demand-side effects 
driving commonality in liquidity; and Domowitz et al. (2005) and Corwin and Lipson (2011) 
document that both effects determine commonality in liquidity. The paper adds to this 
literature by showing cross-sectional evidence for supply- and demand-side effects driving 
commonality in liquidity. Regarding the time-series determinants, the paper provides evidence 
for supply-side effects being more important in driving market-wide commonality in liquidity, 
especially in times of financial stress. 
Third, the paper contributes to the literature analyzing corporate bond liquidity. For 
instance, Bao et al. (2011); Friewald et al. (2012); Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), and Acharya et 
al. (2013) find corporate bond liquidity to vary in the cross-section and over time. The paper 
adds to this by showing cross-sectional determinants of individual bonds’ liquidity 
dependence on market liquidity. 
Finally, the paper’s results extend the literature analyzing contagion within stock markets 
(e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1992; Hertzel et al., 2008; Boone and Ivanov, 2012; Helwege and Zhang, 
2016), within the US corporate bond market (Theocharides, 2007), within derivative markets 
(e.g., Jorion and Zhang, 2007; Jorion and Zhang, 2009), and across different markets (e.g., 
Bekaert et al., 2005; Baur and Lucey, 2009; Longstaff, 2010; Chan et al., 2011; Claeys and 
Vašíček, 2014). I add to this literature as our results reveal that market liquidity is a potential 
contagion channel for corporate bonds. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, I describe my corporate 
bond sample and the used liquidity measures. The existence and cross-sectional determinants 
of corporate bonds’ comovement with market liquidity as well as the existence of other sources 
of commonality in liquidity are tested in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, I investigate the time-
series variation of market-wide commonality in liquidity. Various robustness tests regarding 
the cross-sectional and time-series analyses provides Section 4.5 and Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2. Bond sample and liquidity measures 
The paper uses US bond transaction data (i.e., actual trade price, yield resulting from this price, 
trade size, trade time, and trade date) from TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine). 
The sample period lasts from July 1, 2002 until December 31, 2012. I filter out erroneous 
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trades with the median and reversal filter introduced by Edwards et al. (2007) and the 
algorithm described in Dick-Nielsen (2009). The sample only consists of plain vanilla bonds 
with fixed coupons. I obtain bond characteristics such as S&P ratings, coupons, and maturity 
dates from Thomson Reuters Datastream and exclude bonds without S&P rating and initial 
time to maturity of more than 30 years. Defaulted bonds are only included up to three months 
before the default date to eliminate an impact of abnormal trading behavior around and after 
the default event (Jankowitsch et al., 2014). I further exclude federal holidays as only sparse 
trading occurs on these days. 
I obtain accounting data from Compustat, historical stock and industry information from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and US Treasury yields, swap rates, and 
market data from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The final sample consists of 3,177 corporate 
bonds of 736 firms. 
Using the bond transaction data from TRACE, I compute seven daily liquidity measures 
for each bond: number of trades (Trades), trading volume (Volume), turnover (Turnover), 
realized depth (Depth), Amihud measure (Amihud), Roll measure (Roll), and the inter-quartile 
range (IQR). All measures are found to be related to liquidity (e.g., Han and Zhou, 2007; Bao 
et al., 2011; Friewald et al., 2012; Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012). In the appendix I provide a more 
detailed description of the computation of these measures. Table 4.1 presents summary 
statistics for the firms and bonds in the sample as well as for the liquidity measures. 
Panel A of Table 4.1 shows summary statistics of firm characteristics. On average, a firm 
in the sample has a size of 32.06 bn USD, a leverage ratio of 28%, and exists for 32 years. 
Firm performance in terms of return on assets (ROA) is 12%. The outstanding and actively 
traded corporate bonds of the firms in the sample have, on average, 5 years to maturity and a 
rating of almost 9 (=BBB). 
Panel B of Table 4.1 shows summary statistics of bond characteristics. The mean 
outstanding volume is 0.49 bn USD, the mean coupon rate is 6.53%, the mean maturity 
roughly equals 5 years, and the mean S&P rating equals 8 (=BBB+). 
Panel C of Table 4.1 presents bond pricing variables. The average yield is 4.97%. I 
compute yield spreads as the difference between the yield and the maturity-matched US 
Treasury yields or maturity-matched US swap rates.43 The average yield spreads based on US  
                                                                                                                                               
43 More specifically, on each trading day I collect constant maturity US Treasury yields from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream of maturities between one month and 30 years. Afterwards, I fit a cubic function with maturity as 
the independent variable to the observed yields, and use the interpolated yield as a proxy for the maturity-
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics of the bond sample 
Variable Mean Std. dev. 5th percentile median 95th percentile
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
Firm size (bn USD) 32.06 50.05 1.62 11.36 165.68
Leverage ratio 0.28 0.14 0.06 0.27 0.52
Return on assets 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.11 0.23
Firm age (yrs) 31.98 22.73 5.76 26.50 80.42
Average time to maturity (yrs) 4.86 3.41 1.45 4.03 11.93
Average rating 8.89 2.99 4.67 8.87 14.59
Panel B: Bond characteristics 
Amount issued (bn USD) 0.49 0.55 0.10 0.30 1.50
Coupon (%) 6.53 1.68 3.63 6.65 9.13
Time to maturity (yrs) 4.98 5.47 0.90 3.11 19.07
Rating 8.00 3.13 3.51 7.83 14.20
Panel C: Bond pricing variables 
Yield (%) 4.97 3.13 2.04 4.47 9.28
Yield spread (Treasury, %) 2.32 2.95 0.51 1.51 6.42
Yield spread (Swap, %) 1.98 2.94 0.19 1.15 6.09
Panel D: Bond liquidity measures 
Trades 4.61 5.24 1.64 2.76 13.54
Volume (m USD) 2.96 3.44 0.32 2.06 8.35
Turnover (%) 1.10 6.67 0.19 0.55 2.41
Depth (m USD) 1.17 1.27 0.13 0.85 3.39
Amihud (bp per m USD) 77.98 74.38 9.13 56.40 220.06
Roll (bp) 136.44 93.29 24.61 114.15 331.95
Inter quartile range (bp) 0.40 0.36 0.06 0.29 1.09
Notes: The table reports characteristics of the corporate bond sample. The dataset consists of 3,177 US corporate 
bonds of 736 firms traded over the period July 2002 to December 2012. The table reports the mean, standard 
deviation, 5th percentile, median, and 95th percentile for firm and bond characteristics. The statistics are first 
averaged across time for each individual firm or bond. Panel A shows firm characteristics: Firm size is the book 
value of assets (at) in billion USD. Leverage ratio is the sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities (dltt 
and dlc) relative to the book value of assets. Return on assets is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (ebitda) to the book value of assets. Firm age is proxied by the first trade date of a 
firm in CRSP. Average time to maturity is the average time to maturity in years of a firm's actively traded bonds 
in the sample. Average rating is the average rating of a firm's actively traded bonds in the sample. Panel B shows 
bond characteristics: Amount issued is the outstanding volume per traded bond in billion USD. Coupon is the 
per annum coupon rate in percentage points. Time to maturity is the time to maturity per traded bond in years.  
(Continued) 
  
                                                                                                                                               
matched risk-free rate at this date. For swaps, on each trading day I collect US swap rates from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream of maturities between one week and 30 years. I then fit a cubic function with maturity as 
the independent variable to the observed yields, and use the interpolated yield as a proxy for the maturity-
matched risk-free rate at this date. 
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Table 4.1 (Continued): Summary statistics of the bond sample 
Rating is the S&P rating expressed as a number (AAA=1, ... , C=21). Panel C shows bond pricing variables: 
Yield is the yield to maturity in percentage points. Yield Spread is computed relative to the US Treasury yield 
curve (Treasury) and swap curve (Swap) in percentage points. Panel D shows bond liquidity measures: Trades is 
daily number of trades. Volume is the daily trading volume. Turnover is daily trading volume relative to 
outstanding volume in percentage points. Depth is the daily realized depth of a bond computed as its mean of 
daily buy and sell volume. Amihud is the Amihud measure in basis points per million USD. Roll is the roll 
measure in basis points. Inter quartile range is the inter quartile range in basis points. The liquidity measures 
(Amihud, Roll, inter quartile range) are computed as described in the main text in the Appendix. 
Treasury yields and US swap rates are 2.32% and 1.98%, respectively. Overall, firm and bond 
characteristics as well as pricing variables are comparable to the literature (e.g., Friewald et 
al., 2012; Colla et al., 2013). 
Panel D of Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for the liquidity measures. The average 
bond trades four to five times a day, with a trading volume of 2.96 m USD, a realized depth 
of 1.17 m USD, and a turnover of 1.10%. Considering relative (effective) bid-ask spread 
measures, the average Roll measure is 136.44 bp and the average IQR measure is 0.40 bp. 
Finally, the average price impact measured by the average Amihud measure is 77.98 bp per m 
USD. Overall, the summary statistics of the liquidity measures are comparable to the literature 
(e.g., Friewald et al., 2012; Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012; Schestag et al., 2016). 
4.3. Commonality in liquidity and cross-sectional determinants 
Commonality in liquidity is basically defined as the comovement of individual assets’ liquidity 
with market liquidity (Chordia et al., 2000). In this section, I analyze the existence and 
determinants of commonality in liquidity among US corporate bonds. Specifically, I describe 
the approach used to compute commonality in liquidity and present empirical evidence on its 
existence in Section 4.3.1. I then analyze the determinants of commonality in liquidity in 
Section 4.3.2. Finally, I test for the existence of additional sources of comovement in liquidity 
while controlling for market liquidity in Section 4.3.3. 
4.3.1. Existence of commonality in liquidity 
I first test whether commonality in liquidity exists in the corporate bond market. The extensive 
empirical evidence on the existence of commonality in liquidity for different markets (e.g., 
Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Chordia et al., 2005; Kempf and Mayston, 2008; Cao and Wei, 
2010; Karolyi et al., 2012) and studies documenting the time-series variation and varying 
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importance of corporate bond liquidity (e.g., Bao et al., 2011; Friewald et al., 2012; Dick-
Nielsen et al., 2012) imply the existence of a common driver of corporate bond liquidity. Thus, 
I expect commonality in liquidity to exist also among US corporate bonds. 
First, I adjust the liquidity measures for day-of-the-week and monthly effects in liquidity 
(e.g., Chordia et al., 2005; Nippani and Arize, 2008; Dbouk et al., 2013). To do so, I follow 
Hameed et al. (2010) and Karolyi et al. (2012) and run yearly bond-specific regressions for 
the natural logarithm of liquidity measures 
    5 121 ,
1 2
ln ln ,   
 
       t t d m Liq t
d m
Liquidity Liquidity Weekday Month   (4.1) 
where tLiquidity  are the different liquidity measures introduced in Section 4.2, dWeekday  are 
day-of-the-week dummies, and mMonth  are month-dummies.44 In the following I use the 
residuals , Liq t  of these regressions. They can be interpreted as percentage innovations in the 
liquidity measures because I control for the respective lagged dependent variable in 
Equation (4.1). Analyzing liquidity innovations is sensible because commonality in liquidity 
describes common variation in liquidity over time.45 
Second, I follow Chordia et al. (2000) to measure commonality in liquidity and use a 
factor model that relates individual bond liquidity to concurrent market liquidity. Specifically, 
the following yearly bond-specific time-series regression of liquidity innovations on market 
liquidity innovations of the respective liquidity measures determines the bond-specific degree 
of commonality in liquidity 
, , ,          Mkt MktLiq t Liq Liq t t tControls  (4.2) 
where , Liq t  are the respective residuals from Equation (4.1), , MktLiq t  is the respective market 
average of , Liq t  for all bonds excluding the dependent variable bond, and tControls  is a vector 
of further control variables. These are the one trading day leading and lagging values of , MktLiq t  , 
the concurrent, one trading day leading and lagging market return, and the concurrent 
                                                                                                                                               
44 As in Karolyi et al. (2012), I add one to the Amihud measure and then take the natural logarithm to reduce the 
impact of outliers. 
45 I run yearly regressions because my general approach to analyze commonality in liquidity is based on yearly 
time-series regressions. The results also hold when adjusting the full time series of each bond. Therefore I add 
yearly dummies to the regression in Equation (4.1). Panel C and Panel D of Table 4.11 in the robustness section, 
Section 4.5, present the results. 
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percentage change in the dependent variable bond’s squared return.46 In line with the literature 
(e.g., Chordia et al., 2000; Karolyi et al., 2012; Rösch and Kaserer, 2013), adding leading and 
lagging values of market liquidity innovations controls for temporal differences in 
commonality in liquidity, market returns control for general market conditions, and the bond’s 
squared return controls for changes in the riskiness of a bond. 
Table 4.2: Commonality in liquidity among US corporate bonds 
  Trades Volume Turnover Depth Amihud Roll IQR 
Concurrent 1.0345 *** 0.9662 *** 0.9655 *** 0.8542 *** 0.7375 *** 0.9599 *** 1.3653 ***
  (41.19) (34.36) (34.33) (25.42) (11.87) (30.97) (20.83) 
%positive 75.35 73.58 73.59 70.10 58.59 68.15 68.02 
% + significant 21.13 15.51 15.50 14.20 7.86 14.52 13.20 
Lag 0.0466 * 0.0627 ** 0.0635 ** 0.0878 *** 0.0690 * 0.0961 *** 0.2666 ***
  (1.96) (2.37) (2.40) (2.79) (1.90) (3.31) (4.23) 
%positive 51.19 51.94 51.85 52.01 51.82 51.56 55.54 
% + significant 3.34 3.02 2.99 3.41 4.31 3.62 4.59 
Lead 0.0377   0.0477 * 0.0478 * 0.0393   0.0956 *** 0.0580 ** 0.2453 ***
  (1.56) (1.80) (1.80) (1.20) (2.62) (2.00) (4.10) 
%positive 51.32 52.33 52.33 51.63 50.04 51.27 54.40 
% + significant 3.29 2.81 2.79 3.10 4.18 3.12 3.89 
Sum 1.1189 *** 1.0766 *** 1.0768 *** 0.9814 *** 0.9021 *** 1.1139 *** 1.8773 ***
  (33.10) (27.57) (27.57) (19.91) (11.69) (24.03) (20.02) 
Adj. R2 1.90 1.59 1.58 1.04 2.62 1.22 1.95 
N   8962 8962 8962 8962 8962 8582 4728 
Notes: The table reports the results of time-series regressions that relate daily individual bond liquidity 
innovations to the respective market liquidity innovations for all bonds in the sample. In each individual 
regression, the market liquidity innovations are the averages of the respective liquidity measure for all bonds 
excluding the dependent variable bond. Column 1 to 7 provide the results for the different liquidity measures. 
Trades is daily number of trades. Volume is the daily trading volume. Depth is the daily realized depth of each 
bond computed as the mean of daily buy and sell volume. Turnover is daily trading volume as a percentage of 
outstanding volume. Amihud is the Amihud measure. Roll is the roll measure. IQR is the inter quartile range. 
The liquidity measures (Amihud, Roll, inter quartile range) are computed as described in the Appendix. 
Cross-sectional averages of time-series slope coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Concurrent, Lag, and Lead refer, 
respectively, to the same, previous, and next trading day observations of market liquidity innovations. "% 
positive" reports the percentage of positive slope coefficients, while "% + significant" gives the percentage of 
positive slope coefficients with p-values smaller than 5%. 
(Continued) 
                                                                                                                                               
46 Following Chordia et al. (2000) who analyze one year of stock data, I use their approach to run yearly time-
series regressions and exclude bonds with less than 20 trading days to reduce the influence of rarely traded 
bonds. 
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Table 4.2 (Continued): Commonality in liquidity among US corporate bonds 
Sum is the average of the sum of the Concurrent, Lag, and Lead coefficients. Adj. R2 mean are the cross-sectional 
averages of adjusted R² statistics in percentage points. 
The concurrent, lagging, and leading values of the market return, and the proportional daily change in dependent 
variable bond’s squared return (a measure of change in return volatility) are additional regressors; coefficients 
not reported. 
Table 4.2 shows cross-sectional averages of concurrent coefficients  MktLiq  (Concurrent) 
from these yearly bond-specific time-series regressions. Additionally, Table 4.2 shows the 
cross-sectional averages of the leading (Lead) and lagging (Lag) coefficients of market 
liquidity innovations, the average sum of all three coefficients, and the average adjusted R2 
statistics. 
Table 4.2 provides strong support for the existence of commonality in liquidity. The 
concurrent coefficients  MktLiq  for all liquidity measures are positive and significant at the 1% 
level. More precisely, the average concurrent coefficient ranges from 0.74 for the Amihud 
measure to 1.37 for the IQR measure.47 For all liquidity measures a high fraction of 
coefficients is positive, ranging from 59% to 75%. Considering the percentage of positive and 
significant coefficients, the percentage ranges from 8% (for the Amihud measure) to 21% (for 
commonality in the number of trades). Comparing these percentages to the results for stock 
markets, they are slightly lower but in the range of Chordia et al. (2000) and lower compared 
to the results of Kamara et al. (2008). The latter may reflect the difference in the market 
structures (opaque OTC vs. transparent centralized market structure) or indicate that bond-
specific liquidity is less related to systematic movements in market liquidity compared to 
stocks. 
In line with other studies analyzing commonality in liquidity (e.g., Chordia et al., 2000; 
Kempf and Mayston, 2008), the average adjusted R2 statistics are very low and range from 
1.04% to 2.62%. This indicates that also for bonds a substantial part of bond-specific liquidity 
is not related to systematic movements in market liquidity, overall market conditions, and 
                                                                                                                                               
47 Considering the IQR measure, coefficients reflect only the most often traded bonds in the sample as this 
measure is based on bonds’ trading days with at least three trades per bond. 
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bond-specific riskiness and/or bond-specific liquidity is substantially driven by noise (e.g., 
Chordia et al., 2000; Huberman and Halka, 2001).48,49 
4.3.2. Cross-sectional determinants of commonality in liquidity 
Having documented the existence of commonality in liquidity, it is essential to analyze its 
determinants. Commonality in liquidity can arise through comovement in liquidity supply or 
comovement in liquidity demand. Comovement in liquidity supply may theoretically be 
explained by systematic variation in inventory risk, asymmetric information, or funding 
liquidity (e.g., Kyle and Xiong (2001); Gromb and Vayanos (2002); Gârleanu and Pedersen 
(2007); Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)). Comovement in liquidity demand may 
theoretically arise through investors’ correlated trading activities (e.g., Bernardo and Welch 
(2004); Morris and Shin (2004); Vayanos (2004); Veldkamp (2006)). The potential 
mechanisms imply that bond, firm (=issuer), and industry characteristics are potential 
determinants of the degree of commonality in liquidity. 
In Section 4.3.2.1 to 4.3.2.4, I first test for obvious observable bond characteristics (rating, 
time to maturity, amount outstanding, and industry) that are related to supply and demand of 
liquidity to be determinants of commonality in liquidity. The analyses focus on these obvious 
observable characteristics because these are basic characteristics considered by investors and 
issuers. Investors tend to acquire cheap and easily accessible information (e.g., Dong and Ni, 
2014; Dong et al., 2016) as well as information that is common to several assets (e.g., 
Veldkamp, 2006; Peng and Xiong, 2006). For issuers these basic characteristics are important 
to consider in their financing decisions as they decisively influence issuers’ type of funding 
and financing costs (e.g., Hale and Santos, 2008; Gopalan et al., 2014). In Section 4.3.2.5, a 
more detailed set of bond, firm, and industry characteristics is analyzed. 
                                                                                                                                               
48 Noise and the opaque TRACE information setting might be reasons as shown in the robustness section. Panel 
E of Table 4.11 presents commonality in liquidity results based on aggregated firm time series. Noise is reduced 
and the adjusted R2 statistics increase to roughly 10%. 
49 Regarding the yearly bond-specific time-series regression approach, one might have the concern that the results 
are driven by single years. Unreported results (available upon request from the author) of yearly cross-sectional 
averages document substantial coefficient averages for all sample years. The coefficients are higher in years of 
financial stress as in Rösch and Kaserer (2013), but these results do not imply that the main results in Table 
4.2 are driven by single years. To account for the time-series variation in these coefficients, I use year fixed 
effects in the panel analyses in Table 4.7. 
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4.3.2.1. Commonality in liquidity by credit rating bucket 
Liquidity supply and demand differs across credit rating buckets. Edwards et al. (2007) and 
Jankowitsch et al. (2011) find transaction costs to increase with corporate bond ratings, i.e. 
bonds with lower credit quality face higher transaction costs which might indicate higher 
dependence of high yield bonds on market liquidity relative to investment grade bonds. 
However, Bessembinder et al. (2016) document higher dealer trading activity for investment 
grade bonds indicating a higher likelihood of supply-side comovement among these bonds. 
Kisgen and Strahan (2010) relate the segmentation of the corporate bond market to higher 
demand for investment grade bonds due to constrained investors such as insurance companies. 
This also indicates a higher likelihood of demand-side comovement among investment grade 
bonds. Since the overall trading activity is also more focused on investment grade bonds 
(Wang and Wu, 2015), I expect commonality in liquidity to differ between credit rating 
buckets and to be higher among investment grade bonds relative to high yield bonds. 
To test for credit rating buckets being a determinant of commonality in liquidity, I 
replicate Table 4.2 for different credit rating buckets. As in Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), I 
consider six credit rating buckets (all investment grade (IG) bonds, AAA-, AA-, A-, BBB-
rated bonds, and all high yield (HY) bonds). 
Table 4.3 presents results for different credit rating buckets. For brevity, it only reports 
results for the average concurrent coefficient, the average sum of concurrent, leading, and 
lagging coefficients, and the average adjusted R2 statistics. Panel A and Panel B of Table 4.3 
show the results for all investment grade (IG) bonds, i.e. bonds rated between AAA and BBB-
, and high yield (HY) bonds, i.e. bonds rated below BBB-. Panel C to Panel F of Table 4.3 
present the results for the specific investment grade credit rating buckets AAA to BBB. The 
concurrent coefficients indicate that commonality in liquidity is higher among investment 
grade bonds. The difference between all IG and HY bonds is positive for all liquidity measures 
and significant in four out of seven cases as shown in Panel G of Table 4.3. Within the 
investment grade segment, commonality in liquidity is, on average, lowest for AAA-rated 
bonds and highest among AA-rated bonds. This pattern also holds for the sum of concurrent, 
leading, and lagging coefficients.50 
 
                                                                                                                                               
50 Compared to Table 4.2, the results in Table 4.3 to 4.6 are slightly upward-biased because the influence of 
extreme values increases when considering smaller sample subsets. 
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Table 4.3: Commonality in liquidity by credit rating bucket 
  Trades Volume Turnover Depth Amihud Roll IQR 
    Panel A: IG bonds 
Concurrent 1.0544 *** 0.9805 *** 0.9798 *** 0.8807 *** 0.7667 *** 1.0312 *** 1.4537 ***
Sum 1.1281 *** 1.0706 *** 1.0712 *** 0.9782 *** 0.8822 *** 1.1904 *** 1.9153 ***
Adj. R2 4.02   3.66   3.66   3.37   4.59   3.61   4.11   
    Panel B: HY bonds 
Concurrent 0.9067 *** 0.8743 *** 0.8732 *** 0.6842 *** 0.5493 *** 0.4977 *** 0.7059 ***
Sum 1.0599 *** 1.1151 *** 1.1129 *** 1.0018 *** 1.0294 *** 0.6189 *** 1.5935 ***
Adj. R2 3.76   3.77   3.77   3.43   4.23   3.53   4.07   
    Panel C: AAA bonds 
Concurrent 0.8727 *** 0.6388 *** 0.6411 *** 0.5008 *** 0.2825   1.5762 *** 0.6729   
Sum 1.1697 *** 0.6813 ** 0.6786 ** 0.1190   0.6778   1.2934 *** 1.1476 * 
Adj. R2 4.33   3.80   3.80   3.20   4.42   4.25   4.11   
    Panel D: AA bonds 
Concurrent 1.1611 *** 1.1208 *** 1.1195 *** 0.9229 *** 0.5272 *** 1.2739 *** 1.4467 ***
Sum 1.4094 *** 1.2420 *** 1.2404 *** 1.1090 *** 0.5757 *** 1.3646 *** 1.9515 ***
Adj. R2 4.07   3.24   3.24   2.93   4.24   3.68   3.98   
    Panel E: A bonds 
Concurrent 1.0873 *** 0.9229 *** 0.9209 *** 0.8460 *** 0.8602 *** 1.0795 *** 1.6518 ***
Sum 1.2424 *** 1.0613 *** 1.0618 *** 0.9644 *** 1.0107 *** 1.2174 *** 2.1255 ***
Adj. R2 3.96   3.47   3.46   3.27   4.33   3.47   4.15   
    Panel F: BBB bonds 
Concurrent 0.9634 *** 1.0310 *** 1.0327 *** 0.9409 *** 0.7528 *** 0.8039 *** 1.0880 ***
Sum 0.8117 *** 1.0314 *** 1.0333 *** 0.9930 *** 0.8249 *** 1.0573 *** 1.4889 ***
Adj. R2 4.08   4.15   4.15   3.73   5.17   3.77   4.10   
  Panel G: Differences in slope coefficients of IG and HY bonds 
IG-HY 0.1478 * 0.1062   0.1066   0.1965 * 0.2174   0.5335 *** 0.7479 ***
( (
Notes: The table reports the results of time-series regressions that relate daily individual bond liquidity 
innovations to the respective market liquidity innovations for all bonds in the sample by credit rating bucket. In 
each individual regression, the market liquidity innovations are the averages of the respective liquidity measure 
for all bonds excluding the dependent variable bond. Column 1 to 7 provide the results for the different liquidity 
measures. Trades is daily number of trades. Volume is the daily trading volume. Depth is the daily realized depth 
of each bond computed as the mean of daily buy and sell volume. Turnover is daily trading volume as a 
percentage of outstanding volume. Amihud is the Amihud measure. Roll is the roll measure. IQR is the inter 
quartile range. The liquidity measures (Amihud, Roll, inter quartile range) are computed as described in the 
Appendix. 
The concurrent, lagging, and leading values of market liquidity innovations; concurrent, lagging, and leading 
values of the market return, and the proportional daily change in dependent variable bond’s squared return (a 
measure of change in return volatility) are regressors. Cross-sectional averages of the concurrent time-series 
slope coefficients of market liquidity innovations and the average sum of the concurrent, lagging, and leading 
coefficients of market liquidity innovations are reported. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is the cross-sectional average of adjusted R² statistics in percentage points. 
(Continued) 
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Table 4.3 (Continued): Commonality in liquidity by credit rating bucket 
Panel A shows the respective statistics for all investment grade (IG) bonds, i.e. bonds having a rating between 
AAA and BBB-. Panel B shows the respective statistics for all high yield (HY) bonds, i.e. bonds having a rating 
below BBB-. Panel C shows the respective statistics for all AAA-rated bonds. Panel D shows the respective 
statistics for all AA-rated bonds. Panel E shows the respective statistics for all A-rated bonds. Panel F shows the 
respective statistics for all BBB-rated bonds. Panel G shows differences between concurrent slope coefficients 
from Panel A and B. Significance of differences is determined by using a Welch test. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Summing up, Table 4.3 documents differences in commonality in liquidity across credit 
rating buckets, consistent with the expected positive difference between IG and HY bonds. 
Overall, the results indicate that credit rating buckets determine the degree of commonality in 
liquidity. 
4.3.2.2. Commonality in liquidity by time to maturity 
Bonds’ time to maturity may also lead to differences in commonality in liquidity. Gehde-Trapp 
et al. (2016) develop a model in which investors’ weigh up two sources of liquidity for their 
portfolio allocation of bonds with different maturities: transaction costs and maturity waiting 
costs. If investors are hit by a shock, short-term bonds are not sold due to low waiting costs 
implying less active trading for short-term bonds. A clientele effect arising from investors with 
different trading needs indicates that long-term bonds are also less actively traded. The two 
effects result in a hump-shaped relation between trading volume and time to maturity for 
corporate bonds. Shocks seem to have the largest impact for medium-term bonds increasing 
the likelihood of correlated supply- and demand-side trading activity in these bonds. Thus, I 
expect commonality in liquidity to differ with respect to bonds’ time to maturity and to be 
highest among medium-term corporate bonds. 
I test for this by replicating Table 4.2 for all bonds yearly grouped into three maturity 
groups: short-term bonds, i.e. bonds that have less than 3 years to maturity, medium-term 
bonds, i.e. bonds with maturities between 3 and 7 years, and long-term bonds, i.e. bonds with 
more than 7 years to maturity. Panel A to C of Table 4.4 report the results for short-term bonds, 
medium-term bonds, and long-term bonds. Panel D of Table 4.4 shows differences between 
concurrent slope coefficients from Panel A to C. 
Panel A to C of Table 4.4 report that commonality in liquidity differs across maturity 
groups and is lowest within the maturity group of short-term bonds. The first and last row of 
Panel D of Table 4.4 support this finding. The differences are always positive and significant  
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Table 4.4: Commonality in liquidity by maturity group 
  Trades Volume Turnover Depth Amihud Roll IQR 
    Panel A: Maturity shorter than 3 years (short) 
Concurrent 0.9441 *** 0.8632 *** 0.8612 *** 0.7965 *** 0.5719 *** 0.5908 *** 1.2546 ***
Sum 1.0574 *** 0.9766 *** 0.9747 *** 0.8857 *** 0.7999 *** 0.7386 *** 1.7879 ***
Adj. R2 3.75   3.65   3.64   3.43   5.09   3.17   4.36   
    Panel B: Maturity between 3 and 7 years (medium) 
Concurrent 1.1744 *** 1.0407 *** 1.0394 *** 0.9422 *** 0.6862 *** 1.1877 *** 1.4297 ***
Sum 1.2566 *** 1.1734 *** 1.1739 *** 1.0701 *** 0.8855 *** 1.3500 *** 1.8979 ***
Adj. R2 4.09   3.51   3.51   3.20   4.00   3.75   3.94   
    Panel C: Maturity larger than 7 years (long) 
Concurrent 0.9880 *** 1.0398 *** 1.0423 *** 0.8265 *** 1.1104 *** 1.3001 *** 1.4500 ***
Sum 1.0238 *** 1.1116 *** 1.1150 *** 1.0207 *** 1.1097 *** 1.4535 *** 1.9989 ***
Adj. R2 4.26   3.98   3.97   3.55   4.37   4.16   3.93   
    Panel D: Differences in commonality in liquidity 
medium-short 0.2303 *** 0.1776 *** 0.1782 *** 0.1458 * 0.1143   0.5969 *** 0.1751   
long-medium -0.1864 *** -0.0009   0.0029   -0.1157   0.4243 ** 0.1124   0.0203   
long-short  0.0439   0.1767 ** 0.1811 ** 0.0300   0.5385 *** 0.7093 *** 0.1953   
Notes: The table reports the results of time-series regressions that relate daily individual bond liquidity 
innovations to the respective market liquidity innovations for all bonds in the sample by maturity groups. In each 
individual regression, the market liquidity innovations are the averages of the respective liquidity measure for all 
bonds excluding the dependent variable bond. Column 1 to 7 provide the results for the different liquidity 
measures. Trades is daily number of trades. Volume is the daily trading volume. Depth is the daily realized depth 
of each bond computed as the mean of daily buy and sell volume. Turnover is daily trading volume as a 
percentage of outstanding volume. Amihud is the Amihud measure. Roll is the roll measure. IQR is the inter 
quartile range. The liquidity measures (Amihud, Roll, inter quartile range) are computed as described in the 
Appendix. 
The concurrent, lagging, and leading values of market liquidity innovations; concurrent, lagging, and leading 
values of the market return, and the proportional daily change in dependent variable bond’s squared return (a 
measure of change in return volatility) are regressors. Cross-sectional averages of the concurrent time-series 
slope coefficients of market liquidity innovations and the average sum of the concurrent, lagging, and leading 
coefficients of market liquidity innovations are reported. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is the cross-sectional average of adjusted R² statistics in percentage points. 
Panel A shows the respective statistics for all bonds with maturities shorter than 3 years (short). Panel B shows 
the respective statistics for all bonds with maturities between 3 and 7 years (medium). Panel C shows the 
respective statistics for all bonds with maturities larger than 7 years. Panel D shows differences between 
concurrent slope coefficients from Panel A to C. Significance of differences is determined by using a Welch test. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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in 9 out of 14 cases. There is no significant difference between the medium-term and long-
term maturity group. The differences in the second row of Panel D of Table 4.4 are three times 
negative, four times positive, and only one negative and one positive difference are significant. 
The positive differences between short- and medium-term bonds are in line with the 
expectation based on Gehde-Trapp et al. (2016). Contrary to the above expectation, Table 4.4 
documents similar commonality in liquidity for long-term bonds and medium-term bonds. One 
explanation might be that long-term bonds are more sensitive to yield changes compared to 
short- and medium-term bonds. Thus, market liquidity changes might have a stronger impact 
on the individual liquidity of these bonds as well, being in line with the findings of Acharya 
et al. (2013). 
To sum up, Table 4.4 shows differences in commonality in liquidity between maturity 
groups and indicates that a time to maturity is a further determinant of a bond’s degree of 
commonality in liquidity. 
4.3.2.3. Commonality in liquidity by amount outstanding 
As a further characteristic, a bond’s amount outstanding decisively determines its degree of 
tradability. Edwards et al. (2007) document lower transaction costs for bonds with higher 
amount outstanding. Thus, the sum of potential determinants of transaction costs (e.g., 
inventory risk, asymmetric information, or funding liquidity risk) is lower. This should 
translate into lower commonality in liquidity. Contrary, the common component driving 
transaction costs in these bonds is expected to be larger. This is because dealers make markets 
if they have access to order flow and price information (Schultz, 2003). This is more likely for 
bonds with high amount outstanding which are, on average, investment grade bonds with 
higher trading activity (Wang and Wu, 2015). This implies that dealers’ market making 
activity is more focused on large issues leading to higher commonality in liquidity. Thus, I 
expect commonality in liquidity to differ with respect to bonds’ amount outstanding and to be 
highest among large issues. 
To test for bonds’ amount outstanding being a determinant of commonality in liquidity, I 
repeat the analyses of Table 4.2 for all bonds grouped into amount outstanding quintiles on an 
annual basis. Panel A to E of Table 4.5 show the respective statistics for all bonds in amount 
outstanding quintile one (smallest) to five (largest). Panel F of Table 4.5 reports the differences 
between concurrent slope coefficients from Panel A and E. 
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Table 4.5: Commonality in liquidity by amount outstanding quintile 
  Trades Volume Turnover Depth Amihud Roll IQR 
    Panel A: Amount outstanding quintile 1 (smallest amount outstanding) 
Concurrent 0.6690 *** 0.5547 *** 0.5534 *** 0.3808 *** 0.6313 *** 0.2724 *** 1.0147 ***
Sum 0.7434 *** 0.5668 *** 0.5673 *** 0.3813 *** 1.0372 *** 0.4047 *** 1.5600 ***
Adj. R2 4.64   4.46   4.45   4.12   6.08   4.30   4.98   
    Panel B: Amount outstanding quintile 2 
Concurrent 0.7354 *** 0.7184 *** 0.7181 *** 0.7505 *** 0.4996 *** 0.4170 *** 1.5297 ***
Sum 0.7844 *** 0.7686 *** 0.7686 *** 0.8461 *** 0.5715 *** 0.6678 *** 2.1619 ***
Adj. R2 4.12   4.25   4.25   3.94   5.44   4.19   4.83   
    Panel C: Amount outstanding quintile 3 
Concurrent 1.0576 *** 1.0189 *** 1.0171 *** 0.8528 *** 0.5967 *** 0.7793 *** 1.2224 ***
Sum 1.1998 *** 1.0597 *** 1.0596 *** 0.9355 *** 0.6597 *** 1.0164 *** 1.3311 ***
Adj. R2 3.82   3.28   3.28   2.90   4.38   3.16   3.97   
    Panel D: Amount outstanding quintile 4 
Concurrent 1.1563 *** 1.1201 *** 1.1201 *** 1.0011 *** 0.9876 *** 1.1290 *** 1.5321 ***
Sum 1.2331 *** 1.3591 *** 1.3603 *** 1.2573 *** 1.1524 *** 1.3308 *** 1.8985 ***
Adj. R2 2.92   2.87   2.87   2.66   3.50   2.73   3.43   
    Panel E: Amount outstanding quintile 5 (largest amount outstanding) 
Concurrent 1.5470 *** 1.4120 *** 1.4118 *** 1.2882 *** 0.9877 *** 2.1870 *** 1.4969 ***
Sum 1.6197 *** 1.6315 *** 1.6309 *** 1.4972 *** 1.1120 *** 2.1358 *** 2.3840 ***
Adj. R2 4.41   3.54   3.52   3.30   3.32   3.60   3.32   
    Panel F: Differences in commonality in liquidity 
Q5-Q1  0.8780 *** 0.8573 *** 0.8584 *** 0.9074 *** 0.3564   1.9146 *** 0.4822 **
Notes: The table reports the results of time-series regressions that relate daily individual bond liquidity 
innovations to the respective market liquidity innovations for all bonds in the sample by amount outstanding 
quintiles. In each individual regression, the market liquidity innovations are the averages of the respective 
liquidity measure for all bonds excluding the dependent variable bond. Column 1 to 7 provide the results for the 
different liquidity measures. Trades is daily number of trades. Volume is the daily trading volume. Depth is the 
daily realized depth of each bond computed as the mean of daily buy and sell volume. Turnover is daily trading 
volume as a percentage of outstanding volume. Amihud is the Amihud measure. Roll is the roll measure. IQR is 
the inter quartile range. The liquidity measures (Amihud, Roll, inter quartile range) are computed as described in 
the Appendix. 
The concurrent, lagging, and leading values of market liquidity innovations; concurrent, lagging, and leading 
values of the market return, and the proportional daily change in dependent variable bond’s squared return (a 
measure of change in return volatility) are regressors. Cross-sectional averages of the concurrent time-series 
slope coefficients of market liquidity innovations and the average sum of the concurrent, lagging, and leading 
coefficients of market liquidity innovations are reported. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is the cross-sectional average of adjusted R² statistics in percentage points. 
Panel A to E show the respective statistics for all bonds by amount outstanding quintile. Panel A shows the results 
for bonds with the lowest amount outstanding and Panel E shows the results for bonds with the highest amount 
outstanding. Quintiles are determined yearly. Panel F shows differences between concurrent slope coefficients 
from Panel A and E. Significance of differences is determined by using a Welch test. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Panel A to E of Table 4.5 show that commonality in liquidity is monotonously increasing 
across amount outstanding quintiles for all but two liquidity measures. For the Amihud 
measure the average concurrent coefficient and the sum of coefficients of the first quintile are 
higher compared to the second and third quintile. For the IQR measure a similar effect arises 
for the second quintile. Overall, Panel F of Table 4.5 confirms that commonality in liquidity 
is monotonously increasing across amount outstanding quintiles. The difference between the 
fifth and first quintile is positive in all cases and statistically significant in six out of seven 
cases. 
Summing up, the results of Table 4.5 are in line with the expectation of supply- and 
demand-side trading activity being more focused on large issues and thus leading to higher 
commonality in liquidity. Hence, bonds’ amount outstanding is a further determinant of 
commonality in liquidity. 
4.3.2.4. Commonality in liquidity by industry 
Finally, liquidity supply and demand may also be driven by a bond’s industry. In the model of 
Cespa and Foucault (2014) dealers try to infer price information of assets for which they are 
liquidity suppliers from other assets linking the supply-side liquidity of these assets with each 
other. Regarding liquidity demand, in the model of Veldkamp (2006) comovement arises 
through investors’ preference for cheap information resulting in a common subset of 
information that is used to price different assets. Relative to non-financial firms, financial 
firms as a group depend more on a common subset of information that is also related more to 
market-wide liquidity effects (Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012). Thus, I expect commonality in 
liquidity to be higher among financial firms relative to all non-financial firms. 
To test the expectation of a bond’s industry being a determinant of commonality in 
liquidity, I replicate Table 4.2 for financial and non-financial firms as in Dick-Nielsen et al. 
(2012). Firms with SIC codes ranging from 6000 to 6999 are classified as financial firms. 
Firms with other SIC codes are non-financial firms. Table 4.6 presents results for the 
respective sample subsets. 
Panel A of Table 4.6 shows the respective statistics for bonds issued by financial firms, 
Panel B of Table 4.6 shows the respective statistics for bonds issued by non-financial firms, 
and Panel C of Table 4.6 reports the differences between concurrent slope coefficients from 
Panel A and B. Commonality in liquidity is higher among financial firms as documented in  
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Table 4.6: Commonality in liquidity – financial vs. non-financial firms 
  Trades Volume Turnover Depth Amihud Roll IQR 
    Panel A: Bonds of financial firms 
Concurrent 1.1504 *** 0.9771 *** 0.9759 *** 0.8581 *** 0.9028 *** 1.1277 *** 1.5812 ***
Sum 1.2908 *** 1.1507 *** 1.1511 *** 0.9592 *** 1.0976 *** 1.3049 *** 2.2439 ***
Adj. R2 3.97   3.42   3.41   3.19   4.32   3.62   4.19   
    Panel B: Bonds of non-financial firms 
Concurrent 0.9541 *** 0.9587 *** 0.9582 *** 0.8515 *** 0.6227 *** 0.8406 *** 1.1653 ***
Sum  0.9996 *** 1.0252 *** 1.0252 *** 0.9967 *** 0.7664 *** 0.9783 *** 1.5376 ***
Adj. R2 4.00   3.86   3.85   3.51   4.69   3.58   4.02   
    Panel C: Difference in commonality in liquidity 
FIN-NONFIN 0.1962 *** 0.0184   0.0177   0.0066   0.2801 ** 0.2871 *** 0.4159 ***
Notes: The table reports the results of time-series regressions that relate daily individual bond liquidity 
innovations to the respective market liquidity innovations for all bonds in the sample by the issuers’ type of 
industry (financial vs. non-financial firms). In each individual regression, the market liquidity innovations are 
the averages of the respective liquidity measure for all bonds excluding the dependent variable bond. Column 1 
to 7 provide the results for the different liquidity measures. Trades is daily number of trades. Volume is the daily 
trading volume. Depth is the daily realized depth of each bond computed as the mean of daily buy and sell 
volume. Turnover is daily trading volume as a percentage of outstanding volume. Amihud is the Amihud 
measure. Roll is the roll measure. IQR is the inter quartile range. The liquidity measures (Amihud, Roll, inter 
quartile range) are computed as described in the Appendix. 
The concurrent, lagging, and leading values of market liquidity innovations; concurrent, lagging, and leading 
values of the market return, and the proportional daily change in dependent variable bond’s squared return (a 
measure of change in return volatility) are regressors. Cross-sectional averages of the concurrent time-series 
slope coefficients of market liquidity innovations and the average sum of the concurrent, lagging, and leading 
coefficients of market liquidity innovations are reported. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. Adj. R2 is the cross-sectional average of adjusted R² statistics in percentage points. 
Panel A shows the respective statistics for bonds issued by financial firms. Panel B shows the respective statistics 
for bonds issued by non-financial firms. Panel C shows differences between concurrent slope coefficients from 
Panel A and B. Significance of differences is determined by using a Welch test. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel C of Table 4.6. The differences between concurrent slope coefficients are positive for 
all liquidity measures and significant in four out of seven cases. 
In summary, Table 4.6 supports the expectation by documenting a positive difference in 
commonality in liquidity between financial and non-financial firms. This indicates that a 
bond’s industry is a further determinant of commonality in liquidity. 
4.3.2.5. Panel analysis of determinants of commonality in liquidity 
Overall, the results from Section 4.3.2.1 to 4.3.2.4 suggest basic bond characteristics to be 
determinants of commonality in liquidity. However, the results do not reveal whether the 
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analyzed determinants proxy for the same effects. For instance, bonds with high amount 
outstanding are, on average, investment grade bonds with higher trading activity (Wang and 
Wu, 2015). Moreover, several other bond, firm, and industry characteristics may determine 
individual bonds’ comovement with market liquidity. To take this into account, this section 
analyses the cross-sectional determinants of commonality in liquidity using the panel structure 
of the bond-specific time-series regression results summarized in Table 4.2. 
The coefficients  MktLiq  of the time-series regressions in Equation (4.2) describe individual 
bonds’ sensitivity to market liquidity (Kamara et al., 2008). A second measure are the R2 
statistics of these regressions (Karolyi et al., 2012). A higher R2 statistic indicates a higher 
commonality in liquidity because a higher fraction of bonds’ individual liquidity variation can 
be explained by market movements.51 A higher slope coefficient does not necessarily coincide 
with a higher R2 statistic. Thus, for the cross-section of bonds both measures are important in 
understanding commonality in liquidity as they identify which bonds react more strongly to 
market liquidity and which bonds’ variation in liquidity is explained more by the variation in 
market liquidity. 
I run the following panel regressions to test for the influence of bond, firm, and industry 
characteristics on the degree of commonality in liquidity 
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where the dependent variable in Equation (4.3), , MktLiq i t , are the bond-specific concurrent 
coefficients of market liquidity innovations from Equation (4.2) and the dependent variable in 
Equation (4.4), the logistic transformation of 2,i tR , are the R2 statistics of the bond-specific 
                                                                                                                                               
51 To be consistent with the previous analyses of Section 4.3, I use the R2 statistics based on the regression model 
in Equation (4.2) using concurrent, one trading day leading and lagging values of market liquidity innovations, 
the concurrent, one trading day leading and lagging market return, and the concurrent percentage change in the 
dependent variable bond’s squared return. Unreported regression results (available upon request from the 
author) using only concurrent, one trading day leading and lagging values of market liquidity innovations as 
in Karolyi et al. (2012) provide similar results. Hence, the results of Table 4.7 are not driven by the market 
return or individual bonds’ squared returns. 
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regressions from Equation (4.2).52 Both analyses consider the same rich set of explanatory 
variables covering yearly averages of bond, firm, and industry characteristics to some extent 
all being related to supply- and demand-side effects. The main explanatory variables are based 
on the previous sections, being a bond’s rating expressed as a number, a bond’s time to 
maturity, the logarithm of a bond’s amount outstanding, and a dummy indicating whether a 
bond’s issuer is a financial firm.53 Additionally, I control for a bond’s return and return 
standard deviation found to be related to inventory risk (e.g., Stoll, 1978; Hameed et al., 2010; 
Friewald and Nagler, 2016). Bonds with higher inventory risk are expected to depend more 
on market liquidity. Since trading activity also may be an important determinant of 
commonality in liquidity, I add the logarithm of dealer trading volume as a proxy for 
comovement in supply-side liquidity: high dealer trading volume might indicate higher market 
making activity and thus a higher relevance of funding liquidity (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 
2009) or stronger informational liquidity linkages (Cespa and Foucault, 2014). The logarithms 
of customer buys and customer sells are proxies for correlated demand-side trading activity: 
high buy or sell volume might indicate high correlated trading activity (Chordia et al., 2011). 
I further control for the aging effect of seasoned bonds being less actively traded by adding 
bonds’ age (Hotchkiss and Jostova, 2007). A firm’s leverage ratio and return on assets control 
for profitability and riskiness (Danis et al., 2014), and logarithmized firm size, firm age, and 
analyst coverage54 proxy for the ease to gather firm-specific information and information 
uncertainty all likely to drive supply and demand of firms’ outstanding bonds (e.g., Zhang, 
2006; Lu et al., 2010; Zhao, 2012). Regarding the industry a firm is operating in, it is more 
likely that firms depend on a more similar subset of information in concentrated industries 
(Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004) leading to higher supply and demand-side commonality in 
liquidity according to the theoretical models of Cespa and Foucault (2014) and Veldkamp 
(2006). I proxy for concentration with an industry’s Herfindahl Index computed as the sum of 
the squared fractions of each individual firm’s sales over the total sales of the industry. 
Additionally, I control for the riskiness of industries potentially driving overall industry supply 
and demand by the average industry leverage ratio. Finally, I include year  
 
                                                                                                                                               
52 The values of the R2 statistics are between zero and one by construction. The logistic transformation is used to 
obtain an unbounded variable (e.g., Hameed et al., 2010; Karolyi et al., 2012). 
53 Unreported results (available upon request from the author) show that the results are robust to the inclusion of 
industry fixed effects instead of the financial firm dummy where firms’ three-digit SIC codes define industries. 
54 Analyst coverage is from Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and is the number of analysts 
following a firm’s stock. 
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Table 4.7: Cross-sectional determinants of commonality in liquidity 
 Trades Volume Turnover Depth Amihud Roll IQR 
Panel A: Dependent variables are concurrent market liquidity coefficients 
Return 3.2539  1.8432  2.0058 1.1289 0.1484 7.1226 ** -9.1751
  (0.1026) (0.5167) (0.4801) (0.6974) (0.9750) (0.0106) (0.2319) 
Return std. dev. 0.1668  0.2840 0.2869 -0.1372 1.7166 *** -0.6041 * 0.0556
  (0.5146) (0.3204) (0.3177) (0.6792) (0.0022) (0.0574) (0.9419) 
Dealer volume 0.2586 *** 0.1201 ** 0.1218 ** 0.0559 0.1159 * 0.4761 *** 0.1387
  (0.0000) (0.0153) (0.0141) (0.3258) (0.0570) (0.0000) (0.3441) 
Sell volume 0.1879  0.0089 0.0087 -0.0470 -0.4391 ** 0.1219  -0.2353
  (0.1373) (0.9430) (0.9444) (0.7547) (0.0453) (0.3983) (0.5489) 
Buy volume -0.3583 *** 0.0854 0.0862 0.1256 0.1371 -0.3248 ** 0.0928
  (0.0049) (0.5028) (0.4989) (0.4044) (0.5436) (0.0246) (0.8148) 
Rating -0.0012  0.0050 0.0051 0.0045 -0.0113 -0.0234 * -0.0525 * 
  (0.9188) (0.7026) (0.7003) (0.7709) (0.5380) (0.0960) (0.0934) 
Time to maturity -0.0143 *** -0.0051 -0.0050 -0.0054 0.0126 0.0197 *** -0.0148
  (0.0017) (0.3174) (0.3312) (0.3824) (0.1605) (0.0024) (0.2181) 
Age  -0.0109  -0.0129 * -0.0127 * -0.0095 0.0118 -0.0235 *** -0.0175
  (0.1422) (0.0745) (0.0798) (0.3333) (0.3593) (0.0052) (0.4193) 
Amt. outstanding 0.2547 *** 0.1499 ** 0.1497 ** 0.2672 *** 0.4903 *** 0.4463 *** 0.0339
  (0.0000) (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8310) 
Leverage ratio 0.1021  0.1619 0.1618 -0.1301 -0.5432 0.3052  -0.3982
  (0.6701) (0.5303) (0.5314) (0.6943) (0.1447) (0.3097) (0.6134) 
Return on assets -0.8740  -0.6368 -0.6369 -0.8519 -0.9996  1.2884 * 1.7713
  (0.1259) (0.3657) (0.3659) (0.3054) (0.2060) (0.0829) (0.3144) 
Firm size  0.0471  0.0428 0.0425 -0.0278 -0.1666 *** 0.0232  0.0366
  (0.2026) (0.3105) (0.3144) (0.5680) (0.0065) (0.5819) (0.7480) 
Firm age  -0.0116  -0.0445 -0.0436 -0.0031 0.0007 0.0160  -0.0133
  (0.7036) (0.1711) (0.1808) (0.9417) (0.9900) (0.6907) (0.8766) 
Analyst coverage -0.0078  0.0338 0.0316 0.0732 ** -0.0660 -0.0354  0.0451
  (0.7831) (0.2989) (0.3302) (0.0488) (0.2504) (0.3062) (0.6031) 
Financial firm 0.0123  -0.1608 ** -0.1612 ** -0.1724 ** 0.1208 0.1171  0.3782 **
  (0.8485) (0.0354) (0.0351) (0.0496) (0.2543) (0.1718) (0.0208) 
Industry HERF 0.2410 * 0.3353 ** 0.3380 ** -0.1567 -0.1302 -0.0519  -0.2035
  (0.0988) (0.0347) (0.0333) (0.4178) (0.6013) (0.7823) (0.5947) 
Industry leverage 0.1830  -0.3446 -0.3477 -0.1623 0.2121 0.0175  1.0958
  (0.5070) (0.2636) (0.2598) (0.6578) (0.6515) (0.9603) (0.1495) 
N 8749 8749 8749 8749 8749 8384 4630
Adj. R2 2.91 2.40 2.40 1.48 1.21 8.98 0.97 
(Continued) 
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Table 4.7 (Continued): Cross-sectional determinants of commonality in liquidity 
  Trades Volume Turnover Depth Amihud Roll IQR 
Panel B: Dependent variable are the logistic transformations of R2 statistics 
Return 3.9876 *** 2.6262 *** 2.5937 *** 3.0297 *** 4.2350 *** 4.1429 *** 5.1158 ***
  (0.0000) (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0011) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0050) 
Return std. dev. 0.3043 *** 0.4050 *** 0.4026 *** 0.3994 *** 0.6905 *** 0.5098 *** 0.9096 ***
  (0.0034) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Dealer volume -0.2017 *** -0.2422 *** -0.2426 *** -0.2531 *** -0.3350 *** -0.2293 *** -0.3998 ***
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Sell volume 0.2031 *** 0.2233 *** 0.2243 *** 0.2774 *** 0.2101 *** 0.2044 *** 0.2149 ** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0112) 
Buy volume 0.0683  0.1207 ** 0.1189 ** 0.0675  0.1487 *** 0.1262 ** 0.1593 * 
  (0.1396) (0.0120) (0.0133) (0.1583) (0.0037) (0.0119) (0.0706) 
Rating -0.0264 *** -0.0266 *** -0.0265 *** -0.0238 *** -0.0475 *** -0.0338 *** -0.0413 ***
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Time to maturity 0.0014  0.0026  0.0026  0.0014  -0.0078 *** 0.0103 *** -0.0053  
  (0.5236) (0.2911) (0.2834) (0.5826) (0.0023) (0.0002) (0.1200) 
Age  0.0058 * 0.0087 ** 0.0087 ** 0.0087 ** 0.0082 ** 0.0055 * -0.0046  
  (0.0750) (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0351) (0.0256) (0.0885) (0.4306) 
Amt. outstanding -0.3573 *** -0.4252 *** -0.4247 *** -0.4141 *** -0.4236 *** -0.3731 *** -0.3930 ***
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Leverage ratio -0.5536 *** -0.5329 *** -0.5333 *** -0.4652 *** -0.6302 *** -0.6054 *** -0.3113 * 
  (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0673) 
Return on assets 0.5612 ** 0.6849 ** 0.6829 ** 0.7669 *** 0.2554  0.8511 *** 0.8795 ** 
  (0.0325) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0052) (0.3786) (0.0056) (0.0305) 
Firm size  -0.1050 *** -0.1150 *** -0.1151 *** -0.1046 *** -0.1566 *** -0.1225 *** -0.0997 ***
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Firm age  0.0078  0.0140  0.0138  0.0099  0.0276 * 0.0031  0.0183  
  (0.6205) (0.3711) (0.3768) (0.5422) (0.0971) (0.8570) (0.3739) 
Analyst coverage -0.0232 * -0.0318 ** -0.0317 ** -0.0418 *** -0.0279 ** -0.0324 ** -0.0240  
 (0.0793) (0.0192) (0.0196) (0.0036) (0.0471) (0.0276) (0.2264) 
Financial firm 0.0812 ** 0.0625 * 0.0621 * 0.0651 * 0.0385  0.1109 *** 0.1333 ***
 (0.0137) (0.0666) (0.0684) (0.0552) (0.2750) (0.0035) (0.0021) 
Industry HERF -0.0216  -0.0021  -0.0023  0.0245  -0.0485  0.0435  -0.2525 ** 
  (0.7693) (0.9784) (0.9769) (0.7481) (0.5298) (0.6118) (0.0147) 
Industry leverage 0.5083 *** 0.5485 *** 0.5490 *** 0.4901 *** 0.5895 *** 0.4447 *** 0.4957 ***
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0000) (0.0050) (0.0062) 
N 8749 8749 8749 8749 8749 8384 4630
Adj. R2 16.28 19.76 19.77 18.71 24.64 16.59 17.92 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel data regressions of commonality in liquidity on different cross-
sectional explanatory variables. Commonality in liquidity is measured by the yearly bond-specific concurrent 
coefficient from Equation (4.2) as well as the R2 statistic of these regressions that relate daily individual bond 
liquidity innovations to the respective market liquidity innovations for all bonds using concurrent, lagging, and 
leading values of market liquidity innovations as well as lagging, leading, and concurrent values of the market 
return, and the proportional daily change in dependent variable bond’s squared return (a measure of change in 
return volatility) as explanatory variables. I use the logistic transformation of the yearly bond-specific R2 
statistics, determined as described in the main text in Section 4.3.2.5. 
Column 1 to 7 provide the results for the different liquidity measures. Trades is daily number of trades. Volume 
is the daily trading volume. Depth is the daily realized depth of each bond computed as the mean of daily buy 
and sell volume. Turnover is daily trading volume as a percentage of outstanding volume. Amihud is the Amihud 
measure. Roll is the roll measure. IQR is the inter quartile range. The liquidity measures (Amihud, Roll, inter 
quartile range) are computed as described in the Appendix. 
(Continued) 
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Table 4.7 (Continued): Cross-sectional determinants of commonality in liquidity 
The explanatory variables are bond, firm, and industry variables as described in the main text in Section 4.3.2.5. 
Panel A shows results using the concurrent regression coefficients of yearly bond-specific regressions as 
dependent variable. Panel B shows results using the logistic transformation of the R2 statistics of yearly bond-
specific regressions as dependent variable. In all regressions I use year fixed-effects. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Significance is 
determined using robust standard errors clustered at the bond level. Adjusted R² statistics are in percentage points. 
fixed effects, denoted by Yeart , to adjust for time-series variation in commonality in liquidity 
(e.g., Hameed et al., 2010; Rösch and Kaserer, 2013) and cluster standard errors at the bond 
level. 
Panel A of Table 4.7 presents results of panel regressions from Equation (4.3). Only dealer 
volume and bonds’ amount outstanding are systematically significant. The effect of further 
potential determinants of commonality in liquidity from Table 4.3 to 4.6 seems to be subsumed 
by these two variables. The sensitivity of individual bond liquidity to market liquidity is higher 
for bonds with higher dealer volume in 5 out of 7 cases. This finding is in line with the above 
argumentation of dealer volume being a proxy for market making activity. In addition, the 
liquidity of bonds with high amount outstanding is more sensitive to market liquidity being 
significant in 6 out 7 cases. Given that dealer volume controls for dealers’ market making 
activity being more likely for large issues (Schultz, 2003), amount outstanding most likely 
captures demand-side effects. Bonds with high amount outstanding are more actively traded 
and, thus, likely to be in overall higher demand (Wang and Wu, 2015). Hence, supply- and 
demand-side effects both drive the sensitivity of individual bonds’ liquidity to market 
liquidity. 
Panel B of Table 4.7 shows results of panel regressions from Equation (4.4). Compared 
to the determinants of the sensitivity of individual bonds’ liquidity to market liquidity from 
Panel A of Table 4.7, several more variables have an impact on individual bonds’ liquidity 
variations being explained by market variations. Regarding the bond characteristics from 
Section 4.3.2.1 to 4.3.2.4, I find bonds with higher credit quality (= lower rating number) to 
have higher R2 statistics, bonds’ time to maturity to have no impact, bonds’ with higher amount 
outstanding to have lower R2 statistics, and bonds of financial firms to have higher R2 statistics. 
Interestingly, bonds’ amount outstanding and dealer volume have opposite signs in Panel A 
and Panel B of Table 4.7. Bonds with higher amount outstanding or higher dealer volume are 
more sensitive to variations in market liquidity, but are also influenced more by bond-specific 
 
 
4. Commonality in Liquidity in the US Corporate Bond Market 111 
 
or noise components according to the lower R2 statistics. This finding underlines the 
importance of slope coefficients and R2 statistics as measures of individuals bonds’ degree of 
commonality in liquidity. Overall, the significant explanatory variables are to some extend all 
related to supply- and demand-side effects. Summing up, the results in Table 4.7 show that 
supply- or demand-side effects both influence individual bonds’ comovement with market 
liquidity. 
4.3.3. Alternative sources of individual bonds’ comovement in liquidity 
The analyses in Section 4.3.2 assume market liquidity to be the only source of individual 
bonds’ comovement in liquidity. However, the determinants discussed in Section 4.3.2.1 to 
4.3.2.4 are common to several bonds and, thus, themselves may be sources of commonality in 
liquidity. For instance, the well-known flight-to-quality effect results in correlated demand for 
less risky bonds, i.e. bonds in higher-quality credit rating buckets (e.g., Longstaff et al., 2005; 
Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012). Thus, market liquidity may only be one out of several sources of 
corporate bonds’ liquidity comovement. This section tests for additional sources of 
commonality in liquidity while controlling for market liquidity. For the same reason as in 
Section 4.3.2, I focus on the bond characteristics discussed in Section 4.3.2.1 to 4.3.2.4: credit 
rating buckets, time to maturities, amounts outstanding, and industries. 
To test for additional sources of commonality in liquidity, I extend the model in 
Equation (4.2) that relates bonds’ individual liquidity to market liquidity. I separately add 
credit rating bucket, maturity group, amount outstanding quintile, and industry liquidity 
resulting in the following regression models: 
, , , ,              Mkt Mkt Rat RatLiq t Liq Liq t Liq Liq t t tControls   (4.5) 
, , , ,              Mkt Mkt Mat MatLiq t Liq Liq t Liq Liq t t tControls   (4.6) 
, , , ,              Mkt Mkt Amt AmtLiq t Liq Liq t Liq Liq t t tControls   (4.7) 
, , , .              Mkt Mkt Ind IndLiq t Liq Liq t Liq Liq t t tControls   (4.8) 
The additional regressor , RatLiq t  is the respective credit rating bucket average of , Liq t , , MatLiq t  is 
the respective monthly maturity group (short-, medium-, long-term bonds) average of , Liq t , 
, AmtLiq t  is the respective monthly amount outstanding quintile average of , Liq t , and , IndLiq t  is the 
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respective industry55 average of , Liq t . The averages consider all bonds excluding the 
respective dependent variable bond. tControls  is the same vector of control variables as in 
Equation (4.2) supplemented with one trading day leading and lagging values of , RatLiq t , , MatLiq t , 
, AmtLiq t , or , IndLiq t . 
Panel A of Table 4.8 presents the results for Equation (4.5). It shows that market liquidity 
and credit rating bucket liquidity determine individual bonds’ liquidity as the average 
concurrent slope coefficients and the average sum of the concurrent, leading, and lagging slope 
coefficients are significantly positive. Similarly, Panel B to D of Table 4.8 present the results 
for Equation (4.6) to (4.8). They document that maturity group, amount outstanding quintile, 
and industry liquidity influence individual bond liquidity. Regarding the economic 
significance, a one standard deviation shock in market liquidity based on the roll measure, for 
instance, is 27%, 77%, and 39% larger than a one standard deviation shock in credit rating 
bucket, maturity group, and amount outstanding quintile liquidity, respectively. This relation 
also holds for the other six liquidity measures. For industry liquidity, a one standard deviation 
shock in market liquidity is three times larger than a one standard deviation shock in industry 
liquidity. Hence, market liquidity is the most important source of commonality in liquidity as 
it has the overall highest economic significance.  
Summing up the results of Table 4.8, credit rating bucket, maturity group, amount 
outstanding quintile, and industry liquidity are additional sources of commonality in liquidity 
while market liquidity seems to play the most important role for commonality in liquidity. 
Overall, the results of Section 4.3 clearly document the existence of commonality in 
liquidity among US corporate bonds. Individual bonds’ comovement with market liquidity is 
driven by bond, firm, and industry characteristics related to supply- and demand-side effects. 
In addition, this section reveals that commonality in liquidity may also arise through individual 
bonds’ comovement with credit rating bucket, maturity group, amount outstanding quintile, 
or industry liquidity while market liquidity remains the most important source of liquidity 
comovement. 
  
                                                                                                                                               
55 Firms within the same three-digit SIC code range are defined as one industry. 
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Table 4.8: Alternative sources of commonality in liquidity 
  Trades Volume Turnover Depth Amihud Roll IQR 
    Panel A: Market + Rating liquidity innovations 
Conc. market 0.7082 *** 0.6053 *** 0.6040 *** 0.5472 *** 0.5318 *** 0.7593 *** 1.0901 ***
Lag market -0.0598   -0.0357   -0.0353   -0.0127   0.0639   0.0780 * 0.2354 ** 
Lead market -0.0830 ** 0.0011   0.0005   0.0117   0.0862 * -0.0290   0.1209   
Sum market 0.5654 *** 0.5707 *** 0.5692 *** 0.5463 *** 0.6820 *** 0.8083 *** 1.4464 ***
Conc. rating 0.2830 *** 0.2964 *** 0.2965 *** 0.2435 *** 0.1817 *** 0.1633 *** 0.2180 ***
Lag rating   0.0785 *** 0.0703 *** 0.0706 *** 0.0772 *** -0.0042   -0.0003   0.0411   
Lead rating 0.0987 *** 0.0213   0.0222   0.0243   0.0074   0.0586 ** 0.1298 * 
Sum rating 0.4603 *** 0.3880 *** 0.3893 *** 0.3451 *** 0.1849 *** 0.2216 *** 0.3889 ***
Adj. R2 2.10   1.76   1.75   1.27   3.06   1.67   2.26   
  Trades Volume Turnover Depth Amihud Roll IQR 
    Panel B: Market + Time to maturity liquidity innovations 
Conc. market 0.7033 *** 0.6311 *** 0.6318 *** 0.6212 *** 0.5909 *** 0.7534 *** 0.9513 ***
Lag market 0.0276   0.0136   0.0133   0.0830   0.0504   0.0506   0.2191 ** 
Lead market -0.0291   -0.0015   -0.0044   -0.0241   -0.0155   0.0667   0.2663 ***
Sum market 0.7017 *** 0.6432 *** 0.6407 *** 0.6801 *** 0.6258 *** 0.8707 *** 1.4367 ***
Conc. maturity 0.3297 *** 0.3162 *** 0.3157 *** 0.2149 *** 0.1281 *** 0.1937 *** 0.3642 ***
Lag maturity   0.0324   0.0742 ** 0.0759 ** 0.0190   0.0208   0.0366   0.0786   
Lead maturity 0.0769 ** 0.0466   0.0481   0.0645   0.0714 * 0.0103   -0.0284   
Sum maturity 0.4389 *** 0.4370 *** 0.4397 *** 0.2985 *** 0.2203 *** 0.2405 *** 0.4143 ***
Adj. R2 2.01   1.89   1.88   1.19   2.99   1.80   2.16   
    Panel C: Market + Amount outstanding liquidity innovations 
Conc. market 0.7338 *** 0.7458 *** 0.7459 *** 0.6546 *** 0.4813 *** 0.5415 *** 0.7774 ***
Lag market 0.0427   0.1036 ** 0.1038 ** 0.1155 ** 0.1188 ** 0.0780 * 0.3080 ***
Lead market 0.0336   0.0669   0.0680 * 0.0634   0.1007 ** 0.1284 *** 0.2138 ** 
Sum market 0.8101 *** 0.9163 *** 0.9177 *** 0.8335 *** 0.7009 *** 0.7480 *** 1.2992 ***
Conc. amount 0.1836 *** 0.1549 *** 0.1553 *** 0.1108 *** 0.1478 *** 0.2359 *** 0.4025 ***
Lag amount 0.0146   -0.0505 * -0.0505 * -0.0457   -0.0302   0.0491 * 0.0611   
Lead amount 0.0309   -0.0263   -0.0274   -0.0221   0.0048   -0.0061   0.0870   
Sum amount 0.2291 *** 0.0781   0.0774   0.0430   0.1224 ** 0.2789 *** 0.5506 ***
Adj. R2 2.04   1.76   1.75   1.29   2.98   1.68   2.43   
(Continued) 
 
 
 
4. Commonality in Liquidity in the US Corporate Bond Market 114 
 
Table 4.8: Alternative sources of commonality in liquidity 
    Panel D: Market + Industry liquidity innovations 
Conc. market 0.8989 *** 0.7813 *** 0.7795 *** 0.7226 *** 0.6728 *** 0.9180 *** 1.3392 ***
Lag market 0.0343   0.0209   0.0220   0.0563   0.0806 * 0.0911 *** 0.1692 ** 
Lead market -0.0069   -0.0165   -0.0155   0.0015   0.0655   0.0561   0.1816 ***
Sum market 0.9263 *** 0.7856 *** 0.7860 *** 0.7803 *** 0.8188 *** 1.0652 *** 1.6919 ***
Conc. industry 0.1304 *** 0.1623 *** 0.1629 *** 0.1152 *** 0.0088   0.0608 *** 0.0916 ***
Lag industry 0.0317 *** 0.0392 *** 0.0391 *** 0.0143   0.0094   0.0163   0.0400 * 
Lead industry 0.0474 *** 0.0498 *** 0.0496 *** 0.0393 *** 0.0018   -0.0075   0.0446 ** 
Sum industry 0.2095 *** 0.2513 *** 0.2517 *** 0.1688 *** 0.0200   0.0696 *** 0.1762 ***
Adj. R2 2.37   2.11   2.10   1.41   2.95   1.75   2.30   
Notes: The table reports the results of time-series regressions that relate daily individual bond liquidity 
innovations to the respective market, credit rating bucket, time to maturity group, amount outstanding quintile, 
and industry liquidity innovations for all bonds in the sample. In each individual regression, the market liquidity 
innovations are the averages of the respective liquidity measure for all bonds excluding the dependent variable 
bond, the credit rating bucket liquidity innovations are the credit rating bucket averages of the respective liquidity 
measure excluding the dependent variable bond using five credit rating buckets (AAA, AA, A, BBB, below BBB-
), the maturity group liquidity innovations are the maturity group averages of the respective liquidity measure 
excluding the dependent variable bond using three maturity groups (< 3 years, between 3 and 7 years, > 7 years), 
the amount outstanding quintile liquidity innovations are the amount outstanding quintile averages of the 
respective liquidity measure excluding the dependent variable bond, and the industry liquidity innovations are 
the three-digit SIC code industry averages of the respective liquidity measure excluding the dependent variable 
bond. Column 1 to 7 provide the results for the different liquidity measures. Trades is daily number of trades. 
Volume is the daily trading volume. Depth is the daily realized depth of each bond computed as the mean of 
daily buy and sell volume. Turnover is daily trading volume as a percentage of outstanding volume. Amihud is 
the Amihud measure. Roll is the roll measure. IQR is the inter quartile range. The liquidity measures (Amihud, 
Roll, inter quartile range) are computed as described in the Appendix. 
Cross-sectional averages of concurrent (Conc.), lagging (Lag), and leading (Lead) time-series slope coefficients 
of market, credit rating bucket, maturity group, amount outstanding quintile, and industry liquidity innovations 
are reported. Sum market/rating/maturity/amount/industry is the average sum of the concurrent, lagging, and 
leading coefficients of market, credit rating bucket, maturity group, amount outstanding quintile, and industry 
liquidity innovations. Adj. R2 is the cross-sectional average of adjusted R² statistics in percentage points. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Panel A shows the respective statistics where market and credit rating bucket liquidity innovations are used as 
explanatory variables. Panel B shows the respective statistics where market and maturity group liquidity 
innovations are used as explanatory variables. Panel C shows the respective statistics where market and amount 
outstanding quintile liquidity innovations are used as explanatory variables. Panel D shows the respective 
statistics where market and industry liquidity innovations are used as explanatory variables. The concurrent, 
lagging, and leading values of the market return, and the proportional daily change in dependent variable bond’s 
squared return (a measure of change in return volatility) are additional regressors; coefficients not reported. 
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4.4. Commonality in liquidity over time 
After documenting the existence and cross-sectional determinants of individual bonds’ 
comovement with market liquidity, this section focuses on the time-series variation of market-
wide commonality in liquidity. First, I describe the approach used to proxy for market-wide 
commonality in liquidity for US corporate bonds and show its evolution over time in Section 
4.4.1. Second, I present more detailed evidence on the determinants of market-wide 
commonality in liquidity over time in Section 4.4.2. 
4.4.1. Time-series evolution of commonality in liquidity 
The findings of the previous section show a high cross-sectional variation in commonality in 
liquidity for corporate bonds. For stocks, Kamara et al. (2008), Hameed et al. (2010), and 
Rösch and Kaserer (2013) document that market-wide commonality in liquidity also varies 
heavily over time. They find market-wide commonality in liquidity to be higher in times of 
financial stress. Considering the results of sharp liquidity dry-ups for corporate bonds during 
the financial crisis in 2008 reported by Friewald et al. (2012) and Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), 
I also expect market-wide commonality in liquidity of US corporate bonds to vary over time 
and to be higher in months with severe financial stress events. 
To analyze time-series variation in market-wide commonality in liquidity, I run a monthly 
single factor regression that relates individual bond liquidity innovations to market liquidity 
innovations for each bond that is traded on at least 75% of a month’s trading days 
, , ,       Mkt MktLiq t Liq Liq t t  (4.9) 
where , Liq t  are the respective residuals from Equation (4.1) and , MktLiq t  are the respective market 
averages of , Liq t  for all bonds excluding the dependent variable bond.56,57 Following Hameed 
et al. (2010), Karolyi et al. (2012), and Rösch and Kaserer (2013), I compute the monthly 
average R2 statistic of the bond-specific regressions from Equation (4.9) for each liquidity 
measure. A higher average R2 statistic indicates a higher market-wide commonality in 
liquidity. Figure 4.1 shows how market-wide commonality in liquidity based on the different 
liquidity measures evolves over time. 
                                                                                                                                               
56 The computation of residuals in Equation (4.1) is adjusted to the monthly frequency. Each month, I regress the 
natural logarithm of a bond’s liquidity measures on the respective one trading day lagging natural logarithm 
of the bond’s liquidity measures and day-of-the-week dummies. 
57 In the robustness section I also use the approach of Karolyi et al. (2012) and add one trading day leading and 
lagging values of the respective market liquidity innovations to Equation (4.9). 
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Figure 4.1: Commonality in liquidity over time 
 
Panel A: Trades, Volume, Turnover, and Depth commonality time series 
 
 
Panel B: Amihud, Roll, and IQR commonality time series 
 
(Continued) 
 
 
 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Trades Volume Turnover Depth
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
Amihud Roll IQR
 
 
4. Commonality in Liquidity in the US Corporate Bond Market 117 
 
Figure 4.1 (Continued): Commonality in liquidity over time 
 
Panel C: First principal component of commonality in liquidity measures 
 
 
Notes: The Figure shows commonality in liquidity over time for the period July 2002 to December 2012. Panels 
A and B show time-series plots of monthly cross-sectional averages of the R2 statistics of single factor regressions 
that relate daily individual bond liquidity innovations to the respective market liquidity innovations for all bonds 
in the sample. In each individual regression, the market liquidity innovations are the averages of the respective 
liquidity measure for all bonds excluding the dependent variable bond. Trades is the daily number of trades. 
Volume is the daily trading volume. Depth is the daily realized depth of each bond computed as the mean of 
daily buy and sell volume. Turnover is daily trading volume as a percentage of outstanding volume. Amihud is 
the Amihud measure. Roll is the roll measure. IQR is the inter quartile range. The liquidity measures (Amihud, 
Roll, inter quartile range) are computed as described in the Appendix. Panel A shows the time-series plots based 
on the liquidity measures Trades, Volume, Turnover, and Depth. Panel B shows the time-series plots based on 
the liquidity measures Amihud, Roll, and IQR. Panel C shows the time-series plot of the first principal component 
of the logistic transformation of the monthly cross-sectional averages of the R2 statistics of the liquidity measures. 
Panel A of Figure 4.1 shows the time-series evolution of average R2 statistics based on 
the Trades, Volume, Turnover, and Depth liquidity measure regressions. As expected, market-
wide commonality in liquidity varies heavily over time and peaks often may be linked to 
months with severe financial stress events. The time series peak in late 2006 (early 2007) when 
the awareness of a US housing price bubble rose among market participants (e.g., 
announcement of Freddie Mac not to buy more of the most risky subprime mortgages and 
mortgage-related securities on February 27). Further peaks are around the acquisition of Bear 
Stearns by JPMorgan (March 16, 2008) and the September 2008 turmoil (federal takeover of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on September 7, the acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of 
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America on September 14, and the Lehman default on September 15). Panel B of Figure 4.1 
shows the time-series evolution of average R2 statistics based on the Amihud, Roll, and IQR 
liquidity measure regressions. Although the time series seem to be more volatile, all time series 
show a similar pattern of peaks compared to Panel A of Figure 4.1. Finally, Panel C of Figure 
4.1 summarizes the common information of R2 statistics based on the seven liquidity measures. 
It describes the time-series evolution of the first principal component of the seven R2 statistic 
time series. Again, this time series shows a similar pattern of peaks as those in Panel A of 
Figure 4.1.58 Overall, Figure 4.1 shows that market-wide commonality in liquidity varies 
heavily over time and peaks in months with severe financial stress events. 
4.4.2. Time-series determinants of commonality in liquidity 
In this section, I extend the analysis of the R2 statistic time series from the previous section 
and try to identify the determinants of time-series variation. Recent evidence by Rösch and 
Kaserer (2013) suggests funding liquidity to be an important determinant of market-wide 
commonality in liquidity for German stocks. Considering the over-the-counter (OTC) market 
structure of the US corporate bond market, dealers are important in providing liquidity and 
arranging trades (Bessembinder et al., 2016). Thus, I expect funding liquidity to be a major 
determinant of market-wide commonality in liquidity for corporate bonds. Commonality is 
expected to be high when funding liquidity is low. Given the theoretical implications of 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), I expect this relation to be especially pronounced in times 
of financial stress. 
To test for the time-series determinants of market-wide commonality in liquidity, I run 
the following regression for monthly average R2 statistics resulting from Equation (4.9) based 
on the different liquidity measures 
 
2
Business Default2
Mkt Liq Funding Liq
ln ADS index default spread
1
market liquidity funding liquidity +
  
  
         
   
t
t
t
t t t
R
R   (4.10) 
where  2 2ln 1  t tR R  is the logistic transformation of the respective R2 statistic (e.g., Morck 
et al., 2000; Hameed et al., 2010; Karolyi et al., 2012; Rösch and Kaserer, 2013), ADS index 
                                                                                                                                               
58 I compute the first principal component using the logistic transformation  2 2ln 1  R R  of the R2 statistics. 
Again, the logistic transformation is used to obtain an unbounded variable (e.g., Hameed et al., 2010; Karolyi 
et al., 2012). 
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is the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index59, default spread is the difference 
between Moody’s Baa and Aaa yield, overall market liquidity is the first principal component 
of the monthly averages of the liquidity measures, and funding liquidity is the difference 
between the 90-day AA nonfinancial commercial paper interest rate and the three-month US 
Treasury bill rate as in Karolyi et al. (2012). Higher values of the ADS index indicate better 
economic conditions, higher values of the default spread indicate a more risky market 
environment and higher values of the market and funding liquidity proxies are associated with 
higher illiquidity. The ADS index controls for the overall state of the economy that might be 
related to market-wide commonality in liquidity since Rösch and Kaserer (2013) find 
commonality in liquidity to be higher during times of financial stress. I add the default spread 
to capture the overall corporate bond market conditions as market conditions are identified to 
drive market-wide commonality in liquidity (e.g., Hameed et al., 2010; Rösch and Kaserer, 
2013). Finally, market liquidity and funding liquidity capture the implications of the self-
reinforcing interplay of both measures proposed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). 
Overall, the proxies capture aggregate demand-side (e.g., correlated trading in times of 
financial stress) and supply-side effects (e.g., funding liquidity evaporating) potentially 
influencing market-wide commonality in liquidity. 
As seen in Section 4.3 and documented by the existing literature (e.g., Edwards et al., 
2007; Dick-Nielsen et al., 2012; Acharya et al., 2013), commonality in liquidity differs across 
credit rating buckets. For this reason, the influence of the above proxies on aggregate 
commonality in liquidity may also differ across credit rating buckets. Thus, I compute the first 
principal component of the logistic transformation of monthly average R2 statistics of the 
seven liquidity measures for seven different subsets of the sample: all bonds in the sample, all 
investment grade (IG) bonds, AAA-rated bonds, AA-rated bonds, A-rated bonds, BBB-rated 
bonds, and high yield (HY) bonds. Then, I regress the respective first principal component on 
the same explanatory variables as in Equation (4.10). Table 4.9 reports the results for the time-
series regressions based on Equation (4.10). 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
59 The index is based on Aruoba et al. (2009). I obtained its values from the following website: 
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/business-conditions-index. 
 
 
4. Commonality in Liquidity in the US Corporate Bond Market 120 
 
Table 4.9: Time-series analyses of commonality in liquidity 
Panel A: Commonality in liquidity determinants by liquidity measure 
  Trades Volume Turnover Depth Amihud Roll IQR 
ADS index 0.0473  0.0580 * 0.0582 * 0.0839 ** -0.0117  0.0030  0.0141  
  (0.1686) (0.0676) (0.0662) (0.0189) (0.7047) (0.9115) (0.7450) 
Default spread 0.1144 * 0.0977  0.0980  0.1370 * -0.0096  -0.0602  0.0140  
  (0.0931) (0.1751) (0.1716) (0.0539) (0.8418) (0.3712) (0.8306) 
Market liquidity 0.0085  0.0184  0.0184  0.0124  0.0190 ** 0.0186  0.0037  
  (0.5020) (0.1441) (0.1441) (0.3437) (0.0450) (0.1237) (0.7399) 
Funding liquidity 0.1550 ** 0.1378 ** 0.1378 ** 0.1593 *** 0.1200 *** 0.1068 * 0.2146 ***
  (0.0270) (0.0337) (0.0332) (0.0070) (0.0058) (0.0778) (0.0001) 
Constant -2.5144 *** -2.5745 *** -2.5750 *** -2.6205 *** -2.5486 *** -2.3706 *** -2.5258 ***
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
N 126 126 126 126 126 125 126 
Adj. R2 5.07 5.99 6.03 5.80 10.70 0.62 5.50 
Panel B: Commonality in liquidity determinants by credit rating bucket 
  Full Sample IG bonds AAA bonds AA bonds A bonds BBB bonds HY bonds 
ADS index 0.4778  0.4964  0.5857 *** 0.5261 ** 0.4686  0.3577  0.5355 ** 
  (0.1423) (0.1336) (0.0039) (0.0434) (0.1391) (0.2366) (0.0293) 
Default spread 0.9119  0.9978  0.7114  0.7108  1.1675 * 0.6237  0.4614  
  (0.1803) (0.1444) (0.1188) (0.2710) (0.0886) (0.2388) (0.3168) 
Market liquidity 0.1342  0.1065  -0.0162  0.0963  0.0477  0.1574  0.2211 * 
  (0.2804) (0.3729) (0.8447) (0.4342) (0.6741) (0.1197) (0.0764) 
Funding liquidity 1.8813 *** 1.8974 *** 0.4209  1.9142 *** 1.3680 *** 1.4680 *** 0.8526  
  (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.6479) (0.0015) (0.0083) (0.0089) (0.1726) 
Constant -1.2763 * -1.3743 ** -0.6925  -1.0297  -1.4740 ** -0.8965 * -0.5010  
  (0.0669) (0.0471) (0.1626) (0.1204) (0.0350) (0.0865) (0.3610) 
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 
Adj. R2 7.29 7.31 -0.38 5.89 5.10 6.33 3.42 
Notes: The table reports the results of regressions of commonality in liquidity on different market variables. In 
Panel A, commonality in liquidity is measured by monthly cross-sectional averages of the R2 statistics of single 
factor regressions that relate daily individual bond liquidity innovations to the respective market liquidity 
innovations for all bonds in the sample. I use the logistic transformation of cross-sectional averages of the R2 
statistic as dependent variable, determined as described in the main text in Section 4.4.2. Column 1 to 7 of Panel 
A show the results for commonality in liquidity based on the different liquidity measures as dependent variable. 
Trades is daily number of trades. Volume is the daily trading volume. Depth is the daily realized depth of each 
bond computed as the mean of daily buy and sell volume. Turnover is daily trading volume as a percentage of 
outstanding volume. Amihud is the Amihud measure. Roll is the roll measure. IQR is the inter quartile range. 
The liquidity measures (Amihud, Roll, inter quartile range) are computed as described in the Appendix. In Panel 
B, commonality in liquidity is measured as the first principal component of the logistic transformation of cross-
sectional averages of the R2 statistics of the different liquidity measures from Panel A for different credit rating 
buckets. Column 1 shows the results for all bonds in the sample. Column 2 shows the results for all investment 
grade (IG) bonds, i.e. bonds having a rating between AAA and BBB-. Column 3 to 6 show the results for all 
AAA- to BBB-rated bonds. Column 7 shows the results for all high yield (HY) bonds, i.e. bonds having a rating 
below BBB-. The explanatory market variables are the same in all regressions and are explained in the main text 
in Section 4.4.2. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. Significance is determined using Newey-West standard errors. Adjusted R² statistics are in 
percentage points. 
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Panel A of Table 4.9 shows the regression results of Equation (4.10) for the seven liquidity 
measures. ADS index is significant in three out of seven cases. Default spread is significant in 
two cases, and overall market liquidity is significant in one case. The strongest effect on 
market-wide commonality in liquidity has funding liquidity, being significant in all cases. This 
supports the theoretical prediction of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).  
Panel B of Table 4.9 presents the results of the detailed credit rating bucket analysis based 
on the first principal component of the commonality in liquidity measures and on Equation 
(4.10). The first column supports the finding from Panel A of Table 4.9, funding liquidity 
seems to be the most important determinant for the full sample. Digging deeper into the rating 
bucket cross-section, I find funding liquidity to be important for IG bonds, but not HY bonds. 
Thereby, funding liquidity does not determine commonality in liquidity of AAA-rated bonds. 
This may be due to investors’ flight-to-quality behavior induced by a funding liquidity shock. 
Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) find a flight-to-quality to AAA-rated bonds during the financial 
crisis 2008. This might counteract an overall flight-to-quality from corporate bonds to more 
safety assets, i.e. Treasury bonds, and lead to an insignificant effect for AAA-rated bonds. 
The results of Table 4.9 document that funding liquidity is an important determinant for 
corporate bonds’ market-wide commonality in liquidity. According to the theoretical model 
of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), this relation should be especially pronounced in times 
of financial stress. To test the impact of the above determinants in different market phases, the 
sample is split into two periods: July 2002 to February 2008 and March 2008 to December 
2012. The second period covers the period of ongoing financial stress beginning with the 
financial crisis in 2008 and leading to the European sovereign debt crisis starting in 2009. I 
consider March 2008 as the splitting month, since the acquisition of Bear Stearns by JPMorgan 
on March 16, 2008, first obviously reveals severe liquidity problems of financial firms. The 
sample split reduces the number of observations for the time-series analyses. To maintain 
sufficient degrees of freedom in the time-series regressions, I focus on the most important 
determinants from Table 4.9 as explanatory variables: ADS index, default spread, and funding 
liquidity. For brevity, I report only the results for the detailed credit rating bucket analysis 
based on the first principal component of R2 statistics of liquidity measures in Table 4.10. 
Panel A of Table 4.10 replicates the analysis from Panel B of Table 4.9. It documents that 
the results remain unchanged when I consider only the most important determinants from 
Table 4.9. Panel B of Table 4.10 presents the results for the sample period before March 2008.  
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Table 4.10: Financial stress and commonality in liquidity 
  Full Sample IG bonds AAA bonds AA bonds A bonds BBB bonds HY bonds 
Panel A: Full time series 
ADS index 0.4167  0.4479  0.5930 *** 0.4823 * 0.4469  0.2862  0.4349 * 
  (0.1979) (0.1705) (0.0023) (0.0591) (0.1539) (0.3381) (0.0988) 
Default spread 1.2024 * 1.2283 ** 0.6763  0.9191  1.2707 ** 0.9644 * 0.9400 ** 
  (0.0518) (0.0491) (0.1120) (0.1232) (0.0385) (0.0509) (0.0134) 
Funding liquidity 1.7594 *** 1.8007 *** 0.4356  1.8267 *** 1.3247 ** 1.3250 ** 0.6518  
  (0.0033) (0.0028) (0.6306) (0.0038) (0.0149) (0.0263) (0.3029) 
Constant -1.6213 *** -1.6481 *** -0.6509  -1.2771 ** -1.5966 *** -1.3011 *** -1.0694 ** 
  (0.0094) (0.0083) (0.1500) (0.0291) (0.0086) (0.0099) (0.0101) 
N 125 
Adj. R2 7.13 7.48 0.43 6.05 5.76 5.49 0.78 
Panel B: Before March 2008 
ADS index 0.7391  0.8671  0.6703 * 0.8412 * 0.7666  0.5398  0.1208  
  (0.2069) (0.1367) (0.0997) (0.0824) (0.1900) (0.3140) (0.8317) 
Default spread 3.3003 ** 3.3532 ** 1.2174  3.2981 *** 3.0600 ** 2.5654 ** 2.2281  
  (0.0203) (0.0134) (0.2362) (0.0099) (0.0184) (0.0219) (0.1510) 
Funding liquidity 0.9237  0.9188  -0.6387  1.1020 * 0.4723  0.2296  1.0984 ** 
  (0.1480) (0.1897) (0.5483) (0.0939) (0.4462) (0.6918) (0.0499) 
Constant -3.1803 ** -3.2090 ** -0.9086  -3.1990 *** -2.8567 ** -2.3769 ** -2.3046 * 
  (0.0153) (0.0117) (0.3272) (0.0076) (0.0209) (0.0114) (0.0865) 
N 67 
Adj. R2 2.81 3.13 -1.32 5.27 1.51 0.57 2.05 
Panel C: From March 2008 
ADS index 0.4944  0.4973  0.8227 ** 0.5343 * 0.5060  0.3915  0.5576 ** 
  (0.1556) (0.1643) (0.0224) (0.0748) (0.1369) (0.2884) (0.0444) 
Default spread 1.4311 ** 1.4142 ** 0.5400  1.0725 * 1.4051 ** 1.1731 ** 1.5368 ***
  (0.0234) (0.0244) (0.3606) (0.0889) (0.0222) (0.0207) (0.0019) 
Funding liquidity 2.3556 ** 2.4156 ** 2.2051 *** 2.3347 ** 1.9378 ** 2.3301 *** -0.1134  
  (0.0192) (0.0139) (0.0011) (0.0344) (0.0270) (0.0069) (0.9144) 
Constant -2.2534 *** -2.2404 *** -0.7129  -1.7046 ** -2.1152 *** -1.9451 *** -1.8144 ** 
  (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.3355) (0.0149) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0125) 
N 58 
Adj. R2 15.66 16.40 7.84 11.91 12.37 15.73 4.24 
Notes: The table reports the results of regressions of commonality in liquidity on different market variables for 
different sample periods. Commonality in liquidity is measured as the first principal component of the logistic 
transformation of cross-sectional averages of the R2 statistics of single factor regressions that relate daily 
individual bond liquidity innovations to the respective market liquidity innovations for the different liquidity 
measures. The first principal component is computed for different credit rating buckets. Column 1 shows the 
results for all bonds in the sample. Column 2 shows the results for all investment grade (IG) bonds, i.e. bonds 
having a rating between AAA and BBB-. Column 3 to 6 show the results for all AAA- to BBB-rated bonds. 
Column 7 shows the results for all high yield (HY) bonds, i.e. bonds having a rating below BBB-. Panel A shows 
results for the full sample period, Panel B shows results for the period before March 2008, and Panel C shows 
results for the period from March 2008 until December 2012. The explanatory market variables are the same in 
all regressions and are explained in the main text in Section 4.4.2. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Significance is determined using Newey-
West standard errors. Adjusted R² statistics are in percentage points. 
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Higher market-wide risk is related to higher commonality in liquidity, the default spread has 
a positive significant impact when considering the full sample, IG bonds, AA-rated bonds, A-
rated bonds, and BBB-rated bonds. Funding liquidity has only a minor impact. This finding is 
consistent with demand-side explanations of correlated trading theories (e.g., Bernardo and 
Welch, 2004; Vayanos, 2004). Panel C of Table 4.10 documents the determinants of 
commonality in liquidity for the period after February 2008. In line with Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009), funding liquidity is the most important determinant for this period. 
Overall, this section shows that demand- and supply-side effects determine market-wide 
commonality in liquidity. Thereby, the time-series results provide evidence on supply-side 
effects being more important. Commonality In liquidity is high, when funding liquidity is 
evaporating. This relation is especially pronounced since the financial crisis in 2008. 
4.5. Robustness 
This section provides various robustness tests. In Section 4.5.1, I check for the robustness of 
the cross-sectional results by modifying the method described in Equation (4.1) and (4.2) or 
considering subsets of the bond sample. In Section 4.5.2, I test the robustness of the time-
series results by varying funding liquidity and market liquidity proxies, and modifying the 
method described in Equation (4.9). 
4.5.1. Cross-sectional robustness analyses 
Table 4.11 provides results for the robustness of Table 4.2. First, I change the time-series 
regression in Equation (4.2) to not include the market return control variables and the 
dependent variable bond’s squared return as in Karolyi et al. (2012) (Panel A of Table 4.11). 
Next, I reduce the sample to often traded bonds. I compute commonality in liquidity for bonds 
that are traded on at least 75% of their possible trading days (Panel B of Table 4.11). A further 
robustness test changes the way of the computation of liquidity innovations in Equation (4.1)
. Instead of running yearly bond-specific regressions, I add yearly dummies to Equation (4.1)
, run one regression for each bond, and then compute commonality in liquidity based on these 
innovations (Panel C of Table 4.11). Then, I use the previously computed innovations and run 
the regression in Equation (4.2) not yearly but once for the full sample period for each bond 
(Panel D of Table 4.11). Finally, I average each liquidity measure for all bonds of the same  
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Table 4.11: Cross-sectional robustness analyses of commonality in liquidity 
  Trades Volume Turnover Depth Amihud Roll IQR 
    Panel A: Karolyi et al. (2012) model 
Concurrent 1.0059 *** 0.9696 *** 0.9684 *** 0.8930 *** 0.7793 *** 0.9667 *** 1.3868 ***
% + significant 0.2101   0.1615   0.1611   0.1456   0.0785   0.1472   0.1372   
Sum 1.1057 *** 1.0796 *** 1.0796 *** 1.0295 *** 0.9205 *** 1.1179 *** 1.9215 ***
Adj. R2 1.40   0.98   0.98   0.89   0.66   1.28   1.57   
    Panel B: Only bonds with high trading frequency 
Concurrent 1.4780 *** 1.3026 *** 1.3029 *** 1.1295 *** 0.9788 *** 1.3381 *** 1.2777 ***
% + significant 0.4464   0.3159   0.3153   0.2858   0.1318   0.2695   0.1926   
Sum 1.6096 *** 1.5310 *** 1.5313 *** 1.3497 *** 1.1461 *** 1.3765 *** 2.0225 ***
Adj. R2 3.41   2.43   2.41   2.14   2.10   1.64   2.09   
    Panel C: Alternative liquidity innovations computation 
Concurrent 1.0835 *** 1.0028 *** 1.0025 *** 0.8968 *** 0.8223 *** 0.9553 *** 1.4129 ***
% + significant 0.2170   0.1612   0.1618   0.1452   0.0974   0.1481   0.1641   
Sum 1.1792 *** 1.1173 *** 1.1175 *** 1.0421 *** 1.0824 *** 1.1109 *** 2.1391 ***
Adj. R2 2.67   1.77   1.77   1.23   3.24   1.50   4.43   
    Panel D: Full sample commonality in liquidity 
Concurrent 0.9680 *** 0.9117 *** 0.9095 *** 0.8263 *** 0.7727 *** 0.7817 *** 1.3300 ***
% + significant 0.3569   0.3161   0.3161   0.2754   0.1589   0.2449   0.3076   
Sum 1.0236 *** 1.0770 *** 1.0780 *** 1.0485 *** 0.9303 *** 0.9590 *** 1.6629 ***
Adj. R2 8.13   7.78   7.78   7.27   9.38   7.49   10.68   
    Panel E: Firm Sample 
Concurrent 0.7813 *** 0.7691 *** 0.7676 *** 0.7353 *** 0.5640 *** 0.4063 *** 0.6320 ***
% + significant 0.2374   0.2305   0.2264   0.2060   0.1184   0.0787   0.1078   
Sum 0.9455 *** 0.9455 *** 0.9413 *** 0.9259 *** 0.7304 *** 0.6409 *** 1.0899 ***
Adj. R2 10.17   10.06   9.94   9.89   9.89   9.62   11.27   
Notes: The table reports robustness results of time-series regressions that relate daily individual bond liquidity 
innovations to the respective market liquidity innovations. In each individual regression, the market liquidity 
innovations are the averages of the respective liquidity measure for all bonds excluding the dependent variable 
bond. Column 1 to 7 provide the results for the different liquidity measures. Trades is daily number of trades. 
Volume is the daily trading volume. Depth is the daily realized depth of each bond computed as the mean of 
daily buy and sell volume. Turnover is daily trading volume as a percentage of outstanding volume. Amihud is 
the Amihud measure. Roll is the roll measure. IQR is the inter quartile range. The liquidity measures (Amihud, 
Roll, inter quartile range) are computed as described in the Appendix 4.A. 
Cross-sectional averages of the concurrent time-series slope coefficients of market liquidity innovations and the 
average sum of the concurrent, lagging, and leading coefficients of market liquidity innovations are reported. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. "% + significant" gives the 
percentage of positive concurrent slope coefficients with p-values smaller than 5%. Adj. R2 is the cross-sectional 
average of adjusted R² statistics in percentage points. 
Panel A shows the results of time-series regressions with concurrent, leading, and lagging market liquidity 
innovations being the only explanatory variable as in Karolyi et al. (2012). Panel B to E show the results of time-
series regressions where concurrent, lagging, and leading values of market liquidity innovations; concurrent, 
lagging, and leading values of the market return, and the proportional daily change in dependent variable bond’s 
squared return (a measure of change in return volatility) are regressors. Panel B shows results based on bonds 
that are traded on more than 75% of their possible trading days. Panel C shows results based on liquidity 
innovations computed for the full sample period. Panel D shows results where only one time-series regression is 
computed per bond. Panel E shows results where liquidity measures are aggregated per firm. 
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firm and compute firm-specific commonality in liquidity using the regression model from 
Equation (4.2) (Panel E of Table 4.11). 
Panels A to E of Table 4.11 documents that commonality in liquidity exists irrespective 
of how it is measured or which sample subsets are considered. In Panel A of Table 4.11 the 
results indicate the existence of commonality in liquidity not being driven by the market return 
and individual bonds’ squared returns. Concurrent coefficients and the respective sum of 
coefficients are positive and highly statistically significant. Panel B of Table 4.11 shows that 
commonality in liquidity is even stronger among bonds that are traded frequently. Coefficients 
are roughly 40% higher relative to Table 4.2. Commonality in liquidity also exists when 
modifying the way liquidity innovations are computed (Panel C of Table 4.11) and when 
Equation (4.2) is run for the full time series of each bond (Panel D of Table 4.11). The last 
panel, Panel E of Table 4.11, suggest that commonality in liquidity also exists on an aggregate 
firm level. Thus, my findings are robust with respect to the used method and bond sample. 
4.5.2. Time-series robustness analyses 
In Table 4.12, I provide robustness results of the time-series analyses in Panel B of Table 4.9. 
First, I use an alternative funding liquidity proxy, the TED spread (Panel A of Table 4.12). It 
is defined as the difference between the three-month USD Libor and the three-month US 
Treasury bill rate (Fontaine and Garcia, 2012). Again, a higher value indicates higher funding 
illiquidity. Second, I use an alternative proxy for market liquidity associated with investor 
sentiment. Ben-Rephael et al. (2012) and Da et al. (2015) find equity mutual fund outflows 
and bond mutual fund inflows to be related to bad investor sentiment consistent with investors’ 
flight-to-quality. In line with the theoretical predictions of Vayanos (2004), inflows to bond 
funds should increase the liquidity of the overall bond market of which corporate bonds are a 
subgroup. Hence, I use net flows to equity, bond, and money market mutual funds as indirect 
market liquidity proxies (Panel B of Table 4.12).60 Finally, I extend the regression model in 
Equation (4.9) to include leading and lagging market liquidity innovations as in Karolyi et al. 
(2012) in Panel C of Table 4.12. 
Panel A of Table 4.12 shows that the time-series results are robust to the alternative 
funding liquidity proxy. As the US commercial paper spread in Panel B of Table 4.9, the  
  
                                                                                                                                               
60 I obtain the fund flows from the Investment Company Institute (ICI) (2015). According to the Investment 
Company Institute (ICI) (2015) the three used mutual fund categories cover 91% of US mutual fund assets. 
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Table 4.12: Time-series robustness analyses of commonality in liquidity 
  Full Sample IG bonds AAA bonds AA bonds A bonds BBB bonds HY bonds
 Panel A: Funding liquidity proxied by the TED spread 
ADS index 0.4566  0.4871  0.5930 *** 0.5281 * 0.4297  0.3832  0.4425 * 
  (0.1837) (0.1629) (0.0058) (0.0637) (0.1916) (0.2236) (0.0941) 
Default spread 0.7174  0.7952  0.6614  0.5005  1.0385  0.4499  0.4172  
  (0.3494) (0.2995) (0.1841) (0.4975) (0.1686) (0.4330) (0.4104) 
Market liquidity 0.1280  0.1017  -0.0162  0.0927  0.0404  0.1574  0.2085 * 
  (0.3155) (0.4082) (0.8424) (0.4674) (0.7276) (0.1224) (0.0895) 
Funding liquidity 0.9315 *** 0.9751 *** 0.2441  1.0171 *** 0.6080 ** 0.8504 *** 0.1765  
  (0.0074) (0.0048) (0.6092) (0.0065) (0.0450) (0.0043) (0.7159) 
Constant -1.0921  -1.1929  -0.6557  -0.8508  -1.3317 * -0.7680  -0.3875  
  (0.1494) (0.1121) (0.2167) (0.2448) (0.0722) (0.1695) (0.4930) 
N 125
Adj. R2 5.36 5.52 -0.45 3.87 3.66 5.63 2.25
 Panel B: Market liquidity proxied by net mutual fund flows 
ADS index 0.3528  0.4047  0.6314 *** 0.4320 * 0.4030  0.2339  0.2797  
  (0.2670) (0.1957) (0.0009) (0.0980) (0.1617) (0.4249) (0.4007) 
Default spread 0.4314  0.5658  0.8442  0.3686  0.5693  0.2937  0.0591  
  (0.4803) (0.3559) (0.1372) (0.6039) (0.3058) (0.5974) (0.9305) 
Equity flow -2.0124 * -1.8067 * 0.2590  -1.4029  -1.9131 ** -1.7457 * -1.8061 * 
  (0.0716) (0.0984) (0.7142) (0.1984) (0.0457) (0.0990) (0.0922) 
Bond flow -0.9155 *** -0.9243 *** -0.1567  -0.5875 * -0.9521 *** -0.7279 ** -0.2900  
  (0.0074) (0.0066) (0.5417) (0.0753) (0.0033) (0.0148) (0.2783) 
Money mkt. flow -0.2706  -0.2216  0.0514  -0.1930  -0.2113  -0.1840  -0.4815 **
  (0.2782) (0.3723) (0.7598) (0.3355) (0.3599) (0.4249) (0.0185) 
Funding liquidity 1.6255 ** 1.5703 ** 0.2436  1.7748 *** 1.0477 * 1.1431 * 1.3766 * 
  (0.0150) (0.0196) (0.8013) (0.0047) (0.0939) (0.0670) (0.0802) 
Constant -0.2249  -0.3359  -0.6958  -0.3293  -0.2065  -0.0922  -0.1905  
  (0.7646) (0.6539) (0.2986) (0.7086) (0.7577) (0.8913) (0.8159) 
N 125
Adj. R2 12.81 13.14 -1.29 8.13 12.59 9.70 5.39
 
 Panel C: Karolyi et al. (2012) model
ADS index 0.3240  0.2498  0.3504 * -0.1024  0.2989  0.3890  0.5931 * 
  (0.3275) (0.4510) (0.0950) (0.7190) (0.3593) (0.2302) (0.0715) 
Default spread 0.1810  0.1232  0.6217  -0.3651  0.1923  0.2826  0.1740  
  (0.8023) (0.8657) (0.1393) (0.6198) (0.7788) (0.6295) (0.7862) 
Market liquidity 0.2599 * 0.2420 * 0.1344  0.1877 * 0.2364 * 0.2056 * 0.3141 ***
  (0.0520) (0.0647) (0.1144) (0.0976) (0.0548) (0.0639) (0.0049) 
Funding liquidity 2.0164 *** 1.9770 *** -0.5118  1.1536 * 1.9564 *** 2.2447 *** 0.7955  
  (0.0019) (0.0030) (0.5618) (0.0884) (0.0014) (0.0000) (0.2114) 
Constant -0.5030  -0.4571  -0.4751  0.1494  -0.5145  -0.6476  -0.1246  
  (0.5150) (0.5559) (0.3204) (0.8490) (0.4808) (0.2938) (0.8555) 
N 125
Adj. R2 6.66 6.45 2.19 2.87 6.76 9.73 5.24
Notes: The table reports the results of regressions of commonality in liquidity on different market variables for 
different sample periods. Commonality in liquidity is measured as the first principal component of the logistic 
transformation of cross-sectional averages of the R2 statistics of single factor regressions that relate daily 
individual bond liquidity innovations to the respective market liquidity innovations for the different liquidity 
measures. The first principal component is computed for different credit rating buckets. Column 1 shows the 
results for all bonds in the sample. Column 2 shows the results for all investment grade (IG) bonds, i.e. bonds 
having a rating between AAA and BBB-. Column 3 to 6 show the results for all AAA- to BBB-rated bonds. 
Column 7 shows the results for all high yield (HY) bonds, i.e. bonds having a rating below BBB-. 
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Table 4.12 (Continued): Time-series robustness analyses of commonality in liquidity 
Panel A shows results using the TED spread as alternative funding liquidity proxy, Panel B shows results using 
mutual fund flows as alternative market liquidity proxies, and Panel C shows results using the method of Karolyi 
et al. (2012) adding leading and lagging market liquidity innovations to Equation (4.9). 
The further explanatory market variables are the same in all regressions and explained in the main text in Section 
4.4.2. 
P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Significance is determined using Newey-West standard errors. Adjusted R² statistics are in 
percentage points. 
TED spread is significant in five out of seven cases. Considering mutual fund flows in Panel 
B of Table 4.12, I find equity mutual fund outflows to be significantly related to higher 
commonality in liquidity in 5 out of 7 cases, but with low significance. This finding might 
indicate overall investors’ flight-to-quality into Treasury bonds. In line with the intuition of 
bond mutual fund flows being a market liquidity proxy, bond mutual fund inflows significantly 
decrease commonality in liquidity. Finally, Panel C of Table 4.12 shows that the results in 
Panel B of Table 4.9 are robust to using an alternative approach to measure commonality in 
liquidity. 
Overall, Section 4.5 provides support for the robustness of the cross-sectional and time-
series results documented in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4. 
4.6. Conclusion 
This paper documents the existence and determinants of commonality in liquidity among US 
corporate bonds. Bonds’ individual liquidity depends strongly on market liquidity. Individual 
bonds’ dependence on market liquidity is determined by bond, firm, and industry 
characteristics related to supply- and demand-side effects. The analyses also shed light on 
further sources of commonality in liquidity. They identify a bond’s credit rating bucket, 
maturity, amount outstanding, and industry liquidity to be additional sources of commonality 
in liquidity while market liquidity is the most important source of commonality in liquidity. 
Time-series results document a high variation of market-wide commonality in liquidity 
over time. Peaks may be related to important events disrupting markets. Consistent with the 
literature, the analyses reveal that funding liquidity is the most important determinant. 
Summing up, the results contribute to the literature by providing a detailed picture of 
commonality in liquidity among corporate bonds. The results are highly relevant as 
commonality in liquidity decisively determines investors’ diversification benefits across 
corporate bonds and issuers financing costs.  
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4.A. Description of liquidity measures 
In this appendix I describe the liquidity measures used in this paper in more detail. The 
liquidity measures are number of trades (Trades), trading volume (Volume), turnover 
(Turnover), realized depth (Depth), Amihud measure (Amihud), Roll measure (Roll), and the 
inter-quartile range (IQR). 
Following Friewald et al. (2012), number of trades is the sum of trades for one bond on 
each trading day. Trade volume is the sum of trade sizes for one bond on each trading day. 
Higher values of both measures should indicate higher liquidity. As in Dick-Nielsen et al. 
(2012) I use turnover as a further liquidity measure. Turnover is a bond’s daily trade volume 
relative to its outstanding volume. Again, a higher turnover should indicate higher liquidity. 
In line with the given intuition, Friewald et al. (2012) find corporate bond yield spreads to be 
lower for higher number of trades and higher trade volumes. Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) show 
that yield spreads are lower for bonds with higher turnover. Hence, the empirical evidence 
suggests that these measures convey information on corporate bond liquidity. 
Due to the OTC market structure of the US corporate bond market, it is not possible to 
observe a limit order book as for centralized markets such as the New York Stock Exchange. 
Thus, computing the quoted depth as in Chordia et al. (2000) is not possible for corporate 
bonds. However, I am able to separate each bond’s trading volume in customer buys, customer 
sells, and dealer trades. Thus, I roughly approximate a bond’s market depth by computing its 
realized depth. Similar to Chordia et al. (2000), I define the realized depth as the mean of a 
bond’s daily buy and sell volume.61 Higher values of realized depth indicate higher liquidity. 
Although bid and ask quotes in OTC markets are not observable, Roll (1984), Han and 
Zhou (2007), and Pu (2009) developed measures to approximate the (effective) bid-ask spread. 
Roll (1984) proxies for the effective bid-ask spread by making use of the negative auto-
covariance of an asset’s consecutive returns. Similar to Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) and 
Schestag et al. (2016), I compute daily values of this measure for the relative effective bid-ask 
spread as follows 
 12 , r , t i iRoll Cov r  (4.11) 
                                                                                                                                               
61 To be in line with the quoted depth in Chordia et al. (2000), I implicitly assume that daily buys and daily sells 
of a bond are settled at the same price, respectively. 
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 is the return of the i-th trade.  1, r i iCov r  is set to 0 if it is larger than 0. A 
daily Roll measure is computed using a 21-trading-day rolling window. Higher values of the 
Roll measure indicate lower liquidity as shown by Bao et al. (2011), Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), 
and Friewald et al. (2012). 
An alternative measure to approximate the relative bid-ask spread is the inter-quartile 
range (IQR). This measure was introduced by Han/Zhou (2007) and Pu (2009) and is defined 
as the ratio of the difference between the upper and lower quartile of a bond’s trade prices on 
day t to its average trade price on day t: 
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P
 (4.12) 
The measure is computed for all trading days of a bond with at least three trades. A higher 
inter quartile range indicates lower liquidity (see, e.g., Han and Zhou, 2007 and Pu, 2009). 
Finally, I approximate the daily price impact of trades by the modified Amihud (2002) 
measure used in Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012). This measure proxies the price impact of a trade 
by relating the return to the trading volume of a trade 
1
1 ,

 tN it
it i
r
Amihud
N V
  (4.13) 
where tN  is the number of returns on day t and iV  is the trading volume of the i-th trade. For 
bonds with a higher Amihud measure price movements are stronger given the same trading 
volume. Thus, bonds with a higher Amihud measure are less liquid. Friewald et al. (2012) and 
Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) show empirical evidence for this intuition. 
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